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authorNiall Sheridan <nsheridan@gmail.com>2016-12-28 14:54:57 +0000
committerNiall Sheridan <nsheridan@gmail.com>2016-12-28 15:01:58 +0000
commitd7129803488e81e6df691161b774908bf801e527 (patch)
tree5391b7ad94435086c5e3a5937e1118580a17edfd /vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme
parente0a1ccb64a637673195804513902cba6b1d4e97c (diff)
Add LetsEncrypt support
When configured the server will request a TLS certificate for the specified server name from LetsEncrypt
Diffstat (limited to 'vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme')
-rw-r--r--vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/acme.go946
-rw-r--r--vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/autocert.go793
-rw-r--r--vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/cache.go130
-rw-r--r--vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/renewal.go125
-rw-r--r--vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/jws.go153
-rw-r--r--vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/types.go209
6 files changed, 2356 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/acme.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/acme.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8aafada
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/acme.go
@@ -0,0 +1,946 @@
+// Copyright 2015 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+// Package acme provides an implementation of the
+// Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME) spec.
+// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-acme-acme-02 for details.
+//
+// Most common scenarios will want to use autocert subdirectory instead,
+// which provides automatic access to certificates from Let's Encrypt
+// and any other ACME-based CA.
+//
+// This package is a work in progress and makes no API stability promises.
+package acme
+
+import (
+ "bytes"
+ "crypto"
+ "crypto/ecdsa"
+ "crypto/elliptic"
+ "crypto/rand"
+ "crypto/sha256"
+ "crypto/tls"
+ "crypto/x509"
+ "encoding/base64"
+ "encoding/hex"
+ "encoding/json"
+ "encoding/pem"
+ "errors"
+ "fmt"
+ "io"
+ "io/ioutil"
+ "math/big"
+ "net/http"
+ "strconv"
+ "strings"
+ "sync"
+ "time"
+
+ "golang.org/x/net/context"
+ "golang.org/x/net/context/ctxhttp"
+)
+
+// LetsEncryptURL is the Directory endpoint of Let's Encrypt CA.
+const LetsEncryptURL = "https://acme-v01.api.letsencrypt.org/directory"
+
+const (
+ maxChainLen = 5 // max depth and breadth of a certificate chain
+ maxCertSize = 1 << 20 // max size of a certificate, in bytes
+)
+
+// CertOption is an optional argument type for Client methods which manipulate
+// certificate data.
+type CertOption interface {
+ privateCertOpt()
+}
+
+// WithKey creates an option holding a private/public key pair.
+// The private part signs a certificate, and the public part represents the signee.
+func WithKey(key crypto.Signer) CertOption {
+ return &certOptKey{key}
+}
+
+type certOptKey struct {
+ key crypto.Signer
+}
+
+func (*certOptKey) privateCertOpt() {}
+
+// WithTemplate creates an option for specifying a certificate template.
+// See x509.CreateCertificate for template usage details.
+//
+// In TLSSNIxChallengeCert methods, the template is also used as parent,
+// resulting in a self-signed certificate.
+// The DNSNames field of t is always overwritten for tls-sni challenge certs.
+func WithTemplate(t *x509.Certificate) CertOption {
+ return (*certOptTemplate)(t)
+}
+
+type certOptTemplate x509.Certificate
+
+func (*certOptTemplate) privateCertOpt() {}
+
+// Client is an ACME client.
+// The only required field is Key. An example of creating a client with a new key
+// is as follows:
+//
+// key, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
+// if err != nil {
+// log.Fatal(err)
+// }
+// client := &Client{Key: key}
+//
+type Client struct {
+ // Key is the account key used to register with a CA and sign requests.
+ // Key.Public() must return a *rsa.PublicKey or *ecdsa.PublicKey.
+ Key crypto.Signer
+
+ // HTTPClient optionally specifies an HTTP client to use
+ // instead of http.DefaultClient.
+ HTTPClient *http.Client
+
+ // DirectoryURL points to the CA directory endpoint.
+ // If empty, LetsEncryptURL is used.
+ // Mutating this value after a successful call of Client's Discover method
+ // will have no effect.
+ DirectoryURL string
+
+ dirMu sync.Mutex // guards writes to dir
+ dir *Directory // cached result of Client's Discover method
+}
+
+// Discover performs ACME server discovery using c.DirectoryURL.
+//
+// It caches successful result. So, subsequent calls will not result in
+// a network round-trip. This also means mutating c.DirectoryURL after successful call
+// of this method will have no effect.
