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authorDaniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>2003-10-07 21:46:47 +0000
committerDaniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>2003-10-07 21:46:47 +0000
commit6494889e3ba6b1432258f0a8ed402723607cff21 (patch)
tree032d37a0009e37b7e53516f3be1d0a5b7078d49a /lib/ssluse.c
parentf52534522ce447afa6556079ff534a6d859397ae (diff)
Neil Dunbar provided a patch that now makes libcurl check SSL
subjectAltNames when matching certs. This is apparently detailed in RFC2818 as the right thing to do. I had to add configure checks for inet_pton() and our own (strictly speaking, code from BIND written by Paul Vixie) provided code for the function for platforms that miss it.
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/ssluse.c')
-rw-r--r--lib/ssluse.c272
1 files changed, 193 insertions, 79 deletions
diff --git a/lib/ssluse.c b/lib/ssluse.c
index 14142822b..8b04ccf1f 100644
--- a/lib/ssluse.c
+++ b/lib/ssluse.c
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
#include <sys/types.h>
#endif
@@ -41,9 +42,11 @@
#include "sendf.h"
#include "formdata.h" /* for the boundary function */
#include "url.h" /* for the ssl config check function */
+#include "inet_pton.h"
#ifdef USE_SSLEAY
#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
/* The last #include file should be: */
#ifdef CURLDEBUG
@@ -191,7 +194,7 @@ int random_the_seed(struct SessionHandle *data)
/* generates a default path for the random seed file */
buf[0]=0; /* blank it first */
RAND_file_name(buf, BUFSIZE);
- if ( buf[0] ) {
+ if(buf[0]) {
/* we got a file name to try */
nread += RAND_load_file(buf, 16384);
if(seed_enough(nread))
@@ -207,13 +210,13 @@ int random_the_seed(struct SessionHandle *data)
#endif
static int do_file_type(const char *type)
{
- if (!type || !type[0])
+ if(!type || !type[0])
return SSL_FILETYPE_PEM;
- if (curl_strequal(type, "PEM"))
+ if(curl_strequal(type, "PEM"))
return SSL_FILETYPE_PEM;
- if (curl_strequal(type, "DER"))
+ if(curl_strequal(type, "DER"))
return SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1;
- if (curl_strequal(type, "ENG"))
+ if(curl_strequal(type, "ENG"))
return SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE;
return -1;
}
@@ -228,7 +231,7 @@ int cert_stuff(struct connectdata *conn,
struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
int file_type;
- if (cert_file != NULL) {
+ if(cert_file != NULL) {
SSL *ssl;
X509 *x509;
@@ -255,7 +258,7 @@ int cert_stuff(struct connectdata *conn,
switch(file_type) {
case SSL_FILETYPE_PEM:
/* SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file() only works on PEM files */
- if (SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(conn->ssl.ctx,
+ if(SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(conn->ssl.ctx,
cert_file) != 1) {
failf(data, "unable to set certificate file (wrong password?)");
return 0;
@@ -266,7 +269,7 @@ int cert_stuff(struct connectdata *conn,
/* SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file() works with either PEM or ASN1, but
we use the case above for PEM so this can only be performed with
ASN1 files. */
- if (SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(conn->ssl.ctx,
+ if(SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(conn->ssl.ctx,
cert_file,
file_type) != 1) {
failf(data, "unable to set certificate file (wrong password?)");
@@ -286,11 +289,11 @@ int cert_stuff(struct connectdata *conn,
switch(file_type) {
case SSL_FILETYPE_PEM:
- if (key_file == NULL)
+ if(key_file == NULL)
/* cert & key can only be in PEM case in the same file */
key_file=cert_file;
case SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1:
- if (SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(conn->ssl.ctx,
+ if(SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(conn->ssl.ctx,
key_file,
file_type) != 1) {
failf(data, "unable to set private key file: '%s' type %s\n",
@@ -302,11 +305,11 @@ int cert_stuff(struct connectdata *conn,
