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authorDaniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>2019-07-19 12:05:05 +0200
committerDaniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>2019-07-19 23:50:22 +0200
commitec3f6f1c36fa9962c092ee4a812484dd7d90c49e (patch)
tree3a4515ba0de95784bd5969cc025b20a4fc333f9f /lib
parentaa73eb47bc8583070734696b25b34ad54c2c1f5e (diff)
source: remove names from source comments
Several reasons: - we can't add everyone who's helping out so its unfair to just a few selected ones. - we already list all helpers in THANKS and in RELEASE-NOTES for each release - we don't want to give the impression that some parts of the code is "owned" or "controlled" by specific persons Assisted-by: Daniel Gustafsson Closes #4129
Diffstat (limited to 'lib')
-rw-r--r--lib/cookie.c14
-rw-r--r--lib/vtls/openssl.c25
2 files changed, 12 insertions, 27 deletions
diff --git a/lib/cookie.c b/lib/cookie.c
index 9a9e14d01..53ca40237 100644
--- a/lib/cookie.c
+++ b/lib/cookie.c
@@ -819,22 +819,14 @@ Curl_cookie_add(struct Curl_easy *data,
badcookie = TRUE;
break;
case 1:
- /* This field got its explanation on the 23rd of May 2001 by
- Andrés García:
-
- flag: A TRUE/FALSE value indicating if all machines within a given
- domain can access the variable. This value is set automatically by
- the browser, depending on the value you set for the domain.
-
- As far as I can see, it is set to true when the cookie says
+ /* flag: A TRUE/FALSE value indicating if all machines within a given
+ domain can access the variable. Set TRUE when the cookie says
.domain.com and to false when the domain is complete www.domain.com
*/
co->tailmatch = strcasecompare(ptr, "TRUE")?TRUE:FALSE;
break;
case 2:
- /* It turns out, that sometimes the file format allows the path
- field to remain not filled in, we try to detect this and work
- around it! Andrés García made us aware of this... */
+ /* The file format allows the path field to remain not filled in */
if(strcmp("TRUE", ptr) && strcmp("FALSE", ptr)) {
/* only if the path doesn't look like a boolean option! */
co->path = strdup(ptr);
diff --git a/lib/vtls/openssl.c b/lib/vtls/openssl.c
index fb9f27123..c2d195656 100644
--- a/lib/vtls/openssl.c
+++ b/lib/vtls/openssl.c
@@ -25,11 +25,6 @@
* but vtls.c should ever call or use these functions.
*/
-/*
- * The original SSLeay-using code for curl was written by Linas Vepstas and
- * Sampo Kellomaki 1998.
- */
-
#include "curl_setup.h"
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
@@ -1565,11 +1560,10 @@ static CURLcode verifyhost(struct connectdata *conn, X509 *server_cert)
assumed that the data returned by ASN1_STRING_data() is null
terminated or does not contain embedded nulls." But also that
"The actual format of the data will depend on the actual string
- type itself: for example for and IA5String the data will be ASCII"
+ type itself: for example for an IA5String the data will be ASCII"
- Gisle researched the OpenSSL sources:
- "I checked the 0.9.6 and 0.9.8 sources before my patch and
- it always 0-terminates an IA5String."
+ It has been however verified that in 0.9.6 and 0.9.7, IA5String
+ is always zero-terminated.
*/
if((altlen == strlen(altptr)) &&
/* if this isn't true, there was an embedded zero in the name
@@ -1633,8 +1627,7 @@ static CURLcode verifyhost(struct connectdata *conn, X509 *server_cert)
/* In OpenSSL 0.9.7d and earlier, ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8 fails if the input
is already UTF-8 encoded. We check for this case and copy the raw
string manually to avoid the problem. This code can be made
- conditional in the future when OpenSSL has been fixed. Work-around
- brought by Alexis S. L. Carvalho. */
+ conditional in the future when OpenSSL has been fixed. */
if(tmp) {
if(ASN1_STRING_type(tmp) == V_ASN1_UTF8STRING) {
j = ASN1_STRING_length(tmp);
@@ -2654,11 +2647,11 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
}
/* Try building a chain using issuers in the trusted store first to avoid
- problems with server-sent legacy intermediates.
- Newer versions of OpenSSL do alternate chain checking by default which
- gives us the same fix without as much of a performance hit (slight), so we
- prefer that if available.
- https://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=3621&user=guest&pass=guest
+ problems with server-sent legacy intermediates. Newer versions of
+ OpenSSL do alternate chain checking by default which gives us the same
+ fix without as much of a performance hit (slight), so we prefer that if
+ available.
+ https://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=3621&user=guest&pass=guest
*/
#if defined(X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) && !defined(X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)
if(verifypeer) {