From ad7291c1a9d6b2800fd7cb9174ced31d4bcbc439 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Stenberg Date: Thu, 14 Feb 2013 00:06:19 +0100 Subject: ossl_seed: fix the last resort PRNG seeding Instead of just abusing the pseudo-randomizer from Curl_FormBoundary(), this now uses Curl_ossl_random() to get entropy. --- lib/ssluse.c | 25 ++++++------------------- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) (limited to 'lib/ssluse.c') diff --git a/lib/ssluse.c b/lib/ssluse.c index 4a0dba734..79a61e49d 100644 --- a/lib/ssluse.c +++ b/lib/ssluse.c @@ -236,27 +236,14 @@ static int ossl_seed(struct SessionHandle *data) /* If we get here, it means we need to seed the PRNG using a "silly" approach! */ - { + do { int len; - char *area; - - /* Changed call to RAND_seed to use the underlying RAND_add implementation - * directly. Do this in a loop, with the amount of additional entropy - * being dependent upon the algorithm used by Curl_FormBoundary(): N bytes - * of a 7-bit ascii set. -- Richard Gorton, March 11 2003. - */ + unsigned char randb[64]; + Curl_ossl_random(data, randb, sizeof(randb)); - do { - area = Curl_FormBoundary(); - if(!area) - return 3; /* out of memory */ - - len = curlx_uztosi(strlen(area)); - RAND_add(area, len, (len >> 1)); - - free(area); /* now remove the random junk */ - } while(!RAND_status()); - } + len = sizeof(randb); + RAND_add(randb, len, (len >> 1)); + } while(!RAND_status()); /* generates a default path for the random seed file */ buf[0]=0; /* blank it first */ -- cgit v1.2.3