From d7129803488e81e6df691161b774908bf801e527 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Niall Sheridan Date: Wed, 28 Dec 2016 14:54:57 +0000 Subject: Add LetsEncrypt support When configured the server will request a TLS certificate for the specified server name from LetsEncrypt --- vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/acme.go | 946 +++++++++++++++++++++ .../golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/autocert.go | 793 +++++++++++++++++ vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/cache.go | 130 +++ .../golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/renewal.go | 125 +++ vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/jws.go | 153 ++++ vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/types.go | 209 +++++ vendor/vendor.json | 12 + 7 files changed, 2368 insertions(+) create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/acme.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/autocert.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/cache.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/renewal.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/jws.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/types.go (limited to 'vendor') diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/acme.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/acme.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8aafada --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/acme.go @@ -0,0 +1,946 @@ +// Copyright 2015 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// Package acme provides an implementation of the +// Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME) spec. +// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-acme-acme-02 for details. +// +// Most common scenarios will want to use autocert subdirectory instead, +// which provides automatic access to certificates from Let's Encrypt +// and any other ACME-based CA. +// +// This package is a work in progress and makes no API stability promises. +package acme + +import ( + "bytes" + "crypto" + "crypto/ecdsa" + "crypto/elliptic" + "crypto/rand" + "crypto/sha256" + "crypto/tls" + "crypto/x509" + "encoding/base64" + "encoding/hex" + "encoding/json" + "encoding/pem" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" + "io/ioutil" + "math/big" + "net/http" + "strconv" + "strings" + "sync" + "time" + + "golang.org/x/net/context" + "golang.org/x/net/context/ctxhttp" +) + +// LetsEncryptURL is the Directory endpoint of Let's Encrypt CA. +const LetsEncryptURL = "https://acme-v01.api.letsencrypt.org/directory" + +const ( + maxChainLen = 5 // max depth and breadth of a certificate chain + maxCertSize = 1 << 20 // max size of a certificate, in bytes +) + +// CertOption is an optional argument type for Client methods which manipulate +// certificate data. +type CertOption interface { + privateCertOpt() +} + +// WithKey creates an option holding a private/public key pair. +// The private part signs a certificate, and the public part represents the signee. +func WithKey(key crypto.Signer) CertOption { + return &certOptKey{key} +} + +type certOptKey struct { + key crypto.Signer +} + +func (*certOptKey) privateCertOpt() {} + +// WithTemplate creates an option for specifying a certificate template. +// See x509.CreateCertificate for template usage details. +// +// In TLSSNIxChallengeCert methods, the template is also used as parent, +// resulting in a self-signed certificate. +// The DNSNames field of t is always overwritten for tls-sni challenge certs. +func WithTemplate(t *x509.Certificate) CertOption { + return (*certOptTemplate)(t) +} + +type certOptTemplate x509.Certificate + +func (*certOptTemplate) privateCertOpt() {} + +// Client is an ACME client. +// The only required field is Key. An example of creating a client with a new key +// is as follows: +// +// key, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048) +// if err != nil { +// log.Fatal(err) +// } +// client := &Client{Key: key} +// +type Client struct { + // Key is the account key used to register with a CA and sign requests. + // Key.Public() must return a *rsa.PublicKey or *ecdsa.PublicKey. + Key crypto.Signer + + // HTTPClient optionally specifies an HTTP client to use + // instead of http.DefaultClient. + HTTPClient *http.Client + + // DirectoryURL points to the CA directory endpoint. + // If empty, LetsEncryptURL is used. + // Mutating this value after a successful call of Client's Discover method + // will have no effect. + DirectoryURL string + + dirMu sync.Mutex // guards writes to dir + dir *Directory // cached result of Client's Discover method +} + +// Discover performs ACME server discovery using c.DirectoryURL. +// +// It caches successful result. So, subsequent calls will not result in +// a network round-trip. This also means mutating c.DirectoryURL after successful call +// of this method will have no effect. +func (c *Client) Discover(ctx context.Context) (Directory, error) { + c.dirMu.Lock() + defer c.dirMu.Unlock() + if c.dir != nil { + return *c.dir, nil + } + + dirURL := c.DirectoryURL + if dirURL == "" { + dirURL = LetsEncryptURL + } + res, err := ctxhttp.Get(ctx, c.HTTPClient, dirURL) + if err != nil { + return Directory{}, err + } + defer res.Body.Close() + if res.StatusCode != http.StatusOK { + return Directory{}, responseError(res) + } + + var v struct { + Reg string `json:"new-reg"` + Authz string `json:"new-authz"` + Cert string `json:"new-cert"` + Revoke string `json:"revoke-cert"` + Meta struct { + Terms string `json:"terms-of-service"` + Website string `json:"website"` + CAA []string `json:"caa-identities"` + } + } + if json.NewDecoder(res.Body).Decode(&v); err != nil { + return Directory{}, err + } + c.dir = &Directory{ + RegURL: v.Reg, + AuthzURL: v.Authz, + CertURL: v.Cert, + RevokeURL: v.Revoke, + Terms: v.Meta.Terms, + Website: v.Meta.Website, + CAA: v.Meta.CAA, + } + return *c.dir, nil +} + +// CreateCert requests a new certificate using the Certificate Signing Request csr encoded in DER format. +// The exp argument indicates the desired certificate validity duration. CA may issue a certificate +// with a different duration. +// If the bundle argument is true, the returned value will also contain the CA (issuer) certificate chain. +// +// In the case where CA server does not provide the issued certificate in the response, +// CreateCert will poll certURL using c.FetchCert, which will result in additional round-trips. +// In such scenario the caller can cancel the polling with ctx. +// +// CreateCert returns an error if the CA's response or chain was unreasonably large. +// Callers are encouraged to parse the returned value to ensure the certificate is valid and has the expected features. +func (c *Client) CreateCert(ctx context.Context, csr []byte, exp time.Duration, bundle bool) (der [][]byte, certURL string, err error) { + if _, err := c.Discover(ctx); err != nil { + return nil, "", err + } + + req := struct { + Resource string `json:"resource"` + CSR string `json:"csr"` + NotBefore string `json:"notBefore,omitempty"` + NotAfter string `json:"notAfter,omitempty"` + }{ + Resource: "new-cert", + CSR: base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(csr), + } + now := timeNow() + req.NotBefore = now.Format(time.RFC3339) + if exp > 0 { + req.NotAfter = now.Add(exp).Format(time.RFC3339) + } + + res, err := postJWS(ctx, c.HTTPClient, c.Key, c.dir.CertURL, req) + if err != nil { + return nil, "", err + } + defer res.Body.Close() + if res.StatusCode != http.StatusCreated { + return nil, "", responseError(res) + } + + curl := res.Header.Get("location") // cert permanent URL + if res.ContentLength == 0 { + // no cert in the body; poll until we get it + cert, err := c.FetchCert(ctx, curl, bundle) + return cert, curl, err + } + // slurp issued cert and CA chain, if requested + cert, err := responseCert(ctx, c.HTTPClient, res, bundle) + return cert, curl, err +} + +// FetchCert retrieves already issued certificate from the given url, in DER format. +// It retries the request until the certificate is successfully retrieved, +// context is cancelled by the caller or an error response is received. +// +// The returned value will also contain the CA (issuer) certificate if the bundle argument is true. +// +// FetchCert returns an error if the CA's response or chain was unreasonably large. +// Callers are encouraged to parse the returned value to ensure the certificate is valid +// and has expected features. +func (c *Client) FetchCert(ctx context.Context, url string, bundle bool) ([][]byte, error) { + for { + res, err := ctxhttp.Get(ctx, c.HTTPClient, url) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + defer res.Body.Close() + if res.StatusCode == http.StatusOK { + return responseCert(ctx, c.HTTPClient, res, bundle) + } + if res.StatusCode > 299 { + return nil, responseError(res) + } + d := retryAfter(res.Header.Get("retry-after"), 3*time.Second) + select { + case <-time.After(d): + // retry + case <-ctx.Done(): + return nil, ctx.Err() + } + } +} + +// RevokeCert revokes a previously issued certificate cert, provided in DER format. +// +// The key argument, used to sign the request, must be authorized +// to revoke the certificate. It's up to the CA to decide which keys are authorized. +// For instance, the key pair of the certificate may be authorized. +// If