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vtls/gtls.c: In function ‘Curl_gtls_data_pending’:
vtls/gtls.c:1429:3: error: this ‘if’ clause does not guard... [-Werror=misleading-indentation]
if(conn->proxy_ssl[connindex].session &&
^~
vtls/gtls.c:1433:5: note: ...this statement, but the latter is misleadingly indented as if it is guarded by the ‘if’
return res;
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* HTTPS proxies:
An HTTPS proxy receives all transactions over an SSL/TLS connection.
Once a secure connection with the proxy is established, the user agent
uses the proxy as usual, including sending CONNECT requests to instruct
the proxy to establish a [usually secure] TCP tunnel with an origin
server. HTTPS proxies protect nearly all aspects of user-proxy
communications as opposed to HTTP proxies that receive all requests
(including CONNECT requests) in vulnerable clear text.
With HTTPS proxies, it is possible to have two concurrent _nested_
SSL/TLS sessions: the "outer" one between the user agent and the proxy
and the "inner" one between the user agent and the origin server
(through the proxy). This change adds supports for such nested sessions
as well.
A secure connection with a proxy requires its own set of the usual SSL
options (their actual descriptions differ and need polishing, see TODO):
--proxy-cacert FILE CA certificate to verify peer against
--proxy-capath DIR CA directory to verify peer against
--proxy-cert CERT[:PASSWD] Client certificate file and password
--proxy-cert-type TYPE Certificate file type (DER/PEM/ENG)
--proxy-ciphers LIST SSL ciphers to use
--proxy-crlfile FILE Get a CRL list in PEM format from the file
--proxy-insecure Allow connections to proxies with bad certs
--proxy-key KEY Private key file name
--proxy-key-type TYPE Private key file type (DER/PEM/ENG)
--proxy-pass PASS Pass phrase for the private key
--proxy-ssl-allow-beast Allow security flaw to improve interop
--proxy-sslv2 Use SSLv2
--proxy-sslv3 Use SSLv3
--proxy-tlsv1 Use TLSv1
--proxy-tlsuser USER TLS username
--proxy-tlspassword STRING TLS password
--proxy-tlsauthtype STRING TLS authentication type (default SRP)
All --proxy-foo options are independent from their --foo counterparts,
except --proxy-crlfile which defaults to --crlfile and --proxy-capath
which defaults to --capath.
Curl now also supports %{proxy_ssl_verify_result} --write-out variable,
similar to the existing %{ssl_verify_result} variable.
Supported backends: OpenSSL, GnuTLS, and NSS.
* A SOCKS proxy + HTTP/HTTPS proxy combination:
If both --socks* and --proxy options are given, Curl first connects to
the SOCKS proxy and then connects (through SOCKS) to the HTTP or HTTPS
proxy.
TODO: Update documentation for the new APIs and --proxy-* options.
Look for "Added in 7.XXX" marks.
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- Fix GnuTLS code for CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_2 that broke when the
TLS 1.3 support was added in 6ad3add.
- Homogenize across code for all backends the error message when TLS 1.3
is not available to "<backend>: TLS 1.3 is not yet supported".
- Return an error when a user-specified ssl version is unrecognized.
---
Prior to this change our code for some of the backends used the
'default' label in the switch statement (ie ver unrecognized) for
ssl.version and treated it the same as CURL_SSLVERSION_DEFAULT.
Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/mail/lib-2016-11/0048.html
Reported-by: Kamil Dudka
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Fully implemented with the NSS backend only for now.
Reviewed-by: Ray Satiro
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This is a followup to commit 811a693b
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We had some confusions on when each function was used. We should not act
differently on different locales anyway.
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Curl_select_ready() was the former API that was replaced with
Curl_select_check() a while back and the former arg setup was provided
with a define (in order to leave existing code unmodified).
Now we instead offer SOCKET_READABLE and SOCKET_WRITABLE for the most
common shortcuts where only one socket is checked. They're also more
visibly macros.
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Prior to this change we called Curl_ssl_getsessionid and
Curl_ssl_addsessionid regardless of whether session ID reusing was
enabled. According to comments that is in case session ID reuse was
disabled but then later enabled.
The old way was not intuitive and probably not something users expected.
When a user disables session ID caching I'd guess they don't expect the
session ID to be cached anyway in case the caching is later enabled.
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Sessionid cache management is inseparable from managing individual
session lifetimes. E.g. for reference-counted sessions (like those in
SChannel and OpenSSL engines) every session addition and removal
should be accompanied with refcount increment and decrement
respectively. Failing to do so synchronously leads to a race condition
that causes symptoms like use-after-free and memory corruption.