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE_H
{ /* XXXX still needs some work */
EVP_PKEY *priv_key = NULL;
- if (conn && conn->data && conn->data->engine) {
+ if(conn && conn->data && conn->data->engine) {
#ifdef HAVE_ENGINE_LOAD_FOUR_ARGS
UI_METHOD *ui_method = UI_OpenSSL();
#endif
- if (!key_file || !key_file[0]) {
+ if(!key_file || !key_file[0]) {
failf(data, "no key set to load from crypto engine\n");
return 0;
}
@@ -315,11 +318,11 @@ int cert_stuff(struct connectdata *conn,
ui_method,
#endif
data->set.key_passwd);
- if (!priv_key) {
+ if(!priv_key) {
failf(data, "failed to load private key from crypto engine\n");
return 0;
}
- if (SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(conn->ssl.ctx, priv_key) != 1) {
+ if(SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(conn->ssl.ctx, priv_key) != 1) {
failf(data, "unable to set private key\n");
EVP_PKEY_free(priv_key);
return 0;
@@ -346,7 +349,7 @@ int cert_stuff(struct connectdata *conn,
/* This version was provided by Evan Jordan and is supposed to not
leak memory as the previous version: */
- if (x509 != NULL) {
+ if(x509 != NULL) {
EVP_PKEY *pktmp = X509_get_pubkey(x509);
EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pktmp,SSL_get_privatekey(ssl));
EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp);
@@ -360,7 +363,7 @@ int cert_stuff(struct connectdata *conn,
/* Now we know that a key and cert have been set against
* the SSL context */
- if (!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(conn->ssl.ctx)) {
+ if(!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(conn->ssl.ctx)) {
failf(data, "Private key does not match the certificate public key");
return(0);
}
@@ -457,7 +460,7 @@ void Curl_SSL_cleanup(void)
*/
void Curl_SSL_Close(struct connectdata *conn)
{
- if (conn->ssl.use) {
+ if(conn->ssl.use) {
/*
ERR_remove_state() frees the error queue associated with
thread pid. If pid == 0, the current thread will have its
@@ -583,7 +586,7 @@ int Curl_SSL_Close_All(struct SessionHandle *data)
free(data->state.session);
}
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE_H
- if (data->engine)
+ if(data->engine)
{
ENGINE_free(data->engine);
data->engine = NULL;
@@ -669,28 +672,28 @@ static int Curl_ASN1_UTCTIME_output(struct connectdata *conn,
i=tm->length;
asn1_string=(char *)tm->data;
- if (i < 10)
+ if(i < 10)
return 1;
- if (asn1_string[i-1] == 'Z')
+ if(asn1_string[i-1] == 'Z')
gmt=TRUE;
for (i=0; i<10; i++)
- if ((asn1_string[i] > '9') || (asn1_string[i] < '0'))
+ if((asn1_string[i] > '9') || (asn1_string[i] < '0'))
return 2;
year= (asn1_string[0]-'0')*10+(asn1_string[1]-'0');
- if (year < 50)
+ if(year < 50)
year+=100;
month= (asn1_string[2]-'0')*10+(asn1_string[3]-'0');
- if ((month > 12) || (month < 1))
+ if((month > 12) || (month < 1))
return 3;
day= (asn1_string[4]-'0')*10+(asn1_string[5]-'0');
hour= (asn1_string[6]-'0')*10+(asn1_string[7]-'0');
minute= (asn1_string[8]-'0')*10+(asn1_string[9]-'0');
- if ( (asn1_string[10] >= '0') && (asn1_string[10] <= '9') &&
- (asn1_string[11] >= '0') && (asn1_string[11] <= '9'))
+ if((asn1_string[10] >= '0') && (asn1_string[10] <= '9') &&
+ (asn1_string[11] >= '0') && (asn1_string[11] <= '9'))
second= (asn1_string[10]-'0')*10+(asn1_string[11]-'0');
infof(data,
@@ -742,6 +745,148 @@ cert_hostcheck(const char *certname, const char *hostname)
}
#endif
+static CURLcode verifyhost(struct connectdata *conn)
+{
+ char peer_CN[257];
+ int ntype = 3; /* 1 = IPv6, 2 = IPv4, 3=DNS */
+ int i;
+ int altmatch = 0;
+#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
+ struct in6_addr addr;
+#else
+ struct in_addr addr;
+#endif
+ char *ptr;
+ struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
+ if(conn->hostname[0] == '[' && strchr(conn->hostname, ']')) {
+ char *n2 = strdup(conn->hostname+1);
+ *strchr(n2, ']') = '\0';
+ if(Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET6, n2, &addr))
+ ntype = 1;
+ free(n2);