the key is nil, c.Key is used instead. +func (c *Client) RevokeCert(ctx context.Context, key crypto.Signer, cert []byte, reason CRLReasonCode) error { + if _, err := c.Discover(ctx); err != nil { + return err + } + + body := &struct { + Resource string `json:"resource"` + Cert string `json:"certificate"` + Reason int `json:"reason"` + }{ + Resource: "revoke-cert", + Cert: base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(cert), + Reason: int(reason), + } + if key == nil { + key = c.Key + } + res, err := postJWS(ctx, c.HTTPClient, key, c.dir.RevokeURL, body) + if err != nil { + return err + } + defer res.Body.Close() + if res.StatusCode != http.StatusOK { + return responseError(res) + } + return nil +} + +// AcceptTOS always returns true to indicate the acceptance of a CA's Terms of Service +// during account registration. See Register method of Client for more details. +func AcceptTOS(tosURL string) bool { return true } + +// Register creates a new account registration by following the "new-reg" flow. +// It returns registered account. The a argument is not modified. +// +// The registration may require the caller to agree to the CA's Terms of Service (TOS). +// If so, and the account has not indicated the acceptance of the terms (see Account for details), +// Register calls prompt with a TOS URL provided by the CA. Prompt should report +// whether the caller agrees to the terms. To always accept the terms, the caller can use AcceptTOS. +func (c *Client) Register(ctx context.Context, a *Account, prompt func(tosURL string) bool) (*Account, error) { + if _, err := c.Discover(ctx); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + var err error + if a, err = c.doReg(ctx, c.dir.RegURL, "new-reg", a); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + var accept bool + if a.CurrentTerms != "" && a.CurrentTerms != a.AgreedTerms { + accept = prompt(a.CurrentTerms) + } + if accept { + a.AgreedTerms = a.CurrentTerms + a, err = c.UpdateReg(ctx, a) + } + return a, err +} + +// GetReg retrieves an existing registration. +// The url argument is an Account URI. +func (c *Client) GetReg(ctx context.Context, url string) (*Account, error) { + a, err := c.doReg(ctx, url, "reg", nil) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + a.URI = url + return a, nil +} + +// UpdateReg updates an existing registration. +// It returns an updated account copy. The provided account is not modified. +func (c *Client) UpdateReg(ctx context.Context, a *Account) (*Account, error) { + uri := a.URI + a, err := c.doReg(ctx, uri, "reg", a) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + a.URI = uri + return a, nil +} + +// Authorize performs the initial step in an authorization flow. +// The caller will then need to choose from and perform a set of returned +// challenges using c.Accept in order to successfully complete authorization. +// +// If an authorization has been previously granted, the CA may return +// a valid authorization (Authorization.Status is StatusValid). If so, the caller +// need not fulfill any challenge and can proceed to requesting a certificate. +func (c *Client) Authorize(ctx context.Context, domain string) (*Authorization, error) { + if _, err := c.Discover(ctx); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + type authzID struct { + Type string `json:"type"` + Value string `json:"value"` + } + req := struct { + Resource string `json:"resource"` + Identifier authzID `json:"identifier"` + }{ + Resource: "new-authz", + Identifier: authzID{Type: "dns", Value: domain}, + } + res, err := postJWS(ctx, c.HTTPClient, c.Key, c.dir.AuthzURL, req) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + defer res.Body.Close() + if res.StatusCode != http.StatusCreated { + return nil, responseError(res) + } + + var v wireAuthz + if err := json.NewDecoder(res.Body).Decode(&v); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: invalid response: %v", err) + } + if v.Status != StatusPending && v.Status != StatusValid { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: unexpected status: %s", v.Status) + } + return v.authorization(res.Header.Get("Location")), nil +} + +// GetAuthorization retrieves an authorization identified by the given URL. +// +// If a caller needs to poll an authorization until its status is final, +// see the WaitAuthorization method. +func (c *Client) GetAuthorization(ctx context.Context, url string) (*Authorization, error) { + res, err := ctxhttp.Get(ctx, c.HTTPClient, url) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + defer res.Body.Close() + if res.StatusCode != http.StatusOK && res.StatusCode != http.StatusAccepted { + return nil, responseError(res) + } + var v wireAuthz + if err := json.NewDecoder(res.Body).Decode(&v); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: invalid response: %v", err) + } + return v.authorization(url), nil +} + +// RevokeAuthorization relinquishes an existing authorization identified +// by the given URL. +// The url argument is an Authorization.URI value. +// +// If successful, the caller will be required to obtain a new authorization +// using the Authorize method before being able to request a new certificate +// for the domain associated with the authorization. +// +// It does not revoke existing certificates. +func (c *Client) RevokeAuthorization(ctx context.Context, url string) error { + req := struct { + Resource string `json:"resource"` + Status string `json:"status"` + Delete bool `json:"delete"` + }{ + Resource: "authz", + Status: "deactivated", + Delete: true, + } + res, err := postJWS(ctx, c.HTTPClient, c.Key, url, req) + if err != nil { + return err + } + defer res.Body.Close() + if res.StatusCode != http.StatusOK { + return responseError(res) + } + return nil +} + +// WaitAuthorization polls an authorization at the given URL +// until it is in one of the final states, StatusValid or StatusInvalid, +// or the context is done. +// +// It returns a non-nil Authorization only if its Status is StatusValid. +// In all other cases WaitAuthorization returns an error. +// If the Status is StatusInvalid, the returned error is ErrAuthorizationFailed. +func (c *Client) WaitAuthorization(ctx context.Context, url string) (*Authorization, error) { + var count int + sleep := func(v string, inc int) error { + count += inc + d := backoff(count, 10*time.Second) + d = retryAfter(v, d) + wakeup := time.NewTimer(d) + defer wakeup.Stop() + select { + case <-ctx.Done(): + return ctx.Err() + case <-wakeup.C: + return nil + } + } + + for { + res, err := ctxhttp.Get(ctx, c.HTTPClient, url) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + retry := res.Header.Get("retry-after") + if res.StatusCode != http.StatusOK && res.StatusCode != http.StatusAccepted { + res.Body.Close() + if err := sleep(retry, 1); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + continue + } + var raw wireAuthz + err = json.NewDecoder(res.Body).Decode(&raw) + res.Body.Close() + if err != nil { + if err := sleep(retry, 0); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + continue + } + if raw.Status == StatusValid { + return raw.authorization(url), nil + } + if raw.Status == StatusInvalid { + return nil, ErrAuthorizationFailed + } + if err := sleep(retry, 0); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + } +} + +// GetChallenge retrieves the current status of an challenge. +// +// A client typically polls a challenge status using this method. +func (c *Client) GetChallenge(ctx context.Context, url string) (*Challenge, error) { + res, err := ctxhttp.Get(ctx, c.HTTPClient, url) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + defer res.Body.Close() + if res.StatusCode != http.StatusOK && res.StatusCode != http.StatusAccepted { + return nil, responseError(res) + } + v := wireChallenge{URI: url} + if err := json.NewDecoder(res.Body).Decode(&v); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: invalid response: %v", err) + } + return v.challenge(), nil +} + +// Accept informs the server that the client accepts one of its challenges +// previously obtained with c.Authorize. +// +// The server will then perform the validation asynchronously. +func (c *Client) Accept(ctx context.Context, chal *Challenge) (*Challenge, error) { + auth, err := keyAuth(c.Key.Public(), chal.Token) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + req := struct { + Resource string `json:"resource"` + Type string `json:"type"` + Auth string `json:"keyAuthorization"` + }{ + Resource: "challenge", + Type: chal.Type, + Auth: auth, + } + res, err := postJWS(ctx, c.HTTPClient, c.Key, chal.URI, req) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + defer res.Body.Close() + // Note: the protocol specifies 200 as the expected response code, but + // letsencrypt seems to be returning 202. + if res.StatusCode != http.StatusOK && res.StatusCode != http.StatusAccepted { + return nil, responseError(res) + } + + var v wireChallenge + if err := json.NewDecoder(res.Body).Decode(&v); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: invalid response: %v", err) + } + return v.challenge(), nil +} + +// DNS01ChallengeRecord returns a DNS record value for a dns-01 challenge response. +// A TXT record containing the returned value must be provisioned under +// "_acme-challenge" name of the domain being validated. +// +// The token argument is a Challenge.Token value. +func (c *Client) DNS01ChallengeRecord(token string) (string, error) { + ka, err := keyAuth(c.Key.Public(), token) + if err != nil { + return "", err + } + b := sha256.Sum256([]byte(ka)) + return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(b[:]), nil +} + +// HTTP01ChallengeResponse returns the response for an http-01 challenge. +// Servers should respond with the value to HTTP requests at the URL path +// provided by HTTP01ChallengePath to validate the challenge and prove control +// over a domain name. +// +// The token argument is a Challenge.Token value. +func (c *Client) HTTP01ChallengeResponse(token string) (string, error) { + return keyAuth(c.Key.Public(), token) +} + +// HTTP01ChallengePath returns the URL path at which the response for an http-01 challenge +// should be provided by the servers. +// The response value can be obtained with HTTP01ChallengeResponse. +// +// The token argument is a Challenge.Token value. +func (c *Client) HTTP01ChallengePath(token string) string { + return "/.well-known/acme-challenge/" + token +} + +// TLSSNI01ChallengeCert creates a certificate for TLS-SNI-01 challenge response. +// Servers can present the certificate to validate the challenge and prove control +// over a domain name. +// +// The implementation is incomplete in that the returned value is a single certificate, +// computed only for Z0 of the key authorization. ACME CAs are expected to update +// their implementations to use the newer version, TLS-SNI-02. +// For more details on TLS-SNI-01 see https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-acme-acme-01#section-7.3. +// +// The token argument is a Challenge.Token value. +// If a WithKey option is provided, its private part signs the returned cert, +// and the public part is used to specify the signee. +// If no WithKey option is provided, a new ECDSA key is generated using P-256 curve. +// +// The returned certificate is valid for the next 24 hours and must be presented only when +// the server name of the client hello matches exactly the returned name value. +func (c *Client) TLSSNI01ChallengeCert(token string, opt ...CertOption) (cert tls.Certificate, name string, err error) { + ka, err := keyAuth(c.Key.Public(), token) + if err != nil { + return tls.Certificate{}, "", err + } + b := sha256.Sum256([]byte(ka)) + h := hex.EncodeToString(b[:]) + name = fmt.Sprintf("%s.%s.acme.invalid", h[:32], h[32:]) + cert, err = tlsChallengeCert([]string{name}, opt) + if err != nil { + return tls.Certificate{}, "", err + } + return cert, name, nil +} + +// TLSSNI02ChallengeCert creates a certificate for TLS-SNI-02 challenge response. +// Servers can present the certificate to validate the challenge and prove control +// over a domain name. For more details on TLS-SNI-02 see +// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-acme-acme-03#section-7.3. +// +// The token argument is a Challenge.Token value. +// If a WithKey option is provided, its private part signs the returned cert, +// and the public part is used to specify the signee. +// If no WithKey option is provided, a new ECDSA key is generated using P-256 curve. +// +// The returned certificate is valid for the next 24 hours and must be presented only when +// the server name in the client hello matches exactly the returned name value. +func (c *Client) TLSSNI02ChallengeCert(token string, opt ...CertOption) (cert tls.Certificate, name string, err error) { + b := sha256.Sum256([]byte(token)) + h := hex.EncodeToString(b[:]) + sanA := fmt.Sprintf("%s.%s.token.acme.invalid", h[:32], h[32:]) + + ka, err := keyAuth(c.Key.Public(), token) + if err != nil { + return tls.Certificate{}, "", err + } + b = sha256.Sum256([]byte(ka)) + h = hex.EncodeToString(b[:]) + sanB := fmt.Sprintf("%s.%s.ka.acme.invalid", h[:32], h[32:]) + + cert, err = tlsChallengeCert([]string{sanA, sanB}, opt) + if err != nil { + return tls.Certificate{}, "", err + } + return cert, sanA, nil +} + +// doReg sends all types of registration requests. +// The type of request is identified by typ argument, which is a "resource" +// in the ACME spec terms. +// +// A non-nil acct argument indicates whether the intention is to mutate data +// of the Account. Only Contact and Agreement of its fields are used +// in such cases. +func (c *Client) doReg(ctx context.Context, url string, typ string, acct *Account) (*Account, error) { + req := struct { + Resource string `json:"resource"` + Contact []string `json:"contact,omitempty"` + Agreement string `json:"agreement,omitempty"` + }{ + Resource: typ, + } + if acct != nil { + req.Contact = acct.Contact + req.Agreement = acct.AgreedTerms + } + res, err := postJWS(ctx, c.HTTPClient, c.Key, url, req) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + defer res.Body.Close() + if res.StatusCode < 200 || res.StatusCode > 299 { + return nil, responseError(res) + } + + var v struct { + Contact []string + Agreement string + Authorizations string + Certificates string + } + if err := json.NewDecoder(res.Body).Decode(&v); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: invalid response: %v", err) + } + var tos string + if v := linkHeader(res.Header, "terms-of-service"); len(v) > 0 { + tos = v[0] + } + var authz string + if v := linkHeader(res.Header, "next"); len(v) > 0 { + authz = v[0] + } + return &Account{ + URI: res.Header.Get("Location"), + Contact: v.Contact, + AgreedTerms: v.Agreement, + CurrentTerms: tos, + Authz: authz, + Authorizations: v.Authorizations, + Certificates: v.Certificates, + }, nil +} + +func responseCert(ctx context.Context, client *http.Client, res *http.Response, bundle bool) ([][]byte, error) { + b, err := ioutil.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(res.Body, maxCertSize+1)) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: response stream: %v", err) + } + if len(b) > maxCertSize { + return nil, errors.New("acme: certificate is too big") + } + cert := [][]byte{b} + if !bundle { + return cert, nil + } + + // Append CA chain cert(s). + // At least one is required according to the spec: + // https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-acme-acme-03#section-6.3.1 + up := linkHeader(res.Header, "up") + if len(up) == 0 { + return nil, errors.New("acme: rel=up link not found") + } + if len(up) > maxChainLen { + return nil, errors.New("acme: rel=up link is too large") + } + for _, url := range up { + cc, err := chainCert(ctx, client, url, 0) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + cert = append(cert, cc...) + } + return cert, nil +} + +// responseError creates an error of Error type from resp. +func responseError(resp *http.Response) error { + // don't care if ReadAll returns an error: + // json.Unmarshal will fail in that case anyway + b, _ := ioutil.ReadAll(resp.Body) + e := struct { + Status int + Type string + Detail string + }{ + Status: resp.StatusCode, + } + if err := json.Unmarshal(b, &e); err != nil { + // this is not a regular error response: + // populate detail with anything we received, + // e.Status will already contain HTTP response code value + e.Detail = string(b) + if e.Detail == "" { + e.Detail = resp.Status + } + } + return &Error{ + StatusCode: e.Status, + ProblemType: e.Type, + Detail: e.Detail, + Header: resp.Header, + } +} + +// chainCert fetches CA certificate chain recursively by following "up" links. +// Each recursive call increments the depth by 1, resulting in an error +// if the recursion level reaches maxChainLen. +// +// First chainCert call starts with depth of 0. +func chainCert(ctx context.Context, client *http.Client, url string, depth int) ([][]byte, error) { + if depth >= maxChainLen { + return nil, errors.New("acme: certificate chain is too deep") + } + + res, err := ctxhttp.Get(ctx, client, url) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + defer res.Body.Close() + if res.StatusCode != http.StatusOK { + return nil, responseError(res) + } + b, err := ioutil.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(res.Body, maxCertSize+1)) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if len(b) > maxCertSize { + return nil, errors.New("acme: certificate is too big") + } + chain := [][]byte{b} + + uplink := linkHeader(res.Header, "up") + if len(uplink) > maxChainLen { + return nil, errors.New("acme: certificate chain is too large") + } + for _, up := range uplink { + cc, err := chainCert(ctx, client, up, depth+1) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + chain = append(chain, cc...) + } + + return chain, nil +} + +// postJWS signs the body with the given key and POSTs it to the provided url. +// The body argument must be JSON-serializable. +func postJWS(ctx context.Context, client *http.Client, key crypto.Signer, url string, body interface{}) (*http.Response, error) { + nonce, err := fetchNonce(ctx, client, url) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + b, err := jwsEncodeJSON(body, key, nonce) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return ctxhttp.Post(ctx, client, url, "application/jose+json", bytes.NewReader(b)) +} + +func fetchNonce(ctx context.Context, client *http.Client, url string) (string, error) { + resp, err := ctxhttp.Head(ctx, client, url) + if err != nil { + return "", nil + } + defer resp.Body.Close() + enc := resp.Header.Get("replay-nonce") + if enc == "" { + return "", errors.New("acme: nonce not found") + } + return enc, nil +} + +// linkHeader returns URI-Reference values of all Link headers +// with relation-type rel. +// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5988#section-5 for details. +func linkHeader(h http.Header, rel string) []string { + var links []string + for _, v := range h["Link"] { + parts := strings.Split(v, ";") + for _, p := range parts { + p = strings.TrimSpace(p) + if !strings.HasPrefix(p, "rel=") { + continue + } + if v := strings.Trim(p[4:], `"`); v == rel { + links = append(links, strings.Trim(parts[0], "<>")) + } + } + } + return links +} + +// retryAfter parses a Retry-After HTTP header value, +// trying to convert v into an int (seconds) or use http.ParseTime otherwise. +// It returns d if v cannot be parsed. +func retryAfter(v string, d time.Duration) time.Duration { + if i, err := strconv.Atoi(v); err == nil { + return time.Duration(i) * time.Second + } + t, err := http.ParseTime(v) + if err != nil { + return d + } + return t.Sub(timeNow()) +} + +// backoff computes a duration after which an n+1 retry iteration should occur +// using truncated exponential backoff algorithm. +// +// The n argument is always bounded between 0 and 30. +// The max argument defines upper bound for the returned value. +func backoff(n int, max time.Duration) time.Duration { + if n < 0 { + n = 0 + } + if n > 30 { + n = 30 + } + var d time.Duration + if x, err := rand.Int(rand.Reader, big.NewInt(1000)); err == nil { + d = time.Duration(x.Int64()) * time.Millisecond + } + d += time.Duration(1< max { + return max + } + return d +} + +// keyAuth generates a key authorization string for a given token. +func keyAuth(pub crypto.PublicKey, token string) (string, error) { + th, err := JWKThumbprint(pub) + if err != nil { + return "", err + } + return fmt.Sprintf("%s.%s", token, th), nil +} + +// tlsChallengeCert creates a temporary certificate for TLS-SNI challenges +// with the given SANs and auto-generated public/private key pair. +// To create a cert with a custom key pair, specify WithKey option. +func tlsChallengeCert(san []string, opt []CertOption) (tls.Certificate, error) { + var ( + key crypto.Signer + tmpl *x509.Certificate + ) + for _, o := range opt { + switch o := o.(type) { + case *certOptKey: + if key != nil { + return tls.Certificate{}, errors.New("acme: duplicate key option") + } + key = o.key + case *certOptTemplate: + var t = *(*x509.Certificate)(o) // shallow copy is ok + tmpl = &t + default: + // package's fault, if we let this happen: + panic(fmt.Sprintf("unsupported option type %T", o)) + } + } + if key == nil { + var err error + if key, err = ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader); err != nil { + return tls.Certificate{}, err + } + } + if tmpl == nil { + tmpl = &x509.Certificate{ + SerialNumber: big.NewInt(1), + NotBefore: time.Now(), + NotAfter: time.Now().Add(24 * time.Hour), + BasicConstraintsValid: true, + KeyUsage: x509.KeyUsageKeyEncipherment, + } + } + tmpl.DNSNames = san + + der, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, tmpl, tmpl, key.Public(), key) + if err != nil { + return tls.Certificate{}, err + } + return tls.Certificate{ + Certificate: [][]byte{der}, + PrivateKey: key, + }, nil +} + +// encodePEM returns b encoded as PEM with block of type typ. +func encodePEM(typ string, b []byte) []byte { + pb := &pem.Block{Type: typ, Bytes: b} + return pem.EncodeToMemory(pb) +} + +// timeNow is useful for testing for fixed current time. +var timeNow = time.Now diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/autocert.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/autocert.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4b15816 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/autocert.go @@ -0,0 +1,793 @@ +// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// Package autocert provides automatic access to certificates from Let's Encrypt +// and any other ACME-based CA. +// +// This package is a work in progress and makes no API stability promises. +package autocert + +import ( + "bytes" + "crypto" + "crypto/ecdsa" + "crypto/elliptic" + "crypto/rand" + "crypto/rsa" + "crypto/tls" + "crypto/x509" + "crypto/x509/pkix" + "encoding/pem" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" + mathrand "math/rand" + "net/http" + "strconv" + "strings" + "sync" + "time" + + "golang.org/x/crypto/acme" + "golang.org/x/net/context" +) + +// pseudoRand is safe for concurrent use. +var pseudoRand *lockedMathRand + +func init() { + src := mathrand.NewSource(timeNow().UnixNano()) + pseudoRand = &lockedMathRand{rnd: mathrand.New(src)} +} + +// AcceptTOS always returns true to indicate the acceptance of a CA Terms of Service +// during account registration. +func AcceptTOS(tosURL string) bool { return true } + +// HostPolicy specifies which host names the Manager is allowed to respond to. +// It returns a non-nil error if the host should be rejected. +// The returned error is accessible via tls.Conn.Handshake and its callers. +// See Manager's HostPolicy field and GetCertificate method docs for more details. +type HostPolicy func(ctx context.Context, host string) error + +// HostWhitelist returns a policy where only the specified host names are allowed. +// Only exact matches are currently supported. Subdomains, regexp or wildcard +// will not match. +func HostWhitelist(hosts ...string) HostPolicy { + whitelist := make(map[string]bool, len(hosts)) + for _, h := range hosts { + whitelist[h] = true + } + return func(_ context.Context, host string) error { + if !whitelist[host] { + return errors.New("acme/autocert: host not configured") + } + return nil + } +} + +// defaultHostPolicy is used when Manager.HostPolicy is not set. +func defaultHostPolicy(context.Context, string) error { + return nil +} + +// Manager is a stateful certificate manager built on top of acme.Client. +// It obtains and refreshes certificates automatically, +// as well as providing them to a TLS server via tls.Config. +// +// A simple usage example: +// +// m := autocert.Manager{ +// Prompt: autocert.AcceptTOS, +// HostPolicy: autocert.HostWhitelist("example.org"), +// } +// s := &http.Server{ +// Addr: ":https", +// TLSConfig: &tls.Config{GetCertificate: m.GetCertificate}, +// } +// s.ListenAndServeTLS("", "") +// +// To preserve issued certificates and improve overall performance, +// use a cache implementation of Cache. For instance, DirCache. +type Manager struct { + // Prompt specifies a callback function to conditionally accept a CA's Terms of Service (TOS). + // The registration may require the caller to agree to the CA's TOS. + // If so, Manager calls Prompt with a TOS URL provided by the CA. Prompt should report + // whether the caller agrees to the terms. + // + // To always accept the terms, the callers can use AcceptTOS. + Prompt func(tosURL string) bool + + // Cache optionally stores and retrieves previously-obtained certificates. + // If nil, certs will only be cached for the lifetime of the Manager. + // + // Manager passes the Cache certificates data encoded in PEM, with private/public + // parts combined in a single Cache.Put call, private key first. + Cache Cache + + // HostPolicy controls which domains the Manager will attempt + // to retrieve new certificates for. It does not affect cached certs. + // + // If non-nil, HostPolicy is called before requesting a new cert. + // If nil, all hosts are currently allowed. This is not recommended, + // as it opens a potential attack where clients connect to a server + // by IP address and pretend to be asking for an incorrect host name. + // Manager will attempt to obtain a certificate for that host, incorrectly, + // eventually reaching the CA's rate limit for certificate requests + // and making it impossible to obtain actual certificates. + // + // See GetCertificate for more details. + HostPolicy HostPolicy + + // RenewBefore optionally specifies how early certificates should + // be renewed before they expire. + // + // If zero, they're renewed 1 week before expiration. + RenewBefore time.Duration + + // Client is used to perform low-level operations, such as account registration + // and requesting new certificates. + // If Client is nil, a zero-value acme.Client is used with acme.LetsEncryptURL + // directory endpoint and a newly-generated ECDSA P-256 key. + // + // Mutating the field after the first call of GetCertificate method will have no effect. + Client *acme.Client + + // Email optionally specifies a contact email address. + // This is used by CAs, such as Let's Encrypt, to notify about problems + // with issued certificates. + // + // If the Client's account key is already registered, Email is not used. + Email string + + // ForceRSA makes the Manager generate certificates with 2048-bit RSA keys. + // + // If false, a default is used. Currently the default + // is EC-based keys using the P-256 curve. + ForceRSA bool + + clientMu sync.Mutex + client *acme.Client // initialized by acmeClient method + + stateMu sync.Mutex + state map[string]*certState // keyed by domain name + + // tokenCert is keyed by token domain name, which matches server name + // of ClientHello. Keys always have ".acme.invalid" suffix. + tokenCertMu sync.RWMutex + tokenCert map[string]*tls.Certificate + + // renewal tracks the set of domains currently running renewal timers. + // It is keyed by domain name. + renewalMu sync.Mutex + renewal