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authorAlex Rousskov <rousskov@measurement-factory.com>2016-11-16 10:49:15 -0700
committerDaniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>2016-11-24 23:41:44 +0100
commitcb4e2be7c6d42ca0780f8e0a747cecf9ba45f151 (patch)
tree8bfc55a2318327b0ad921d2d5a37d972e3cca373 /lib/vtls/nss.c
parent8034d8fc624393326ea9874a4e2d60614ed6c78f (diff)
proxy: Support HTTPS proxy and SOCKS+HTTP(s)
* HTTPS proxies: An HTTPS proxy receives all transactions over an SSL/TLS connection. Once a secure connection with the proxy is established, the user agent uses the proxy as usual, including sending CONNECT requests to instruct the proxy to establish a [usually secure] TCP tunnel with an origin server. HTTPS proxies protect nearly all aspects of user-proxy communications as opposed to HTTP proxies that receive all requests (including CONNECT requests) in vulnerable clear text. With HTTPS proxies, it is possible to have two concurrent _nested_ SSL/TLS sessions: the "outer" one between the user agent and the proxy and the "inner" one between the user agent and the origin server (through the proxy). This change adds supports for such nested sessions as well. A secure connection with a proxy requires its own set of the usual SSL options (their actual descriptions differ and need polishing, see TODO): --proxy-cacert FILE CA certificate to verify peer against --proxy-capath DIR CA directory to verify peer against --proxy-cert CERT[:PASSWD] Client certificate file and password --proxy-cert-type TYPE Certificate file type (DER/PEM/ENG) --proxy-ciphers LIST SSL ciphers to use --proxy-crlfile FILE Get a CRL list in PEM format from the file --proxy-insecure Allow connections to proxies with bad certs --proxy-key KEY Private key file name --proxy-key-type TYPE Private key file type (DER/PEM/ENG) --proxy-pass PASS Pass phrase for the private key --proxy-ssl-allow-beast Allow security flaw to improve interop --proxy-sslv2 Use SSLv2 --proxy-sslv3 Use SSLv3 --proxy-tlsv1 Use TLSv1 --proxy-tlsuser USER TLS username --proxy-tlspassword STRING TLS password --proxy-tlsauthtype STRING TLS authentication type (default SRP) All --proxy-foo options are independent from their --foo counterparts, except --proxy-crlfile which defaults to --crlfile and --proxy-capath which defaults to --capath. Curl now also supports %{proxy_ssl_verify_result} --write-out variable, similar to the existing %{ssl_verify_result} variable. Supported backends: OpenSSL, GnuTLS, and NSS. * A SOCKS proxy + HTTP/HTTPS proxy combination: If both --socks* and --proxy options are given, Curl first connects to the SOCKS proxy and then connects (through SOCKS) to the HTTP or HTTPS proxy. TODO: Update documentation for the new APIs and --proxy-* options. Look for "Added in 7.XXX" marks.
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/vtls/nss.c')
-rw-r--r--lib/vtls/nss.c168
1 files changed, 106 insertions, 62 deletions
diff --git a/lib/vtls/nss.c b/lib/vtls/nss.c
index 6e0dc5b29..2d8439934 100644
--- a/lib/vtls/nss.c
+++ b/lib/vtls/nss.c
@@ -337,9 +337,8 @@ static int is_file(const char *filename)
* should be later deallocated using free(). If the OOM failure occurs, we
* return NULL, too.