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+ {
+ if((ptr = strrchr(conn->hostname, '.')) &&
+ isdigit((unsigned char)ptr[1])) {
+ if(Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET, conn->hostname, &addr))
+ ntype = 2;
+ }
+ }
+
+ i = X509_get_ext_by_NID(conn->ssl.server_cert, NID_subject_alt_name, -1);
+ if(i >= 0) {
+ X509_EXTENSION *ex;
+ STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *alt;
+
+ ex = X509_get_ext(conn->ssl.server_cert, i);
+ alt = X509V3_EXT_d2i(ex);
+ if(alt) {
+ int n, len1 = 0, len2 = 0;
+ char *domain = NULL;
+ GENERAL_NAME *gn;
+
+ if(ntype == 3) {
+ len1 = strlen(conn->hostname);
+ domain = strchr(conn->hostname, '.');
+ if(domain) {
+ len2 = len1 - (domain-conn->hostname);
+ }
+ }
+ n = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(alt);
+ for (i=0; i<n; i++) {
+ char *sn;
+ int sl;
+ gn = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(alt, i);
+ if(gn->type == GEN_DNS) {
+ if(ntype != 3)
+ continue;
+
+ sn = (char *) ASN1_STRING_data(gn->d.ia5);
+ sl = ASN1_STRING_length(gn->d.ia5);
+
+ /* Is this an exact match? */
+ if((len1 == sl) && curl_strnequal(conn->hostname, sn, len1))
+ break;
+
+ /* Is this a wildcard match? */
+ if((*sn == '*') && domain && (len2 == sl-1) &&
+ curl_strnequal(domain, sn+1, len2))
+ break;
+
+ }
+ else if(gn->type == GEN_IPADD) {
+ if(ntype == 3)
+ continue;
+
+ sn = (char *) ASN1_STRING_data(gn->d.ia5);
+ sl = ASN1_STRING_length(gn->d.ia5);
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_IPv6
+ if(ntype == 1 && sl != sizeof(struct in6_addr))
+ continue;
+ else
+#endif
+ if(ntype == 2 && sl != sizeof(struct in_addr))
+ continue;
+
+ if(!memcmp(sn, &addr, sl))
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ GENERAL_NAMES_free(alt);
+ if(i < n) { /* got a match in altnames */
+ altmatch = 1;
+ infof(data, "\t subjectAltName: %s matched\n", conn->hostname);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if(!altmatch) {
+ bool obtain=FALSE;
+ if(X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_get_subject_name(conn->ssl.server_cert),
+ NID_commonName,
+ peer_CN,
+ sizeof(peer_CN)) < 0) {
+ if(data->set.ssl.verifyhost > 1) {
+ failf(data,
+ "SSL: unable to obtain common name from peer certificate");
+ X509_free(conn->ssl.server_cert);
+ return CURLE_SSL_PEER_CERTIFICATE;
+ }
+ else {
+ /* Consider verifyhost == 1 as an "OK" for a missing CN field, but we
+ output a note about the situation */
+ infof(data, "\t common name: WARNING couldn't obtain\n");
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ obtain = TRUE;
+
+ if(obtain) {
+ if(!cert_hostcheck(peer_CN, conn->hostname)) {
+ if(data->set.ssl.verifyhost > 1) {
+ failf(data, "SSL: certificate subject name '%s' does not match "
+ "target host name '%s'", peer_CN, conn->hostname);
+ X509_free(conn->ssl.server_cert);
+ return CURLE_SSL_PEER_CERTIFICATE;
+ }
+ else
+ infof(data, "\t common name: %s (does not match '%s')\n",
+ peer_CN, conn->hostname);
+ }
+ else
+ infof(data, "\t common name: %s (matched)\n", peer_CN);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return CURLE_OK;
+}
+
/* ====================================================== */
CURLcode
Curl_SSLConnect(struct connectdata *conn)
@@ -803,19 +948,19 @@ Curl_SSLConnect(struct connectdata *conn)
SSL_CTX_set_options(conn->ssl.ctx, SSL_OP_ALL);
if(data->set.cert) {
- if (!cert_stuff(conn,
- data->set.cert,
- data->set.cert_type,
- data->set.key,
- data->set.key_type)) {
+ if(!cert_stuff(conn,
+ data->set.cert,
+ data->set.cert_type,
+ data->set.key,
+ data->set.key_type)) {
/* failf() is already done in cert_stuff() */
return CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM;
}
}
if(data->set.ssl.cipher_list) {
- if (!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(conn->ssl.ctx,
- data->set.ssl.cipher_list)) {
+ if(!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(conn->ssl.ctx,
+ data->set.ssl.cipher_list)) {
failf(data, "failed setting cipher list");
