diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'lib')
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/cookie.c | 14 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/vtls/openssl.c | 25 | 
2 files changed, 12 insertions, 27 deletions
| diff --git a/lib/cookie.c b/lib/cookie.c index 9a9e14d01..53ca40237 100644 --- a/lib/cookie.c +++ b/lib/cookie.c @@ -819,22 +819,14 @@ Curl_cookie_add(struct Curl_easy *data,            badcookie = TRUE;          break;        case 1: -        /* This field got its explanation on the 23rd of May 2001 by -           Andrés García: - -           flag: A TRUE/FALSE value indicating if all machines within a given -           domain can access the variable. This value is set automatically by -           the browser, depending on the value you set for the domain. - -           As far as I can see, it is set to true when the cookie says +        /* flag: A TRUE/FALSE value indicating if all machines within a given +           domain can access the variable. Set TRUE when the cookie says             .domain.com and to false when the domain is complete www.domain.com          */          co->tailmatch = strcasecompare(ptr, "TRUE")?TRUE:FALSE;          break;        case 2: -        /* It turns out, that sometimes the file format allows the path -           field to remain not filled in, we try to detect this and work -           around it! Andrés García made us aware of this... */ +        /* The file format allows the path field to remain not filled in */          if(strcmp("TRUE", ptr) && strcmp("FALSE", ptr)) {            /* only if the path doesn't look like a boolean option! */            co->path = strdup(ptr); diff --git a/lib/vtls/openssl.c b/lib/vtls/openssl.c index fb9f27123..c2d195656 100644 --- a/lib/vtls/openssl.c +++ b/lib/vtls/openssl.c @@ -25,11 +25,6 @@   * but vtls.c should ever call or use these functions.   */ -/* - * The original SSLeay-using code for curl was written by Linas Vepstas and - * Sampo Kellomaki 1998. - */ -  #include "curl_setup.h"  #ifdef USE_OPENSSL @@ -1565,11 +1560,10 @@ static CURLcode verifyhost(struct connectdata *conn, X509 *server_cert)               assumed that the data returned by ASN1_STRING_data() is null               terminated or does not contain embedded nulls." But also that               "The actual format of the data will depend on the actual string -             type itself: for example for and IA5String the data will be ASCII" +             type itself: for example for an IA5String the data will be ASCII" -             Gisle researched the OpenSSL sources: -             "I checked the 0.9.6 and 0.9.8 sources before my patch and -             it always 0-terminates an IA5String." +             It has been however verified that in 0.9.6 and 0.9.7, IA5String +             is always zero-terminated.            */            if((altlen == strlen(altptr)) &&               /* if this isn't true, there was an embedded zero in the name @@ -1633,8 +1627,7 @@ static CURLcode verifyhost(struct connectdata *conn, X509 *server_cert)        /* In OpenSSL 0.9.7d and earlier, ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8 fails if the input           is already UTF-8 encoded. We check for this case and copy the raw           string manually to avoid the problem. This code can be made -         conditional in the future when OpenSSL has been fixed. Work-around -         brought by Alexis S. L. Carvalho. */ +         conditional in the future when OpenSSL has been fixed. */        if(tmp) {          if(ASN1_STRING_type(tmp) == V_ASN1_UTF8STRING) {            j = ASN1_STRING_length(tmp); @@ -2654,11 +2647,11 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)    }    /* Try building a chain using issuers in the trusted store first to avoid -  problems with server-sent legacy intermediates. -  Newer versions of OpenSSL do alternate chain checking by default which -  gives us the same fix without as much of a performance hit (slight), so we -  prefer that if available. -  https://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=3621&user=guest&pass=guest +     problems with server-sent legacy intermediates.  Newer versions of +     OpenSSL do alternate chain checking by default which gives us the same +     fix without as much of a performance hit (slight), so we prefer that if +     available. +     https://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=3621&user=guest&pass=guest    */  #if defined(X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) && !defined(X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)    if(verifypeer) { | 
