package handlers import ( "net/http" "regexp" "strings" ) var ( // De-facto standard header keys. xForwardedFor = http.CanonicalHeaderKey("X-Forwarded-For") xRealIP = http.CanonicalHeaderKey("X-Real-IP") xForwardedProto = http.CanonicalHeaderKey("X-Forwarded-Scheme") ) var ( // RFC7239 defines a new "Forwarded: " header designed to replace the // existing use of X-Forwarded-* headers. // e.g. Forwarded: for=192.0.2.60;proto=https;by=203.0.113.43 forwarded = http.CanonicalHeaderKey("Forwarded") // Allows for a sub-match of the first value after 'for=' to the next // comma, semi-colon or space. The match is case-insensitive. forRegex = regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)(?:for=)([^(;|,| )]+)`) // Allows for a sub-match for the first instance of scheme (http|https) // prefixed by 'proto='. The match is case-insensitive. protoRegex = regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)(?:proto=)(https|http)`) ) // ProxyHeaders inspects common reverse proxy headers and sets the corresponding // fields in the HTTP request struct. These are X-Forwarded-For and X-Real-IP // for the remote (client) IP address, X-Forwarded-Proto for the scheme // (http|https) and the RFC7239 Forwarded header, which may include both client // IPs and schemes. // // NOTE: This middleware should only be used when behind a reverse // proxy like nginx, HAProxy or Apache. Reverse proxies that don't (or are // configured not to) strip these headers from client requests, or where these // headers are accepted "as is" from a remote client (e.g. when Go is not behind // a proxy), can manifest as a vulnerability if your application uses these // headers for validating the 'trustworthiness' of a request. func ProxyHeaders(h http.Handler) http.Handler { fn := func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { // Set the remote IP with the value passed from the proxy. if fwd := getIP(r); fwd != "" { r.RemoteAddr = fwd } // Set the scheme (proto) with the value passed from the proxy. if scheme := getScheme(r); scheme != "" { r.URL.Scheme = scheme } // Call the next handler in the chain. h.ServeHTTP(w, r) } return http.HandlerFunc(fn) } // getIP retrieves the IP from the X-Forwarded-For, X-Real-IP and RFC7239 // Forwarded headers (in that order). func getIP(r *http.Request) string { var addr string if fwd := r.Header.Get(xForwardedFor); fwd != "" { // Only grab the first (client) address. Note that '192.168.0.1, // 10.1.1.1' is a valid key for X-Forwarded-For where addresses after // the first may represent forwarding proxies earlier in the chain. s := strings.Index(fwd, ", ") if s == -1 { s = len(fwd) } addr = fwd[:s] } else if fwd := r.Header.Get(xRealIP); fwd != "" { // X-Real-IP should only contain one IP address (the client making the // request). addr = fwd } else if fwd := r.Header.Get(forwarded); fwd != "" { // match should contain at least two elements if the protocol was // specified in the Forwarded header. The first element will always be // the 'for=' capture, which we ignore. In the case of multiple IP // addresses (for=8.8.8.8, 8.8.4.4,172.16.1.20 is valid) we only // extract the first, which should be the client IP. if match := forRegex.FindStringSubmatch(fwd); len(match) > 1 { // IPv6 addresses in Forwarded headers are quoted-strings. We strip // these quotes. addr = strings.Trim(match[1], `"`) } } return addr } // getScheme retrieves the scheme from the X-Forwarded-Proto and RFC7239 // Forwarded headers (in that order). func getScheme(r *http.Request) string { var scheme string // Retrieve the scheme from X-Forwarded-Proto. if proto := r.Header.Get(xForwardedProto); proto != "" { scheme = strings.ToLower(proto) } else if proto := r.Header.Get(forwarded); proto != "" { // match should contain at least two elements if the protocol was // specified in the Forwarded header. The first element will always be // the 'proto=' capture, which we ignore. In the case of multiple proto // parameters (invalid) we only extract the first. if match := protoRegex.FindStringSubmatch(proto); len(match) > 1 { scheme = strings.ToLower(match[1]) } } return scheme }