map[string]*domainRenewal +} + +// GetCertificate implements the tls.Config.GetCertificate hook. +// It provides a TLS certificate for hello.ServerName host, including answering +// *.acme.invalid (TLS-SNI) challenges. All other fields of hello are ignored. +// +// If m.HostPolicy is non-nil, GetCertificate calls the policy before requesting +// a new cert. A non-nil error returned from m.HostPolicy halts TLS negotiation. +// The error is propagated back to the caller of GetCertificate and is user-visible. +// This does not affect cached certs. See HostPolicy field description for more details. +func (m *Manager) GetCertificate(hello *tls.ClientHelloInfo) (*tls.Certificate, error) { + name := hello.ServerName + if name == "" { + return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: missing server name") + } + + // check whether this is a token cert requested for TLS-SNI challenge + if strings.HasSuffix(name, ".acme.invalid") { + m.tokenCertMu.RLock() + defer m.tokenCertMu.RUnlock() + if cert := m.tokenCert[name]; cert != nil { + return cert, nil + } + if cert, err := m.cacheGet(name); err == nil { + return cert, nil + } + // TODO: cache error results? + return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme/autocert: no token cert for %q", name) + } + + // regular domain + name = strings.TrimSuffix(name, ".") // golang.org/issue/18114 + cert, err := m.cert(name) + if err == nil { + return cert, nil + } + if err != ErrCacheMiss { + return nil, err + } + + // first-time + ctx := context.Background() // TODO: use a deadline? + if err := m.hostPolicy()(ctx, name); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + cert, err = m.createCert(ctx, name) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + m.cachePut(name, cert) + return cert, nil +} + +// cert returns an existing certificate either from m.state or cache. +// If a certificate is found in cache but not in m.state, the latter will be filled +// with the cached value. +func (m *Manager) cert(name string) (*tls.Certificate, error) { + m.stateMu.Lock() + if s, ok := m.state[name]; ok { + m.stateMu.Unlock() + s.RLock() + defer s.RUnlock() + return s.tlscert() + } + defer m.stateMu.Unlock() + cert, err := m.cacheGet(name) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + signer, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer) + if !ok { + return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: private key cannot sign") + } + if m.state == nil { + m.state = make(map[string]*certState) + } + s := &certState{ + key: signer, + cert: cert.Certificate, + leaf: cert.Leaf, + } + m.state[name] = s + go m.renew(name, s.key, s.leaf.NotAfter) + return cert, nil +} + +// cacheGet always returns a valid certificate, or an error otherwise. +func (m *Manager) cacheGet(domain string) (*tls.Certificate, error) { + if m.Cache == nil { + return nil, ErrCacheMiss + } + // TODO: might want to define a cache timeout on m + ctx := context.Background() + data, err := m.Cache.Get(ctx, domain) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + // private + priv, pub := pem.Decode(data) + if priv == nil || !strings.Contains(priv.Type, "PRIVATE") { + return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: no private key found in cache") + } + privKey, err := parsePrivateKey(priv.Bytes) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + // public + var pubDER [][]byte + for len(pub) > 0 { + var b *pem.Block + b, pub = pem.Decode(pub) + if b == nil { + break + } + pubDER = append(pubDER, b.Bytes) + } + if len(pub) > 0 { + return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: invalid public key") + } + + // verify and create TLS cert + leaf, err := validCert(domain, pubDER, privKey) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + tlscert := &tls.Certificate{ + Certificate: pubDER, + PrivateKey: privKey, + Leaf: leaf, + } + return tlscert, nil +} + +func (m *Manager) cachePut(domain string, tlscert *tls.Certificate) error { + if m.Cache == nil { + return nil + } + + // contains PEM-encoded data + var buf bytes.Buffer + + // private + switch key := tlscert.PrivateKey.(type) { + case *ecdsa.PrivateKey: + if err := encodeECDSAKey(&buf, key); err != nil { + return err + } + case *rsa.PrivateKey: + b := x509.MarshalPKCS1PrivateKey(key) + pb := &pem.Block{Type: "RSA PRIVATE KEY", Bytes: b} + if err := pem.Encode(&buf, pb); err != nil { + return err + } + default: + return errors.New("acme/autocert: unknown private key type") + } + + // public + for _, b := range tlscert.Certificate { + pb := &pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: b} + if err := pem.Encode(&buf, pb); err != nil { + return err + } + } + + // TODO: might want to define a cache timeout on m + ctx := context.Background() + return m.Cache.Put(ctx, domain, buf.Bytes()) +} + +func encodeECDSAKey(w io.Writer, key *ecdsa.PrivateKey) error { + b, err := x509.MarshalECPrivateKey(key) + if err != nil { + return err + } + pb := &pem.Block{Type: "EC PRIVATE KEY", Bytes: b} + return pem.Encode(w, pb) +} + +// createCert starts the domain ownership verification and returns a certificate +// for that domain upon success. +// +// If the domain is already being verified, it waits for the existing verification to complete. +// Either way, createCert blocks for the duration of the whole process. +func (m *Manager) createCert(ctx context.Context, domain string) (*tls.Certificate, error) { + // TODO: maybe rewrite this whole piece using sync.Once + state, err := m.certState(domain) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + // state may exist if another goroutine is already working on it + // in which case just wait for it to finish + if !state.locked { + state.RLock() + defer state.RUnlock() + return state.tlscert() + } + + // We are the first; state is locked. + // Unblock the readers when domain ownership is verified + // and the we got the cert or the process failed. + defer state.Unlock() + state.locked = false + + der, leaf, err := m.authorizedCert(ctx, state.key, domain) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + state.cert = der + state.leaf = leaf + go m.renew(domain, state.key, state.leaf.NotAfter) + return state.tlscert() +} + +// certState returns a new or existing certState. +// If a new certState is returned, state.exist is false and the state is locked. +// The returned error is non-nil only in the case where a new state could not be created. +func (m *Manager) certState(domain string) (*certState, error) { + m.stateMu.Lock() + defer m.stateMu.Unlock() + if m.state == nil { + m.state = make(map[string]*certState) + } + // existing state + if state, ok := m.state[domain]; ok { + return state, nil + } + + // new locked state + var ( + err error + key crypto.Signer + ) + if m.ForceRSA { + key, err = rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048) + } else { + key, err = ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader) + } + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + state := &certState{ + key: key, + locked: true, + } + state.Lock() // will be unlocked by m.certState caller + m.state[domain] = state + return state, nil +} + +// authorizedCert starts domain ownership verification process and requests a new cert upon success. +// The key argument is the certificate private key. +func (m *Manager) authorizedCert(ctx context.Context, key crypto.Signer, domain string) (der [][]byte, leaf *x509.Certificate, err error) { + // TODO: make m.verify retry or retry m.verify calls here + if err := m.verify(ctx, domain); err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + client, err := m.acmeClient(ctx) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + csr, err := certRequest(key, domain) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + der, _, err = client.CreateCert(ctx, csr, 0, true) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + leaf, err = validCert(domain, der, key) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + return der, leaf, nil +} + +// verify starts a new identifier (domain) authorization flow. +// It prepares a challenge response and then blocks until the authorization +// is marked as "completed" by the CA (either succeeded or failed). +// +// verify returns nil iff the verification was successful. +func (m *Manager) verify(ctx context.Context, domain string) error { + client, err := m.acmeClient(ctx) + if err != nil { + return err + } + + // start domain authorization and get the challenge + authz, err := client.Authorize(ctx, domain) + if err != nil { + return err + } + // maybe don't need to at all + if authz.Status == acme.StatusValid { + return nil + } + + // pick a challenge: prefer tls-sni-02 over tls-sni-01 + // TODO: consider authz.Combinations + var chal *acme.Challenge + for _, c := range authz.Challenges { + if c.Type == "tls-sni-02" { + chal = c + break + } + if c.Type == "tls-sni-01" { + chal = c + } + } + if chal == nil { + return errors.New("acme/autocert: no supported challenge type found") + } + + // create a token cert for the challenge response + var ( + cert tls.Certificate + name string + ) + switch chal.Type { + case "tls-sni-01": + cert, name, err = client.TLSSNI01ChallengeCert(chal.Token) + case "tls-sni-02": + cert, name, err = client.TLSSNI02ChallengeCert(chal.Token) + default: + err = fmt.Errorf("acme/autocert: unknown challenge type %q", chal.Type) + } + if