*/
-static char* dup_nickname(struct Curl_easy *data, enum dupstring cert_kind)
+static char* dup_nickname(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *str)
{
- const char *str = data->set.str[cert_kind];
const char *n;
if(!is_file(str))
@@ -585,6 +584,7 @@ static CURLcode nss_load_key(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex,
SECStatus status;
CURLcode result;
struct ssl_connect_data *ssl = conn->ssl;
+ struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
(void)sockindex; /* unused */
@@ -602,8 +602,7 @@ static CURLcode nss_load_key(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex,
SECMOD_WaitForAnyTokenEvent(mod, 0, 0);
PK11_IsPresent(slot);
- status = PK11_Authenticate(slot, PR_TRUE,
- conn->data->set.str[STRING_KEY_PASSWD]);
+ status = PK11_Authenticate(slot, PR_TRUE, SSL_SET_OPTION(key_passwd));
PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
return (SECSuccess == status) ? CURLE_OK : CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM;
@@ -682,7 +681,7 @@ static SECStatus nss_auth_cert_hook(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool checksig,
struct connectdata *conn = (struct connectdata *)arg;
#ifdef SSL_ENABLE_OCSP_STAPLING
- if(conn->data->set.ssl.verifystatus) {
+ if(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifystatus)) {
SECStatus cacheResult;
const SECItemArray *csa = SSL_PeerStapledOCSPResponses(fd);
@@ -708,7 +707,7 @@ static SECStatus nss_auth_cert_hook(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool checksig,
}
#endif
- if(!conn->data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
+ if(!SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifypeer)) {
infof(conn->data, "skipping SSL peer certificate verification\n");
return SECSuccess;
}
@@ -933,9 +932,12 @@ static SECStatus BadCertHandler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *sock)
CERTCertificate *cert;
/* remember the cert verification result */
- data->set.ssl.certverifyresult = err;
+ if(SSL_IS_PROXY())
+ data->set.proxy_ssl.certverifyresult = err;
+ else
+ data->set.ssl.certverifyresult = err;
- if(err == SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN && !data->set.ssl.verifyhost)
+ if(err == SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN && !SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifyhost))
/* we are asked not to verify the host name */
return SECSuccess;
@@ -1372,36 +1374,55 @@ Curl_nss_check_cxn(struct connectdata *conn)
return -1; /* connection status unknown */
}
+static void nss_close(struct ssl_connect_data *connssl)
+{
+ /* before the cleanup, check whether we are using a client certificate */
+ const bool client_cert = (connssl->client_nickname != NULL)
+ || (connssl->obj_clicert != NULL);
+
+ free(connssl->client_nickname);
+ connssl->client_nickname = NULL;
+
+ /* destroy all NSS objects in order to avoid failure of NSS shutdown */
+ Curl_llist_destroy(connssl->obj_list, NULL);
+ connssl->obj_list = NULL;
+ connssl->obj_clicert = NULL;
+
+ if(connssl->handle) {
+ if(client_cert)
+ /* A server might require different authentication based on the
+ * particular path being requested by the client. To support this
+ * scenario, we must ensure that a connection will never reuse the
+ * authentication data from a previous connection. */
+ SSL_InvalidateSession(connssl->handle);
+
+ PR_Close(connssl->handle);
+ connssl->handle = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
/*
* This function is called when an SSL connection is closed.
*/
void Curl_nss_close(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
{
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
+ struct ssl_connect_data *connssl_proxy = &conn->proxy_ssl[sockindex];
- if(connssl->handle) {
+ if(connssl->handle || connssl_proxy->handle) {
/* NSS closes the socket we previously handed to it, so we must mark it
as closed to avoid double close */
fake_sclose(conn->sock[sockindex]);
conn->sock[sockindex] = CURL_SOCKET_BAD;
+ }
- if((connssl->client_nickname != NULL) || (connssl->obj_clicert != NULL))
- /* A server might require different authentication based on the
- * particular path being requested by the client. To support this
- * scenario, we must ensure that a connection will never reuse the
- * authentication data from a previous connection. */
- SSL_InvalidateSession(connssl->handle);
-
- free(connssl->client_nickname);
- connssl->client_nickname = NULL;
- /* destroy all NSS objects in order to avoid failure of NSS shutdown */
- Curl_llist_destroy(connssl->obj_list, NULL);
- connssl->obj_list = NULL;
- connssl->obj_clicert = NULL;
+ if(connssl->handle)
+ /* nss_close(connssl) will transitively close also connssl_proxy->handle
+ if both are used. Clear it to avoid a double close leading to crash. */
+ connssl_proxy->handle = NULL;
- PR_Close(connssl->handle);
- connssl->handle = NULL;
- }
+ nss_close(connssl);
+ nss_close(connssl_proxy);
}
/* return true if NSS can provide error code (and possibly msg) for the
@@ -1442,8 +1463,8 @@ static CURLcode nss_load_ca_certificates(struct connectdata *conn,
int sockindex)
{
struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
- const char *cafile = data->set.ssl.CAfile;
- const char *capath = data->set.ssl.CApath;
+ const char *cafile = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(CAfile);
+ const char *capath = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(CApath);
if(cafile) {
CURLcode result = nss_load_cert(&conn->ssl[sockindex], cafile, PR_TRUE);
@@ -1491,9 +1512,10 @@ static CURLcode nss_load_ca_certificates(struct connectdata *conn,
}
static CURLcode nss_init_sslver(SSLVersionRange *sslver,
- struct Curl_easy *data)
+ struct Curl_easy *data,
+ struct connectdata *conn)
{
- switch(data->set.ssl.version) {
+ switch (SSL_CONN_CONFIG(version)) {
case CURL_SSLVERSION_DEFAULT:
/* map CURL_SSLVERSION_DEFAULT to NSS default */
if(SSL_VersionRangeGetDefault(ssl_variant_stream, sslver) != SECSuccess)
@@ -1614,6 +1636,7 @@ static CURLcode nss_setup_connect(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
curl_socket_t sockfd = conn->sock[sockindex];
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
CURLcode result;
+ bool second_layer = FALSE;
SSLVersionRange sslver = {
SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0, /* min */
@@ -1672,18 +1695,18 @@ static CURLcode nss_setup_connect(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
goto error;
/* do not use SSL cache if disabled or we are not going to verify peer */
- ssl_no_cache = (conn->ssl_config.sessionid && data->set.ssl.verifypeer) ?