This commit:
- makes existing session cache locking explicit, thus allowing
individual engines to manage lock's scope.
- fixes OpenSSL and SChannel engines by putting refcount management
inside this lock's scope in relevant places.
- adds these explicit locking calls to other engines that use
sessionid cache to accommodate for this change. Note, however,
that it is unknown whether any of these engines could also have
this race.
Bug: https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/815
Fixes #815
Closes #847
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Only protocols that actually have a protocol registered for ALPN and NPN
should try to get that negotiated in the TLS handshake. That is only
HTTPS (well, http/1.1 and http/2) right now. Previously ALPN and NPN
would wrongly be used in all handshakes if libcurl was built with it
enabled.
Reported-by: Jay Satiro
Fixes #789
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Bug: https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/651
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When trying to verify a peer without having any root CA certificates
set, this makes libcurl use the TLS library's built in default as
fallback.
Closes #569
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... and stick to 1.1 for HTTP. This is in line with what browsers do and
should have very little risk.
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This reverts commit 64e959ffe37c436503f9fed1ce2d6ee6ae50bd9a.
Feedback-by: Dan Fandrich
URL: http://curl.haxx.se/mail/lib-2015-11/0062.html
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They tend to never get updated anyway so they're frequently inaccurate
and we never go back to revisit them anyway. We document issues to work
on properly in KNOWN_BUGS and TODO instead.
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If GnuTLS fails to read the certificate then include whatever reason it
provides in the failure message reported to the client.
Signed-off-by: Mike Crowe <mac@mcrowe.com>
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The gnutls vtls back-end was previously ignoring any password set via
CURLOPT_KEYPASSWD. Presumably this was because
gnutls_certificate_set_x509_key_file did not support encrypted keys.
gnutls now has a gnutls_certificate_set_x509_key_file2 function that
does support encrypted keys. Let's determine at compile time whether the
available gnutls supports this new function. If it does then use it to
pass the password. If it does not then emit a helpful diagnostic if a
password is set. This is preferable to the previous behaviour of just
failing to read the certificate without giving a reason in that case.
Signed-off-by: Mike Crowe <mac@mcrowe.com>
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Add a "pinnedpubkey" section to the "Server Certificate" verbose
Bug: https://github.com/bagder/curl/issues/410
Reported-by: W. Mark Kubacki
Closes #430
Closes #410
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- Change fopen calls to use FOPEN_READTEXT instead of "r" or "rt"
- Change fopen calls to use FOPEN_WRITETEXT instead of "w" or "wt"
This change is to explicitly specify when we need to read/write text.
Unfortunately 't' is not part of POSIX fopen so we can't specify it
directly. Instead we now have FOPEN_READTEXT, FOPEN_WRITETEXT.
Prior to this change we had an issue on Windows if an application that
uses libcurl overrides the default file mode to binary. The default file
mode in Windows is normally text mode (translation mode) and that's what
libcurl expects.
Bug: https://github.com/bagder/curl/pull/258#issuecomment-107093055
Reported-by: Orgad Shaneh
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Stop curl from failing when non-fatal alert is received during
handshake. This e.g. fixes lots of problems when working with https
sites through proxies.
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Also print the revocation reason if appropriate.
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Coverity CID 1291167 pointed out that 'rc' was received but never used when
gnutls_credentials_set() was used. Added return code check now.
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Coverity CID 1291165 pointed out 'chainp' could be dereferenced when
NULL if gnutls_certificate_get_peers() had previously failed.
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Coverity CID 1291166 pointed out that we could read this variable
uninitialized.
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Instead of priting cipher and MAC algorithms names separately, print the
whole cipher suite string which also includes the key exchange algorithm,
along with the negotiated TLS version.
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Since they already exist and will make comparing easier
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No need to use _MPRINTF_REPLACE internally.
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Carrying on from commit 037cd0d991, removed the following unimplemented
instances of curlssl_close_all():
Curl_axtls_close_all()
Curl_darwinssl_close_all()
Curl_cyassl_close_all()
Curl_gskit_close_all()
Curl_gtls_close_all()
Curl_nss_close_all()
Curl_polarssl_close_all()
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Also known as "status_request" or OCSP stapling, defined in RFC6066 section 8.
This requires GnuTLS 3.1.3 or higher to build, however it's recommended to use
at least GnuTLS 3.3.11 since previous versions had a bug that caused the OCSP
response verfication to fail even on valid responses.
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The return type of this function is a boolean value, and even uses a
bool internally, so use bool in the function declaration as well as
the variables that store the return value, to avoid any confusion.
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Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/bug/view.cgi?id=1437
Reported-by: Julien
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