diff options
author | Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se> | 2012-10-27 12:31:39 +0200 |
---|---|---|
committer | Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se> | 2012-11-06 19:46:53 +0100 |
commit | da82f59b697310229ccdf66104d5d65a44dfab98 (patch) | |
tree | e7e96d9878ad6ea7536342fc12083b489d28bad0 /lib/url.c | |
parent | ab1f80200a6d1bcbac167ede429be52f3ef838bc (diff) |
CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYHOST: stop supporting the 1 value
After a research team wrote a document[1] that found several live source
codes out there in the wild that misused the CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYHOST
option thinking it was a boolean, this change now bans 1 as a value and
will make libcurl return error for it.
1 was never a sensible value to use in production but was introduced
back in the days to help debugging. It was always documented clearly
this way.
1 was never supported by all SSL backends in libcurl, so this cleanup
makes the treatment of it unified.
The report's list of mistakes for this option were all PHP code and
while there's a binding layer between libcurl and PHP, the PHP team has
decided that they have an as thin layer as possible on top of libcurl so
they will not alter or specifically filter a 'TRUE' value for this
particular option. I sympathize with that position.
[1] = http://daniel.haxx.se/blog/2012/10/25/libcurl-claimed-to-be-dangerous/
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/url.c')
-rw-r--r-- | lib/url.c | 20 |
1 files changed, 16 insertions, 4 deletions
@@ -708,7 +708,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_init_userdefined(struct UserDefined *set) * switched off unless wanted. */ set->ssl.verifypeer = TRUE; - set->ssl.verifyhost = 2; + set->ssl.verifyhost = TRUE; #ifdef USE_TLS_SRP set->ssl.authtype = CURL_TLSAUTH_NONE; #endif @@ -2049,13 +2049,25 @@ CURLcode Curl_setopt(struct SessionHandle *data, CURLoption option, /* * Enable peer SSL verifying. */ - data->set.ssl.verifypeer = va_arg(param, long); + data->set.ssl.verifypeer = (0 != va_arg(param, long))?TRUE:FALSE; break; case CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYHOST: /* - * Enable verification of the CN contained in the peer certificate + * Enable verification of the host name in the peer certificate */ - data->set.ssl.verifyhost = va_arg(param, long); + arg = va_arg(param, long); + + /* Obviously people are not reading documentation and too many thought + this argument took a boolean when it wasn't and misused it. We thus ban + 1 as a sensible input and we warn about its use. Then we only have the + 2 action internally stored as TRUE. */ + + if(1 == arg) { + failf(data, "CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYHOST no longer supports 1 as value!"); + return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; + } + + data->set.ssl.verifyhost = (0 != arg)?TRUE:FALSE; break; #ifdef USE_SSLEAY /* since these two options are only possible to use on an OpenSSL- |