diff options
| author | Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se> | 2016-09-28 12:56:02 +0200 | 
|---|---|---|
| committer | Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se> | 2016-10-31 08:46:35 +0100 | 
| commit | 3d6460edeee21d7d790ec570d0887bed1f4366dd (patch) | |
| tree | 65703bcc26fae14358ff6d5653eebe5b013ecaa1 | |
| parent | 8732ec40db652c53fa58cd13e2acb8eab6e40874 (diff) | |
krb5: avoid realloc(0)
If the requested size is zero, bail out with error instead of doing a
realloc() that would cause a double-free: realloc(0) acts as a free()
and then there's a second free in the cleanup path.
CVE-2016-8619
Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20161102E.html
Reported-by: Cure53
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/security.c | 9 | 
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/lib/security.c b/lib/security.c index a268d4a62..4cef8f89f 100644 --- a/lib/security.c +++ b/lib/security.c @@ -192,15 +192,18 @@ static CURLcode read_data(struct connectdata *conn,                            struct krb5buffer *buf)  {    int len; -  void* tmp; +  void *tmp = NULL;    CURLcode result;    result = socket_read(fd, &len, sizeof(len));    if(result)      return result; -  len = ntohl(len); -  tmp = realloc(buf->data, len); +  if(len) { +    /* only realloc if there was a length */ +    len = ntohl(len); +    tmp = realloc(buf->data, len); +  }    if(tmp == NULL)      return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;  | 