- PR_FALSE : PR_TRUE;
+ ssl_no_cache = (data->set.general_ssl.sessionid
+ && SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifypeer)) ? PR_FALSE : PR_TRUE;
if(SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_NO_CACHE, ssl_no_cache) != SECSuccess)
goto error;
/* enable/disable the requested SSL version(s) */
- if(nss_init_sslver(&sslver, data) != CURLE_OK)
+ if(nss_init_sslver(&sslver, data, conn) != CURLE_OK)
goto error;
if(SSL_VersionRangeSet(model, &sslver) != SECSuccess)
goto error;
- ssl_cbc_random_iv = !data->set.ssl_enable_beast;
+ ssl_cbc_random_iv = !SSL_SET_OPTION(enable_beast);
#ifdef SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV
/* unless the user explicitly asks to allow the protocol vulnerability, we
use the work-around */
@@ -1695,14 +1718,14 @@ static CURLcode nss_setup_connect(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
infof(data, "warning: support for SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV not compiled in\n");
#endif
- if(data->set.ssl.cipher_list) {
- if(set_ciphers(data, model, data->set.ssl.cipher_list) != SECSuccess) {
+ if(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(cipher_list)) {
+ if(set_ciphers(data, model, SSL_CONN_CONFIG(cipher_list)) != SECSuccess) {
result = CURLE_SSL_CIPHER;
goto error;
}
}
- if(!data->set.ssl.verifypeer && data->set.ssl.verifyhost)
+ if(!SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifypeer) && SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifyhost))
infof(data, "warning: ignoring value of ssl.verifyhost\n");
/* bypass the default SSL_AuthCertificate() hook in case we do not want to
@@ -1710,14 +1733,19 @@ static CURLcode nss_setup_connect(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
if(SSL_AuthCertificateHook(model, nss_auth_cert_hook, conn) != SECSuccess)
goto error;
- data->set.ssl.certverifyresult=0; /* not checked yet */
+ /* not checked yet */
+ if(SSL_IS_PROXY())
+ data->set.proxy_ssl.certverifyresult = 0;
+ else
+ data->set.ssl.certverifyresult = 0;
+
if(SSL_BadCertHook(model, BadCertHandler, conn) != SECSuccess)
goto error;
if(SSL_HandshakeCallback(model, HandshakeCallback, conn) != SECSuccess)
goto error;
- if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
+ if(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifypeer)) {
const CURLcode rv = nss_load_ca_certificates(conn, sockindex);
if(rv) {
result = rv;
@@ -1725,24 +1753,24 @@ static CURLcode nss_setup_connect(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
}
}
- if(data->set.ssl.CRLfile) {
- const CURLcode rv = nss_load_crl(data->set.ssl.CRLfile);
+ if(SSL_SET_OPTION(CRLfile)) {
+ const CURLcode rv = nss_load_crl(SSL_SET_OPTION(CRLfile));
if(rv) {
result = rv;
goto error;
}
- infof(data, " CRLfile: %s\n", data->set.ssl.CRLfile);
+ infof(data, " CRLfile: %s\n", SSL_SET_OPTION(CRLfile));
}
- if(data->set.str[STRING_CERT]) {
- char *nickname = dup_nickname(data, STRING_CERT);
+ if(SSL_SET_OPTION(cert)) {
+ char *nickname = dup_nickname(data, SSL_SET_OPTION(cert));
if(nickname) {
/* we are not going to use libnsspem.so to read the client cert */
connssl->obj_clicert = NULL;
}
else {
- CURLcode rv = cert_stuff(conn, sockindex, data->set.str[STRING_CERT],
- data->set.str[STRING_KEY]);
+ CURLcode rv = cert_stuff(conn, sockindex, SSL_SET_OPTION(cert),
+ SSL_SET_OPTION(key));
if(rv) {
/* failf() is already done in cert_stuff() */
result = rv;
@@ -1762,15 +1790,24 @@ static CURLcode nss_setup_connect(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
goto error;
}
- /* wrap OS file descriptor by NSPR's file descriptor abstraction */
- nspr_io = PR_ImportTCPSocket(sockfd);
- if(!nspr_io)
- goto error;
+ if(conn->proxy_ssl[sockindex].use) {
+ DEBUGASSERT(ssl_connection_complete == conn->proxy_ssl[sockindex].state);
+ DEBUGASSERT(conn->proxy_ssl[sockindex].handle != NULL);
+ nspr_io = conn->proxy_ssl[sockindex].handle;
+ second_layer = TRUE;
+ }
+ else {
+ /* wrap OS file descriptor by NSPR's file descriptor abstraction */
+ nspr_io = PR_ImportTCPSocket(sockfd);
+ if(!nspr_io)