err != nil { + return err + } + m.putTokenCert(name, &cert) + defer func() { + // verification has ended at this point + // don't need token cert anymore + go m.deleteTokenCert(name) + }() + + // ready to fulfill the challenge + if _, err := client.Accept(ctx, chal); err != nil { + return err + } + // wait for the CA to validate + _, err = client.WaitAuthorization(ctx, authz.URI) + return err +} + +// putTokenCert stores the cert under the named key in both m.tokenCert map +// and m.Cache. +func (m *Manager) putTokenCert(name string, cert *tls.Certificate) { + m.tokenCertMu.Lock() + defer m.tokenCertMu.Unlock() + if m.tokenCert == nil { + m.tokenCert = make(map[string]*tls.Certificate) + } + m.tokenCert[name] = cert + m.cachePut(name, cert) +} + +// deleteTokenCert removes the token certificate for the specified domain name +// from both m.tokenCert map and m.Cache. +func (m *Manager) deleteTokenCert(name string) { + m.tokenCertMu.Lock() + defer m.tokenCertMu.Unlock() + delete(m.tokenCert, name) + if m.Cache != nil { + m.Cache.Delete(context.Background(), name) + } +} + +// renew starts a cert renewal timer loop, one per domain. +// +// The loop is scheduled in two cases: +// - a cert was fetched from cache for the first time (wasn't in m.state) +// - a new cert was created by m.createCert +// +// The key argument is a certificate private key. +// The exp argument is the cert expiration time (NotAfter). +func (m *Manager) renew(domain string, key crypto.Signer, exp time.Time) { + m.renewalMu.Lock() + defer m.renewalMu.Unlock() + if m.renewal[domain] != nil { + // another goroutine is already on it + return + } + if m.renewal == nil { + m.renewal = make(map[string]*domainRenewal) + } + dr := &domainRenewal{m: m, domain: domain, key: key} + m.renewal[domain] = dr + dr.start(exp) +} + +// stopRenew stops all currently running cert renewal timers. +// The timers are not restarted during the lifetime of the Manager. +func (m *Manager) stopRenew() { + m.renewalMu.Lock() + defer m.renewalMu.Unlock() + for name, dr := range m.renewal { + delete(m.renewal, name) + dr.stop() + } +} + +func (m *Manager) accountKey(ctx context.Context) (crypto.Signer, error) { + const keyName = "acme_account.key" + + genKey := func() (*ecdsa.PrivateKey, error) { + return ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader) + } + + if m.Cache == nil { + return genKey() + } + + data, err := m.Cache.Get(ctx, keyName) + if err == ErrCacheMiss { + key, err := genKey() + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + var buf bytes.Buffer + if err := encodeECDSAKey(&buf, key); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if err := m.Cache.Put(ctx, keyName, buf.Bytes()); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return key, nil + } + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + priv, _ := pem.Decode(data) + if priv == nil || !strings.Contains(priv.Type, "PRIVATE") { + return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: invalid account key found in cache") + } + return parsePrivateKey(priv.Bytes) +} + +func (m *Manager) acmeClient(ctx context.Context) (*acme.Client, error) { + m.clientMu.Lock() + defer m.clientMu.Unlock() + if m.client != nil { + return m.client, nil + } + + client := m.Client + if client == nil { + client = &acme.Client{DirectoryURL: acme.LetsEncryptURL} + } + if client.Key == nil { + var err error + client.Key, err = m.accountKey(ctx) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + } + var contact []string + if m.Email != "" { + contact = []string{"mailto:" + m.Email} + } + a := &acme.Account{Contact: contact} + _, err := client.Register(ctx, a, m.Prompt) + if ae, ok := err.(*acme.Error); err == nil || ok && ae.StatusCode == http.StatusConflict { + // conflict indicates the key is already registered + m.client = client + err = nil + } + return m.client, err +} + +func (m *Manager) hostPolicy() HostPolicy { + if m.HostPolicy != nil { + return m.HostPolicy + } + return defaultHostPolicy +} + +func (m *Manager) renewBefore() time.Duration { + if m.RenewBefore > maxRandRenew { + return m.RenewBefore + } + return 7 * 24 * time.Hour // 1 week +} + +// certState is ready when its mutex is unlocked for reading. +type certState struct { + sync.RWMutex + locked bool // locked for read/write + key crypto.Signer // private key for cert + cert [][]byte // DER encoding + leaf *x509.Certificate // parsed cert[0]; always non-nil if cert != nil +} + +// tlscert creates a tls.Certificate from s.key and s.cert. +// Callers should wrap it in s.RLock() and s.RUnlock(). +func (s *certState) tlscert() (*tls.Certificate, error) { + if s.key == nil { + return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: missing signer") + } + if len(s.cert) == 0 { + return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: missing certificate") + } + return &tls.Certificate{ + PrivateKey: s.key, + Certificate: s.cert, + Leaf: s.leaf, + }, nil +} + +// certRequest creates a certificate request for the given common name cn +// and optional SANs. +func certRequest(key crypto.Signer, cn string, san ...string) ([]byte, error) { + req := &x509.CertificateRequest{ + Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: cn}, + DNSNames: san, + } + return x509.CreateCertificateRequest(rand.Reader, req, key) +} + +// Attempt to parse the given private key DER block. OpenSSL 0.9.8 generates +// PKCS#1 private keys by default, while OpenSSL 1.0.0 generates PKCS#8 keys. +// OpenSSL ecparam generates SEC1 EC private keys for ECDSA. We try all three. +// +// Inspired by parsePrivateKey in crypto/tls/tls.go. +func parsePrivateKey(der []byte) (crypto.Signer, error) { + if key, err := x509.ParsePKCS1PrivateKey(der); err == nil { + return key, nil + } + if key, err := x509.ParsePKCS8PrivateKey(der); err == nil { + switch key := key.(type) { + case *rsa.PrivateKey: + return key, nil + case *ecdsa.PrivateKey: + return key, nil + default: + return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: unknown private key type in PKCS#8 wrapping") + } + } + if key, err := x509.ParseECPrivateKey(der); err == nil { + return key, nil + } + + return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: failed to parse private key") +} + +// validCert parses a cert chain provided as der argument and verifies the leaf, der[0], +// corresponds to the private key, as well as the domain match and expiration dates. +// It doesn't do any revocation checking. +// +// The returned value is the verified leaf cert. +func validCert(domain string, der [][]byte, key crypto.Signer) (leaf *x509.Certificate, err error) { + // parse public part(s) + var n int + for _, b := range der { + n += len(b) + } + pub := make([]byte, n) + n = 0 + for _, b := range der { + n += copy(pub[n:], b) + } + x509Cert, err := x509.ParseCertificates(pub) + if len(x509Cert) == 0 { + return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: no public key found") + } + // verify the leaf is not expired and matches the domain name + leaf = x509Cert[0] + now := timeNow() + if now.Before(leaf.NotBefore) { + return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: certificate is not valid yet") + } + if now.After(leaf.NotAfter) { + return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: expired certificate") + } + if err := leaf.VerifyHostname(domain); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + // ensure the leaf corresponds to the private key + switch pub := leaf.PublicKey.(type) { + case *rsa.PublicKey: + prv, ok := key.(*rsa.PrivateKey) + if !ok { + return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: private key type does not match public key type") + } + if pub.N.Cmp(prv.N) != 0 { + return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: private key does not match public key") + } + case *ecdsa.PublicKey: + prv, ok := key.(*ecdsa.PrivateKey) + if !ok { + return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: private key type does not match public key type") + } + if pub.X.Cmp(prv.X) != 0 || pub.Y.Cmp(prv.Y) != 0 { + return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: private key does not match public key") + } + default: + return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: unknown public key algorithm") + } + return leaf, nil +} + +func retryAfter(v string) time.Duration { + if i, err := strconv.Atoi(v); err == nil { + return time.Duration(i) * time.Second + } + if t, err := http.ParseTime(v); err == nil { + return t.Sub(timeNow()) + } + return time.Second +} + +type lockedMathRand struct { + sync.Mutex + rnd *mathrand.Rand +} + +func (r *lockedMathRand) int63n(max int64) int64 { + r.Lock() + n := r.rnd.Int63n(max) + r.Unlock() + return n +} + +// for easier testing +var timeNow = time.Now diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/cache.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/cache.