+func (c *Client) Discover(ctx context.Context) (Directory, error) {
+ c.dirMu.Lock()
+ defer c.dirMu.Unlock()
+ if c.dir != nil {
+ return *c.dir, nil
+ }
+
+ dirURL := c.DirectoryURL
+ if dirURL == "" {
+ dirURL = LetsEncryptURL
+ }
+ res, err := ctxhttp.Get(ctx, c.HTTPClient, dirURL)
+ if err != nil {
+ return Directory{}, err
+ }
+ defer res.Body.Close()
+ if res.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
+ return Directory{}, responseError(res)
+ }
+
+ var v struct {
+ Reg string `json:"new-reg"`
+ Authz string `json:"new-authz"`
+ Cert string `json:"new-cert"`
+ Revoke string `json:"revoke-cert"`
+ Meta struct {
+ Terms string `json:"terms-of-service"`
+ Website string `json:"website"`
+ CAA []string `json:"caa-identities"`
+ }
+ }
+ if json.NewDecoder(res.Body).Decode(&v); err != nil {
+ return Directory{}, err
+ }
+ c.dir = &Directory{
+ RegURL: v.Reg,
+ AuthzURL: v.Authz,
+ CertURL: v.Cert,
+ RevokeURL: v.Revoke,
+ Terms: v.Meta.Terms,
+ Website: v.Meta.Website,
+ CAA: v.Meta.CAA,
+ }
+ return *c.dir, nil
+}
+
+// CreateCert requests a new certificate using the Certificate Signing Request csr encoded in DER format.
+// The exp argument indicates the desired certificate validity duration. CA may issue a certificate
+// with a different duration.
+// If the bundle argument is true, the returned value will also contain the CA (issuer) certificate chain.
+//
+// In the case where CA server does not provide the issued certificate in the response,
+// CreateCert will poll certURL using c.FetchCert, which will result in additional round-trips.
+// In such scenario the caller can cancel the polling with ctx.
+//
+// CreateCert returns an error if the CA's response or chain was unreasonably large.
+// Callers are encouraged to parse the returned value to ensure the certificate is valid and has the expected features.
+func (c *Client) CreateCert(ctx context.Context, csr []byte, exp time.Duration, bundle bool) (der [][]byte, certURL string, err error) {
+ if _, err := c.Discover(ctx); err != nil {
+ return nil, "", err
+ }
+
+ req := struct {
+ Resource string `json:"resource"`
+ CSR string `json:"csr"`
+ NotBefore string `json:"notBefore,omitempty"`
+ NotAfter string `json:"notAfter,omitempty"`
+ }{
+ Resource: "new-cert",
+ CSR: base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(csr),
+ }
+ now := timeNow()
+ req.NotBefore = now.Format(time.RFC3339)
+ if exp > 0 {
+ req.NotAfter = now.Add(exp).Format(time.RFC3339)
+ }
+
+ res, err := postJWS(ctx, c.HTTPClient, c.Key, c.dir.CertURL, req)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, "", err
+ }
+ defer res.Body.Close()
+ if res.StatusCode != http.StatusCreated {
+ return nil, "", responseError(res)
+ }
+
+ curl := res.Header.Get("location") // cert permanent URL
+ if res.ContentLength == 0 {
+ // no cert in the body; poll until we get it
+ cert, err := c.FetchCert(ctx, curl, bundle)
+ return cert, curl, err
+ }
+ // slurp issued cert and CA chain, if requested
+ cert, err := responseCert(ctx, c.HTTPClient, res, bundle)
+ return cert, curl, err
+}
+
+// FetchCert retrieves already issued certificate from the given url, in DER format.
+// It retries the request until the certificate is successfully retrieved,
+// context is cancelled by the caller or an error response is received.
+//
+// The returned value will also contain the CA (issuer) certificate if the bundle argument is true.
+//
+// FetchCert returns an error if the CA's response or chain was unreasonably large.
+// Callers are encouraged to parse the returned value to ensure the certificate is valid
+// and has expected features.
+func (c *Client) FetchCert(ctx context.Context, url string, bundle bool) ([][]byte, error) {
+ for {
+ res, err := ctxhttp.Get(ctx, c.HTTPClient, url)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+ defer res.Body.Close()
+ if res.StatusCode == http.StatusOK {
+ return responseCert(ctx, c.HTTPClient, res, bundle)
+ }
+ if res.StatusCode > 299 {
+ return nil, responseError(res)
+ }
+ d := retryAfter(res.Header.Get("retry-after"), 3*time.Second)
+ select {
+ case <-time.After(d):
+ // retry
+ case <-ctx.Done():
+ return nil, ctx.Err()
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+// RevokeCert revokes a previously issued certificate cert, provided in DER format.
+//
+// The key argument, used to sign the request, must be authorized
+// to revoke the certificate. It's up to the CA to decide which keys are authorized.
+// For instance, the key pair of the certificate may be authorized.
+// If the key is nil, c.Key is used instead.