+ goto error;
+ }
/* create our own NSPR I/O layer */
nspr_io_stub = PR_CreateIOLayerStub(nspr_io_identity, &nspr_io_methods);
if(!nspr_io_stub) {
- PR_Close(nspr_io);
+ if(!second_layer)
+ PR_Close(nspr_io);
goto error;
}
@@ -1779,7 +1816,8 @@ static CURLcode nss_setup_connect(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
/* push our new layer to the NSPR I/O stack */
if(PR_PushIOLayer(nspr_io, PR_TOP_IO_LAYER, nspr_io_stub) != PR_SUCCESS) {
- PR_Close(nspr_io);
+ if(!second_layer)
+ PR_Close(nspr_io);
PR_Close(nspr_io_stub);
goto error;
}
@@ -1787,7 +1825,8 @@ static CURLcode nss_setup_connect(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
/* import our model socket onto the current I/O stack */
connssl->handle = SSL_ImportFD(model, nspr_io);
if(!connssl->handle) {
- PR_Close(nspr_io);
+ if(!second_layer)
+ PR_Close(nspr_io);
goto error;
}
@@ -1795,12 +1834,12 @@ static CURLcode nss_setup_connect(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
model = NULL;
/* This is the password associated with the cert that we're using */
- if(data->set.str[STRING_KEY_PASSWD]) {
- SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg(connssl->handle, data->set.str[STRING_KEY_PASSWD]);
+ if(SSL_SET_OPTION(key_passwd)) {
+ SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg(connssl->handle, SSL_SET_OPTION(key_passwd));
}
#ifdef SSL_ENABLE_OCSP_STAPLING
- if(data->set.ssl.verifystatus) {
+ if(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifystatus)) {
if(SSL_OptionSet(connssl->handle, SSL_ENABLE_OCSP_STAPLING, PR_TRUE)
!= SECSuccess)
goto error;
@@ -1860,11 +1899,14 @@ static CURLcode nss_setup_connect(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
goto error;
/* propagate hostname to the TLS layer */
- if(SSL_SetURL(connssl->handle, conn->host.name) != SECSuccess)
+ if(SSL_SetURL(connssl->handle, SSL_IS_PROXY() ? conn->http_proxy.host.name :
+ conn->host.name) != SECSuccess)
goto error;
/* prevent NSS from re-using the session for a different hostname */
- if(SSL_SetSockPeerID(connssl->handle, conn->host.name) != SECSuccess)
+ if(SSL_SetSockPeerID(connssl->handle, SSL_IS_PROXY() ?
+ conn->http_proxy.host.name : conn->host.name)
+ != SECSuccess)
goto error;
return CURLE_OK;
@@ -1882,6 +1924,8 @@ static CURLcode nss_do_connect(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
CURLcode result = CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
PRUint32 timeout;
+ long * const certverifyresult = SSL_IS_PROXY() ?
+ &data->set.proxy_ssl.certverifyresult : &data->set.ssl.certverifyresult;
/* check timeout situation */
const long time_left = Curl_timeleft(data, NULL, TRUE);
@@ -1897,9 +1941,9 @@ static CURLcode nss_do_connect(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
if(PR_GetError() == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
/* blocking direction is updated by nss_update_connecting_state() */
return CURLE_AGAIN;
- else if(conn->data->set.ssl.certverifyresult == SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN)
+ else if(*certverifyresult == SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN)
result = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
- else if(conn->data->set.ssl.certverifyresult!=0)
+ else if(*certverifyresult != 0)
result = CURLE_SSL_CACERT;
goto error;
}
@@ -1908,11 +1952,11 @@ static CURLcode nss_do_connect(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
if(result)
goto error;
- if(data->set.str[STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT]) {
+ if(SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert)) {
SECStatus ret = SECFailure;
- char *nickname = dup_nickname(data, STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT);
+ char *nickname = dup_nickname(data, SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert));
if(nickname) {
- /* we support only nicknames in case of STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT for now */
+ /* we support only nicknames in case of issuercert for now */
ret = check_issuer_cert(connssl->handle, nickname);
free(nickname);
}