Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
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Trailing spaces were left unmodifed, assuming they were intentional.
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Consistently use CRLF instead. The mixed endings weren't
documented so I assume they were unintentional.
This change doesn't matter for curl itself but makes using
the tests with a proxy between curl and the test server
more convenient.
Tests that consistently use no carriage returns were
left unmodified as one can easily work around this.
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DNS cache entries populated with CURLOPT_RESOLVE were not properly freed
again when done using the multi interface.
Test case 1502 added to verify.
Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/bug/view.cgi?id=3575448
Reported by: Alex Gruz
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4 more bug fixes and 4 more contributors
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If we use memory functions (malloc, free, strdup etc) in C sources in
libcurl and we fail to include curl_memory.h or memdebug.h we either
fail to properly support user-provided memory callbacks or the memory
leak system of the test suite fails.
After Ajit's report of a failure in the first category in http_proxy.c,
I spotted a few in the second category as well. These problems are now
tested for by test 1132 which runs a perl program that scans for and
attempts to check that we use the correct include files if a memory
related function is used in the source code.
Reported by: Ajit Dhumale
Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/mail/lib-2012-11/0125.html
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Fixed checksrc warnings
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They broke the NTLM tests from 2023 to 2031.
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Re-send ACK for block X in case we receive block X data again while
waiting for block X+1.
Based on an earlier patch by Marcin Adamski.
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When nothing is told to configure, we should not enforce switching off
debug options with -g0 (or similar). We instead don't use -g at all in
that situaion and therefore allow the user's CFLAGS settings possibly
dictate what to do.
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And fix some newlines to be proper CRLF
Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/bug/view.cgi?id=3586741
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It either causes increased memory usage or exposes users
to the "CRIME attack" (CVE-2012-4929)
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The {MD5,SHA1,SHA256}_Init functions from OpenSSL are called directly
without any wrappers and they return 1 for success, 0 otherwise. Hence,
we have to use the same approach in all the wrapper functions that are
used for the other crypto libraries.
This commit fixes a regression introduced in commit dca8ae5f.
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Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/bug/view.cgi?id=3586338
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When using only 1 second precision, curl doesn't create new cnonce
values quickly enough for all uses.
For example, issuing the following command multiple times to a recent
Tomcat causes authentication failures:
curl --digest -utest:test http://tomcat.test.com:8080/manager/list
This is because curl uses the same cnonce for several seconds, but
doesn't increment the nonce counter. Tomcat correctly interprets
this as a replay attack and rejects the request.
When microsecond-precision is available, this commit causes curl to
change cnonce values much more frequently.
With microsecond resolution, increasing the nounce length used in the
headers to 32 was made to further reduce the risk of duplication.
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Instead of relying on the generic CURLE error for SCP or SFTP send
failures, try passing back a more suitable error if possible.
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Fixes bug #3578163:
http://sourceforge.net/tracker/?func=detail&atid=100976&aid=3578163&group_id=976
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... to release resources allocated at global scope
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and make local function static
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axTLS:
This will make the axTLS backend perform the RFC2818 checks, honoring
the VERIFYHOST setting similar to the OpenSSL backend.
Generic for OpenSSL and axTLS:
Move the hostcheck and cert_hostcheck functions from the lib/ssluse.c
files to make them genericly available for both the OpenSSL, axTLS and
other SSL backends. They are now in the new lib/hostcheck.c file.
CyaSSL:
CyaSSL now also has the RFC2818 checks enabled by default. There is a
limitation that the verifyhost can not be enabled exclusively on the
Subject CN field comparison. This SSL backend will thus behave like the
NSS and the GnuTLS (meaning: RFC2818 ok, or bust). In other words:
setting verifyhost to 0 or 1 will disable the Subject Alt Names checks
too.
Schannel:
Updated the schannel information messages: Split the IP address usage
message from the verifyhost setting and changed the message about
disabling SNI (Server Name Indication, used in HTTP virtual hosting)
into a message stating that the Subject Alternative Names checks are
being disabled when verifyhost is set to 0 or 1. As a side effect of
switching off the RFC2818 related servername checks with
SCH_CRED_NO_SERVERNAME_CHECK
(http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa923430.aspx) the SNI feature
is being disabled. This effect is not documented in MSDN, but Wireshark
output clearly shows the effect (details on the libcurl maillist).
PolarSSL:
Fix the prototype change in PolarSSL of ssl_set_session() and the move
of the peer_cert from the ssl_context to the ssl_session. Found this
change in the PolarSSL SVN between r1316 and r1317 where the
POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER was at 0x01010100. But to accommodate the Ubuntu
PolarSSL version 1.1.4 the check is to discriminate between lower then
PolarSSL version 1.2.0 and 1.2.0 and higher. Note: The PolarSSL SVN
trunk jumped from version 1.1.1 to 1.2.0.
Generic:
All the SSL backends are fixed and checked to work with the
ssl.verifyhost as a boolean, which is an internal API change.
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Since we added the curl_multi_wait function, the VERSIONINFO needed
updating.
Reported by: Patrick Monnerat
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Requested by Johnny Luong on the libcurl list.
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The text "additional stuff not fine" text was added for debug purposes a
while ago, but it isn't really helping anyone and for some reason some
Linux distributions provide their libcurls built with debug info still
present and thus (far too many) users get to read this info.
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6 new bugfixes and 3 more contributors...
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The logic previously checked for a started NTLM negotiation only for
host and not also with proxy, leading to problems doing POSTs over a
proxy NTLM that are larger than 2000 bytes. Now it includes proxy in the
check.
Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/bug/view.cgi?id=3582321
Reported by: John Suprock
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The bug report claimed it didn't work. This problem was probably fixed
in 473003fbdf.
Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/bug/view.cgi?id=3581898
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The existing logic only cut off the fragment from the separate 'path'
buffer which is used when sending HTTP to hosts. The buffer that held
the full URL used for proxies were not dealt with. It is now.
Test case 5 was updated to use a fragment on a URL over a proxy.
Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/bug/view.cgi?id=3579813
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Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/bug/view.cgi?id=3579286
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With the reversion of ce8311c7e49eca and the new clear logic, this flaw
is present and we allow it.
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As a handle can be re-used after having done HTTP auth in a previous
request, it must make sure to clear out the HTTP types that aren't
wanted in this new request.
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This test case verifies that bug 3582718 is fixed.
Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/bug/view.cgi?id=3582718
Reported by: Nick Zitzmann (originally)
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This reverts commit ce8311c7e49eca93c136b58efa6763853541ec97.
The commit made test 2024 work but caused a regression with repeated
Digest authentication. We need to fix this differently.
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After a research team wrote a document[1] that found several live source
codes out there in the wild that misused the CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYHOST
option thinking it was a boolean, this change now bans 1 as a value and
will make libcurl return error for it.
1 was never a sensible value to use in production but was introduced
back in the days to help debugging. It was always documented clearly
this way.
1 was never supported by all SSL backends in libcurl, so this cleanup
makes the treatment of it unified.
The report's list of mistakes for this option were all PHP code and
while there's a binding layer between libcurl and PHP, the PHP team has
decided that they have an as thin layer as possible on top of libcurl so
they will not alter or specifically filter a 'TRUE' value for this
particular option. I sympathize with that position.
[1] = http://daniel.haxx.se/blog/2012/10/25/libcurl-claimed-to-be-dangerous/
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