return CURLE_SSL_CIPHER;
}
@@ -826,10 +971,10 @@ Curl_SSLConnect(struct connectdata *conn)
SSL_VERIFY_PEER|SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT|
SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE,
cert_verify_callback);
- if ((data->set.ssl.CAfile || data->set.ssl.CApath) &&
- !SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(conn->ssl.ctx,
- data->set.ssl.CAfile,
- data->set.ssl.CApath)) {
+ if((data->set.ssl.CAfile || data->set.ssl.CApath) &&
+ !SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(conn->ssl.ctx,
+ data->set.ssl.CAfile,
+ data->set.ssl.CApath)) {
failf(data,"error setting certificate verify locations");
return CURLE_SSL_CACERT;
}
@@ -838,10 +983,10 @@ Curl_SSLConnect(struct connectdata *conn)
SSL_CTX_set_verify(conn->ssl.ctx, SSL_VERIFY_NONE, cert_verify_callback);
/* give application a chance to interfere with SSL set up. */
- if (data->set.ssl.fsslctx) {
+ if(data->set.ssl.fsslctx) {
retcode = (*data->set.ssl.fsslctx)(data, conn->ssl.ctx,
data->set.ssl.fsslctxp);
- if (retcode) {
+ if(retcode) {
failf(data,"error signaled by ssl ctx callback");
return retcode;
}
@@ -996,15 +1141,15 @@ Curl_SSLConnect(struct connectdata *conn)
* attack
*/
- conn->ssl.server_cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate (conn->ssl.handle);
+ conn->ssl.server_cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(conn->ssl.handle);
if(!conn->ssl.server_cert) {
failf(data, "SSL: couldn't get peer certificate!");
return CURLE_SSL_PEER_CERTIFICATE;
}
infof (data, "Server certificate:\n");
- str = X509_NAME_oneline (X509_get_subject_name (conn->ssl.server_cert),
- NULL, 0);
+ str = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(conn->ssl.server_cert),
+ NULL, 0);
if(!str) {
failf(data, "SSL: couldn't get X509-subject!");
X509_free(conn->ssl.server_cert);
@@ -1019,45 +1164,14 @@ Curl_SSLConnect(struct connectdata *conn)
certdate = X509_get_notAfter(conn->ssl.server_cert);
Curl_ASN1_UTCTIME_output(conn, "\t expire date: ", certdate);
- if (data->set.ssl.verifyhost) {
- char peer_CN[257];
- if (X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_get_subject_name(conn->ssl.server_cert),
- NID_commonName,
- peer_CN,
- sizeof(peer_CN)) < 0) {
- /* Failed to get the CN field from the server's certificate */
- if (data->set.ssl.verifyhost > 1) {
- failf(data, "SSL: unable to obtain common name from peer certificate");
- X509_free(conn->ssl.server_cert);
- return CURLE_SSL_PEER_CERTIFICATE;
- }
- else
- /* Consider verifyhost == 1 as an "OK" for a missing CN field, but we
- output a note about the situation */
- infof(data, "\t common name: WARNING couldn't obtain\n");
- }
- else {
- /* Compare the CN field with the remote host name */
- if (!cert_hostcheck(peer_CN, conn->hostname)) {
- if (data->set.ssl.verifyhost > 1) {
- failf(data, "SSL: certificate subject name '%s' does not match "
- "target host name '%s'",
- peer_CN, conn->hostname);
- X509_free(conn->ssl.server_cert);
- return CURLE_SSL_PEER_CERTIFICATE;
- }
- else
- infof(data,
- "\t common name: %s (does not match '%s')\n",
- peer_CN, conn->hostname);
- }
- else
- infof(data, "\t common name: %s (matched)\n", peer_CN);
- }
+ if(data->set.ssl.verifyhost) {
+ retcode = verifyhost(conn);
+ if(retcode)
+ return retcode;
}
- str = X509_NAME_oneline (X509_get_issuer_name (conn->ssl.server_cert),
- NULL, 0);
+ str = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(conn->ssl.server_cert),
+ NULL, 0);
if(!str) {
failf(data, "SSL: couldn't get X509-issuer name!");
X509_free(conn->ssl.server_cert);
@@ -1071,7 +1185,7 @@ Curl_SSLConnect(struct connectdata *conn)
if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
data->set.ssl.certverifyresult=SSL_get_verify_result(conn->ssl.handle);
- if (data->set.ssl.certverifyresult != X509_V_OK) {
+ if(data->set.ssl.certverifyresult != X509_V_OK) {
failf(data, "SSL certificate verify result: %d",
data->set.ssl.certverifyresult);
retcode = CURLE_SSL_PEER_CERTIFICATE;