diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/vtls/openssl.c')
-rw-r--r-- | lib/vtls/openssl.c | 144 |
1 files changed, 102 insertions, 42 deletions
diff --git a/lib/vtls/openssl.c b/lib/vtls/openssl.c index e6f9fba34..01305372b 100644 --- a/lib/vtls/openssl.c +++ b/lib/vtls/openssl.c @@ -391,6 +391,31 @@ static char *ossl_strerror(unsigned long error, char *buf, size_t size) return buf; } +/* Return an extra data index for the connection data. + * This index can be used with SSL_get_ex_data() and SSL_set_ex_data(). + */ +static int ossl_get_ssl_conn_index(void) +{ + static int ssl_ex_data_conn_index = -1; + if(ssl_ex_data_conn_index < 0) { + ssl_ex_data_conn_index = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); + } + return ssl_ex_data_conn_index; +} + +/* Return an extra data index for the sockindex. + * This index can be used with SSL_get_ex_data() and SSL_set_ex_data(). + */ +static int ossl_get_ssl_sockindex_index(void) +{ + static int ssl_ex_data_sockindex_index = -1; + if(ssl_ex_data_sockindex_index < 0) { + ssl_ex_data_sockindex_index = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, + NULL); + } + return ssl_ex_data_sockindex_index; +} + static int passwd_callback(char *buf, int num, int encrypting, void *global_passwd) { @@ -1042,6 +1067,10 @@ static int Curl_ossl_init(void) } #endif + /* Initialize the extra data indexes */ + if(ossl_get_ssl_conn_index() < 0 || ossl_get_ssl_sockindex_index() < 0) + return 0; + return 1; } @@ -2190,6 +2219,62 @@ set_ssl_version_min_max(long *ctx_options, struct connectdata *conn, return CURLE_OK; } +/* The "new session" callback must return zero if the session can be removed + * or non-zero if the session has been put into the session cache. + */ +static int ossl_new_session_cb(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *ssl_sessionid) +{ + int res = 0; + struct connectdata *conn; + struct Curl_easy *data; + int sockindex; + curl_socket_t *sockindex_ptr; + int connectdata_idx = ossl_get_ssl_conn_index(); + int sockindex_idx = ossl_get_ssl_sockindex_index(); + + if(connectdata_idx < 0 || sockindex_idx < 0) + return 0; + + conn = (struct connectdata*) SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, connectdata_idx); + if(!conn) + return 0; + + data = conn->data; + + /* The sockindex has been stored as a pointer to an array element */ + sockindex_ptr = (curl_socket_t*) SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, sockindex_idx); + sockindex = (int)(sockindex_ptr - conn->sock); + + if(SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.sessionid)) { + bool incache; + void *old_ssl_sessionid = NULL; + + Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(conn); + incache = !(Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, &old_ssl_sessionid, NULL, + sockindex)); + if(incache) { + if(old_ssl_sessionid != ssl_sessionid) { + infof(data, "old SSL session ID is stale, removing\n"); + Curl_ssl_delsessionid(conn, old_ssl_sessionid); + incache = FALSE; + } + } + + if(!incache) { + if(!Curl_ssl_addsessionid(conn, ssl_sessionid, + 0 /* unknown size */, sockindex)) { + /* the session has been put into the session cache */ + res = 1; + } + else + failf(data, "failed to store ssl session"); + } + Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(conn); + } + + return res; +} + static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex) { CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; @@ -2586,6 +2671,14 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex) } #endif + /* Enable the session cache because it's a prerequisite for the "new session" + * callback. Use the "external storage" mode to avoid that OpenSSL creates + * an internal session cache. + */ + SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(BACKEND->ctx, + SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT | SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL); + SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(BACKEND->ctx, ossl_new_session_cb); + /* give application a chance to interfere with SSL set up. */ if(data->set.ssl.fsslctx) { result = (*data->set.ssl.fsslctx)(data, BACKEND->ctx, @@ -2632,6 +2725,15 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex) /* Check if there's a cached ID we can/should use here! */ if(SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.sessionid)) { void *ssl_sessionid = NULL; + int connectdata_idx = ossl_get_ssl_conn_index(); + int sockindex_idx = ossl_get_ssl_sockindex_index(); + + if(connectdata_idx >= 0 && sockindex_idx >= 0) { + /* Store the data needed for the "new session" callback. + * The sockindex is stored as a pointer to an array element. */ + SSL_set_ex_data(BACKEND->handle, connectdata_idx, conn); + SSL_set_ex_data(BACKEND->handle, sockindex_idx, conn->sock + sockindex); + } Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(conn); if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, &ssl_sessionid, NULL, sockindex)) { @@ -3383,52 +3485,10 @@ static CURLcode servercert(struct connectdata *conn, static CURLcode ossl_connect_step3(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex) { CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; - struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data; struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex]; DEBUGASSERT(ssl_connect_3 == connssl->connecting_state); - if(SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.sessionid)) { - bool incache; - SSL_SESSION *our_ssl_sessionid; - void *old_ssl_sessionid = NULL; - - our_ssl_sessionid = SSL_get1_session(BACKEND->handle); - - /* SSL_get1_session() will increment the reference count and the session - will stay in memory until explicitly freed with SSL_SESSION_free(3), - regardless of its state. */ - - Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(conn); - incache = !(Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, &old_ssl_sessionid, NULL, - sockindex)); - if(incache) { - if(old_ssl_sessionid != our_ssl_sessionid) { - infof(data, "old SSL session ID is stale, removing\n"); - Curl_ssl_delsessionid(conn, old_ssl_sessionid); - incache = FALSE; - } - } - - if(!incache) { - result = Curl_ssl_addsessionid(conn, our_ssl_sessionid, - 0 /* unknown size */, sockindex); - if(result) { - Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(conn); - failf(data, "failed to store ssl session"); - return result; - } - } - else { - /* Session was incache, so refcount already incremented earlier. - * Avoid further increments with each SSL_get1_session() call. - * This does not free the session as refcount remains > 0 - */ - SSL_SESSION_free(our_ssl_sessionid); - } - Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(conn); - } - /* * We check certificates to authenticate the server; otherwise we risk * man-in-the-middle attack; NEVERTHELESS, if we're told explicitly not to |