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| author | Major_Tom <9447735+MajorTomSec@users.noreply.github.com> | 2020-05-13 21:41:27 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se> | 2020-05-14 08:36:35 +0200 |
| commit | 8e762199b094cd77fcd636fee2c503a5b00d0d2e (patch) | |
| tree | 0d6b0efca1db4ce335ef389bd66cb4689212b03e /lib/vauth | |
| parent | f9983a6f9eb5314ad1a788d06929f6763ada6204 (diff) | |
vauth/cleartext: fix theoretical integer overflow
Fix theoretical integer overflow in Curl_auth_create_plain_message.
The security impact of the overflow was discussed on hackerone. We
agreed this is more of a theoretical vulnerability, as the integer
overflow would only be triggerable on systems using 32-bits size_t with
over 4GB of available memory space for the process.
Closes #5391
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/vauth')
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/vauth/cleartext.c | 3 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/lib/vauth/cleartext.c b/lib/vauth/cleartext.c index 6f452c169..001f6ea9a 100644 --- a/lib/vauth/cleartext.c +++ b/lib/vauth/cleartext.c @@ -81,7 +81,8 @@ CURLcode Curl_auth_create_plain_message(struct Curl_easy *data, plen = strlen(passwd); /* Compute binary message length. Check for overflows. */ - if(((zlen + clen) > SIZE_T_MAX/4) || (plen > (SIZE_T_MAX/2 - 2))) + if((zlen > SIZE_T_MAX/4) || (clen > SIZE_T_MAX/4) || + (plen > (SIZE_T_MAX/2 - 2))) return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; plainlen = zlen + clen + plen + 2; |