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1c67f6c --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/cache.go @@ -0,0 +1,130 @@ +// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package autocert + +import ( + "errors" + "io/ioutil" + "os" + "path/filepath" + + "golang.org/x/net/context" +) + +// ErrCacheMiss is returned when a certificate is not found in cache. +var ErrCacheMiss = errors.New("acme/autocert: certificate cache miss") + +// Cache is used by Manager to store and retrieve previously obtained certificates +// as opaque data. +// +// The key argument of the methods refers to a domain name but need not be an FQDN. +// Cache implementations should not rely on the key naming pattern. +type Cache interface { + // Get returns a certificate data for the specified key. + // If there's no such key, Get returns ErrCacheMiss. + Get(ctx context.Context, key string) ([]byte, error) + + // Put stores the data in the cache under the specified key. + // Inderlying implementations may use any data storage format, + // as long as the reverse operation, Get, results in the original data. + Put(ctx context.Context, key string, data []byte) error + + // Delete removes a certificate data from the cache under the specified key. + // If there's no such key in the cache, Delete returns nil. + Delete(ctx context.Context, key string) error +} + +// DirCache implements Cache using a directory on the local filesystem. +// If the directory does not exist, it will be created with 0700 permissions. +type DirCache string + +// Get reads a certificate data from the specified file name. +func (d DirCache) Get(ctx context.Context, name string) ([]byte, error) { + name = filepath.Join(string(d), name) + var ( + data []byte + err error + done = make(chan struct{}) + ) + go func() { + data, err = ioutil.ReadFile(name) + close(done) + }() + select { + case <-ctx.Done(): + return nil, ctx.Err() + case <-done: + } + if os.IsNotExist(err) { + return nil, ErrCacheMiss + } + return data, err +} + +// Put writes the certificate data to the specified file name. +// The file will be created with 0600 permissions. +func (d DirCache) Put(ctx context.Context, name string, data []byte) error { + if err := os.MkdirAll(string(d), 0700); err != nil { + return err + } + + done := make(chan struct{}) + var err error + go func() { + defer close(done) + var tmp string + if tmp, err = d.writeTempFile(name, data); err != nil { + return + } + // prevent overwriting the file if the context was cancelled + if ctx.Err() != nil { + return // no need to set err + } + name = filepath.Join(string(d), name) + err = os.Rename(tmp, name) + }() + select { + case <-ctx.Done(): + return ctx.Err() + case <-done: + } + return err +} + +// Delete removes the specified file name. +func (d DirCache) Delete(ctx context.Context, name string) error { + name = filepath.Join(string(d), name) + var ( + err error + done = make(chan struct{}) + ) + go func() { + err = os.Remove(name) + close(done) + }() + select { + case <-ctx.Done(): + return ctx.Err() + case <-done: + } + if err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) { + return err + } + return nil +} + +// writeTempFile writes b to a temporary file, closes the file and returns its path. +func (d DirCache) writeTempFile(prefix string, b []byte) (string, error) { + // TempFile uses 0600 permissions + f, err := ioutil.TempFile(string(d), prefix) + if err != nil { + return "", err + } + if _, err := f.Write(b); err != nil { + f.Close() + return "", err + } + return f.Name(), f.Close() +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/renewal.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/renewal.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1a5018c --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/renewal.go @@ -0,0 +1,125 @@ +// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package autocert + +import ( + "crypto" + "sync" + "time" + + "golang.org/x/net/context" +) + +// maxRandRenew is a maximum deviation from Manager.RenewBefore. +const maxRandRenew = time.Hour + +// domainRenewal tracks the state used by the periodic timers +// renewing a single domain's cert. +type domainRenewal struct { + m *Manager + domain string + key crypto.Signer + + timerMu sync.Mutex + timer *time.Timer +} + +// start starts a cert renewal timer at the time +// defined by the certificate expiration time exp. +// +// If the timer is already started, calling start is a noop. +func (dr *domainRenewal) start(exp time.Time) { + dr.timerMu.Lock() + defer dr.timerMu.Unlock() + if dr.timer != nil { + return + } + dr.timer = time.AfterFunc(dr.next(exp), dr.renew) +} + +// stop stops the cert renewal timer. +// If the timer is already stopped, calling stop is a noop. +func (dr *domainRenewal) stop() { + dr.timerMu.Lock() + defer dr.timerMu.Unlock() + if dr.timer == nil { + return + } + dr.timer.Stop() + dr.timer = nil +} + +// renew is called periodically by a timer. +// The first renew call is kicked off by dr.start. +func (dr *domainRenewal) renew() { + dr.timerMu.Lock() + defer dr.timerMu.Unlock() + if dr.timer == nil { + return + } + + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Minute) + defer cancel() + // TODO: rotate dr.key at some point? + next, err := dr.do(ctx) + if err != nil { + next = maxRandRenew / 2 + next += time.Duration(pseudoRand.int63n(int64(next))) + } + dr.timer = time.AfterFunc(next, dr.renew) + testDidRenewLoop(next, err) +} + +// do is similar to Manager.createCert but it doesn't lock a Manager.state item. +// Instead, it requests a new certificate independently and, upon success, +// replaces dr.m.state item with a new one and updates cache for the given domain. +// +// It may return immediately if the expiration date of the currently cached cert +// is far enough in the future. +// +// The returned value is a time interval after which the renewal should occur again. +func (dr *domainRenewal) do(ctx context.Context) (time.Duration, error) { + // a race is likely unavoidable in a distributed environment + // but we try nonetheless + if tlscert, err := dr.m.cacheGet(dr.domain); err == nil { + next := dr.next(tlscert.Leaf.NotAfter) + if next > dr.m.renewBefore()+maxRandRenew { + return next, nil + } + } + + der, leaf, err := dr.m.authorizedCert(ctx, dr.key, dr.domain) + if err != nil { + return 0, err + } + state := &certState{ + key: dr.key, + cert: der, + leaf: leaf, + } + tlscert, err := state.tlscert() + if err != nil { + return 0, err + } + dr.m.cachePut(dr.domain, tlscert) + dr.m.stateMu.Lock() + defer dr.m.stateMu.Unlock() + // m.state is guaranteed to be non-nil at this point + dr.m.state[dr.domain] = state + return dr.next(leaf.NotAfter), nil +} + +func (dr *domainRenewal) next(expiry time.Time) time.Duration { + d := expiry.Sub(timeNow()) - dr.m.renewBefore() + // add a bit of randomness to renew deadline + n := pseudoRand.int63n(int64(maxRandRenew)) + d -= time.Duration(n) + if d < 0 { + return 0 + } + return d +} + +var testDidRenewLoop = func(next time.Duration, err error) {} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/jws.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/jws.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..49ba313 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/jws.go @@ -0,0 +1,153 @@ +// Copyright 2015 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package acme + +import ( + "crypto" + "crypto/ecdsa" + "crypto/rand" + "crypto/rsa" + "crypto/sha256" + _ "crypto/sha512" // need for EC keys + "encoding/base64" + "encoding/json" + "fmt" + "math/big" +) + +// jwsEncodeJSON signs claimset using provided key and a nonce. +// The result is serialized in JSON format. +// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7515#section-7. +func jwsEncodeJSON(claimset interface{}, key crypto.Signer, nonce string) ([]byte, error) { + jwk, err := jwkEncode(key.Public()) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + alg, sha := jwsHasher(key) + if alg == "" || !sha.Available() { + return nil, ErrUnsupportedKey + } + phead := fmt.Sprintf(`{"alg":%q,"jwk":%s,"nonce":%q}`, alg, jwk, nonce) + phead = base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(phead)) + cs, err := json.Marshal(claimset) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + payload := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(cs) + hash := sha.New() + hash.Write([]byte(phead + "." + payload)) + sig, err := jwsSign(key, sha, hash.Sum(nil)) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + enc := struct { + Protected string `json:"protected"` + Payload string `json:"payload"` + Sig string `json:"signature"` + }{ + Protected: phead, + Payload: payload, + Sig: base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(sig), + } + return json.Marshal(&enc) +} + +// jwkEncode encodes public part of an RSA or ECDSA key into a JWK. +// The result is also suitable for creating a JWK thumbprint. +// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7517 +func jwkEncode(pub crypto.PublicKey) (string, error) { + switch pub := pub.(type) { + case *rsa.PublicKey: + // https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7518#section-6.3.1 + n := pub.N + e := big.NewInt(int64(pub.E)) + // Field order is important. + // See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7638#section-3.3 for details. + return fmt.Sprintf(`{"e":"%s","kty":"RSA","n":"%s"}`, + base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(e.Bytes()), + base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(n.Bytes()), + ), nil + case *ecdsa.PublicKey: + // https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7518#section-6.2.1 + p := pub.Curve.Params() + n := p.BitSize / 8 + if p.BitSize%8 != 0 { + n++ + } + x := pub.X.Bytes() + if n > len(x) { + x = append(make([]byte, n-len(x)), x...) + } + y := pub.Y.Bytes() + if n > len(y) { + y = append(make([]byte, n-len(y)), y...) + } + // Field order is important. + // See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7638#section-3.3 for details. + return fmt.Sprintf(`{"crv":"%s","kty":"EC","x":"%s","y":"%s"}`, + p.Name, + base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(x), + base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(y), + ), nil + } + return "", ErrUnsupportedKey +} + +// jwsSign signs the digest using the given key. +// It returns ErrUnsupportedKey if the key type is unknown. +// The hash is used only for RSA keys. +func jwsSign(key crypto.Signer, hash crypto.Hash, digest []byte) ([]byte, error) { + switch key := key.(type) { + case *rsa.PrivateKey: + return key.Sign(rand.Reader, digest, hash) + case *ecdsa.PrivateKey: + r, s, err := ecdsa.Sign(rand.Reader, key, digest) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + rb, sb := r.Bytes(), s.Bytes() + size := key.Params().BitSize / 8 + if size%8 > 0 { + size++ + } + sig := make([]byte, size*2) + copy(sig[size-len(rb):], rb) + copy(sig[size*2-len(sb):], sb) + return sig, nil + } + return nil, ErrUnsupportedKey +} + +// jwsHasher indicates suitable JWS algorithm name and a hash function +// to use for signing a digest with the provided key. +// It returns ("", 0) if the key is not supported. +func jwsHasher(key crypto.Signer) (string, crypto.Hash) { + switch key := key.(type) { + case *rsa.PrivateKey: + return "RS256", crypto.SHA256 + case *ecdsa.PrivateKey: + switch key.Params().Name { + case "P-256": + return "ES256", crypto.SHA256 + case "P-384": + return "ES384", crypto.SHA384 + case "P-512": + return "ES512", crypto.SHA512 + } + } + return "", 0 +} + +// JWKThumbprint creates a JWK thumbprint out of pub +// as specified in https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7638. +func JWKThumbprint(pub crypto.PublicKey) (string, error) { + jwk, err := jwkEncode(pub) + if err != nil { + return "", err + } + b := sha256.Sum256([]byte(jwk)) + return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(b[:]), nil +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/types.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/types.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0513b2e --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/types.go @@ -0,0 +1,209 @@ +package acme + +import ( + "errors" + "fmt" + "net/http" +) + +// ACME server response statuses used to describe Authorization and Challenge states. +const ( + StatusUnknown = "unknown" + StatusPending = "pending" + StatusProcessing = "processing" + StatusValid = "valid" + StatusInvalid = "invalid" + StatusRevoked = "revoked" +) + +// CRLReasonCode identifies the reason for a certificate revocation. +type CRLReasonCode int + +// CRL reason codes as defined in RFC 5280. +const ( + CRLReasonUnspecified CRLReasonCode = 0 + CRLReasonKeyCompromise CRLReasonCode = 1 + CRLReasonCACompromise CRLReasonCode = 2 + CRLReasonAffiliationChanged CRLReasonCode = 3 + CRLReasonSuperseded CRLReasonCode = 4 + CRLReasonCessationOfOperation CRLReasonCode = 5 + CRLReasonCertificateHold CRLReasonCode = 6 + CRLReasonRemoveFromCRL CRLReasonCode = 8 + CRLReasonPrivilegeWithdrawn CRLReasonCode = 9 + CRLReasonAACompromise CRLReasonCode = 10 +) + +var ( + // ErrAuthorizationFailed indicates that an authorization for an identifier + // did not succeed. + ErrAuthorizationFailed = errors.New("acme: identifier authorization failed") + + // ErrUnsupportedKey is returned when an unsupported key type is encountered. + ErrUnsupportedKey = errors.New("acme: unknown key type; only RSA and ECDSA are supported") +) + +// Error is an ACME error, defined in Problem Details for HTTP APIs doc +// http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-appsawg-http-problem. +type Error struct { + // StatusCode is The HTTP status code generated by the origin server. + StatusCode int + // ProblemType is a URI reference that identifies the problem type, + // typically in a "urn:acme:error:xxx" form. + ProblemType string + // Detail is a human-readable explanation specific to this occurrence of the problem. + Detail string + // Header is the original server error response headers. + Header http.Header +} + +func (e *Error) Error() string { + return fmt.Sprintf("%d %s: %s", e.StatusCode, e.ProblemType, e.Detail) +} + +// Account is a user account. It is associated with a private key. +type Account struct { + // URI is the account unique ID, which is also a URL used to retrieve + // account data from the CA. + URI string + + // Contact is a slice of contact info used during registration. + Contact []string + + // The terms user has agreed to. + // A value not matching CurrentTerms indicates that the user hasn't agreed + // to the actual Terms of Service of the CA. + AgreedTerms string + + // Actual terms of a CA. + CurrentTerms string + + // Authz is the authorization URL used to initiate a new authz flow. + Authz string + + // Authorizations is a URI from which a list of authorizations + // granted to this account can be fetched via a GET request. + Authorizations string + + // Certificates is a URI from which a list of certificates + // issued for this account can be fetched via a GET request. + Certificates string +} + +// Directory is ACME server discovery data. +type Directory struct { + // RegURL is an account endpoint URL, allowing for creating new + // and modifying existing accounts. + RegURL string + + // AuthzURL is used to initiate Identifier Authorization flow. + AuthzURL string + + // CertURL is a new certificate issuance endpoint URL. + CertURL string + + // RevokeURL is used to initiate a certificate revocation flow. + RevokeURL string + + // Term is a URI identifying the current terms of service. + Terms string + + // Website is an HTTP or HTTPS URL locating a website + // providing more information about the ACME server. + Website string + + // CAA consists of lowercase hostname elements, which the ACME server + // recognises as referring to itself for the purposes of CAA record validation + // as defined in RFC6844. + CAA []string +} + +// Challenge encodes a returned CA challenge. +type Challenge struct { + // Type is the challenge type, e.g. "http-01", "tls-sni-02", "dns-01". + Type string + + // URI is where a challenge response can be posted to. + URI string + + // Token is a random value that uniquely identifies the challenge. + Token string + + // Status identifies the status of this challenge. + Status string +} + +// Authorization encodes an authorization response. +type Authorization struct { + // URI uniquely identifies a authorization. + URI string + + // Status identifies the status of an authorization. + Status string + + // Identifier is what the account is authorized to represent. + Identifier AuthzID + + // Challenges that the client needs to fulfill in order to prove possession + // of the identifier (for pending authorizations). + // For final authorizations, the challenges that were used. + Challenges []*Challenge + + // A collection of sets of challenges, each of which would be sufficient + // to prove possession of the identifier. + // Clients must complete a set of challenges that covers at least one set. + // Challenges are identified by their indices in the challenges array. + // If this field is empty, the client needs to complete all challenges. + Combinations [][]int +} + +// AuthzID is an identifier that an account is authorized to represent. +type AuthzID struct { + Type string // The type of identifier, e.g. "dns". + Value string // The identifier itself, e.g. "example.org". +} + +// wireAuthz is ACME JSON representation of Authorization objects. +type wireAuthz struct { + Status string + Challenges []wireChallenge + Combinations [][]int + Identifier struct { + Type string + Value string + } +} + +func (z *wireAuthz) authorization(uri string) *Authorization { + a := &Authorization{ + URI: uri, + Status: z.Status, + Identifier: AuthzID{Type: z.Identifier.Type, Value: z.Identifier.Value}, + Combinations: z.Combinations, // shallow copy + Challenges: make([]*Challenge, len(z.Challenges)), + } + for i, v := range z.Challenges { + a.Challenges[i] = v.challenge() + } + return a +} + +// wireChallenge is ACME JSON challenge representation. +type wireChallenge struct { + URI string `json:"uri"` + Type string + Token string + Status string +} + +func (c *wireChallenge) challenge() *Challenge { + v := &Challenge{ + URI: c.URI, + Type: c.Type, + Token: c.Token, + Status: c.Status, + } + if v.Status == "" { + v.Status = StatusPending + } + return v +} diff --git a/vendor/vendor.json b/vendor/vendor.json index 526d10b..1412468 100644 --- a/vendor/vendor.json +++ b/vendor/vendor.json @@ -534,6 +534,18 @@ "revision": "399a9d7bfe85437346a5ec4ef0450fc2f1084e61", "revisionTime": "2016-09-23T17:06:11Z" }, + { + "checksumSHA1": "TK1Yr8BbwionaaAvM+77lwAAx/8=", + "path": "golang.org/x/crypto/acme", + "revision": "f6b343c37ca80bfa8ea539da67a0b621f84fab1d", + "revisionTime": "2016-12-21T04:54:10Z" + }, + { + "checksumSHA1": "fvFbUkZIL96D/kWOJwJRMESGjQQ=", + "path": "golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert", + "revision": "f6b343c37ca80bfa8ea539da67a0b621f84fab1d", + "revisionTime": "2016-12-21T04:54:10Z" + }, { "checksumSHA1": "dwOedwBJ1EIK9+S3t108Bx054Y8=", "path": "golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519", -- cgit v1.2.3