+func (c *Client) RevokeCert(ctx context.Context, key crypto.Signer, cert []byte, reason CRLReasonCode) error {
+ if _, err := c.Discover(ctx); err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+
+ body := &struct {
+ Resource string `json:"resource"`
+ Cert string `json:"certificate"`
+ Reason int `json:"reason"`
+ }{
+ Resource: "revoke-cert",
+ Cert: base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(cert),
+ Reason: int(reason),
+ }
+ if key == nil {
+ key = c.Key
+ }
+ res, err := postJWS(ctx, c.HTTPClient, key, c.dir.RevokeURL, body)
+ if err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ defer res.Body.Close()
+ if res.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
+ return responseError(res)
+ }
+ return nil
+}
+
+// AcceptTOS always returns true to indicate the acceptance of a CA's Terms of Service
+// during account registration. See Register method of Client for more details.
+func AcceptTOS(tosURL string) bool { return true }
+
+// Register creates a new account registration by following the "new-reg" flow.
+// It returns registered account. The a argument is not modified.
+//
+// The registration may require the caller to agree to the CA's Terms of Service (TOS).
+// If so, and the account has not indicated the acceptance of the terms (see Account for details),
+// Register calls prompt with a TOS URL provided by the CA. Prompt should report
+// whether the caller agrees to the terms. To always accept the terms, the caller can use AcceptTOS.
+func (c *Client) Register(ctx context.Context, a *Account, prompt func(tosURL string) bool) (*Account, error) {
+ if _, err := c.Discover(ctx); err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+
+ var err error
+ if a, err = c.doReg(ctx, c.dir.RegURL, "new-reg", a); err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+ var accept bool
+ if a.CurrentTerms != "" && a.CurrentTerms != a.AgreedTerms {
+ accept = prompt(a.CurrentTerms)
+ }
+ if accept {
+ a.AgreedTerms = a.CurrentTerms
+ a, err = c.UpdateReg(ctx, a)
+ }
+ return a, err
+}
+
+// GetReg retrieves an existing registration.
+// The url argument is an Account URI.
+func (c *Client) GetReg(ctx context.Context, url string) (*Account, error) {
+ a, err := c.doReg(ctx, url, "reg", nil)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+ a.URI = url
+ return a, nil
+}
+
+// UpdateReg updates an existing registration.
+// It returns an updated account copy. The provided account is not modified.
+func (c *Client) UpdateReg(ctx context.Context, a *Account) (*Account, error) {
+ uri := a.URI
+ a, err := c.doReg(ctx, uri, "reg", a)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+ a.URI = uri
+ return a, nil
+}
+
+// Authorize performs the initial step in an authorization flow.
+// The caller will then need to choose from and perform a set of returned
+// challenges using c.Accept in order to successfully complete authorization.
+//
+// If an authorization has been previously granted, the CA may return
+// a valid authorization (Authorization.Status is StatusValid). If so, the caller
+// need not fulfill any challenge and can proceed to requesting a certificate.
+func (c *Client) Authorize(ctx context.Context, domain string) (*Authorization, error) {
+ if _, err := c.Discover(ctx); err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+
+ type authzID struct {
+ Type string `json:"type"`
+ Value string `json:"value"`
+ }
+ req := struct {
+ Resource string `json:"resource"`
+ Identifier authzID `json:"identifier"`
+ }{
+ Resource: "new-authz",
+ Identifier: authzID{Type: "dns", Value: domain},
+ }
+ res, err := postJWS(ctx, c.HTTPClient, c.Key, c.dir.AuthzURL, req)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+ defer res.Body.Close()
+ if res.StatusCode != http.StatusCreated {
+ return nil, responseError(res)
+ }
+
+ var v wireAuthz
+ if err := json.NewDecoder(res.Body).Decode(&v); err != nil {
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: invalid response: %v", err)
+ }
+ if v.Status != StatusPending && v.Status != StatusValid {
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: unexpected status: %s", v.Status)
+ }
+ return v.authorization(res.Header.Get("Location")), nil
+}
+
+// GetAuthorization retrieves an authorization identified by the given URL.
+//
+// If a caller needs to poll an authorization until its status is final,
+// see the WaitAuthorization method.
+func (c *Client) GetAuthorization(ctx context.Context, url string) (*Authorization, error) {
+ res, err := ctxhttp.Get(ctx, c.HTTPClient, url)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+ defer res.Body.Close()
+ if res.StatusCode != http.StatusOK && res.StatusCode != http.StatusAccepted {
+ return nil, responseError(res)
+ }
+ var v wireAuthz
+ if err := json.NewDecoder(res.Body).Decode(&v); err != nil {
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: invalid response: %v", err)
+ }
+ return v.authorization(url), nil
+}
+
+// RevokeAuthorization relinquishes an existing authorization identified
+// by the given URL.
+// The url argument is an Authorization.URI value.
+//
+// If successful, the caller will be required to obtain a new authorization
+// using the Authorize method before being able to request a new certificate
+// for the domain associated with the authorization.
+//
+// It does not revoke existing certificates.
+func (c *Client) RevokeAuthorization(ctx context.Context, url string) error {
+ req := struct {
+ Resource string `json:"resource"`
+ Status string `json:"status"`
+ Delete bool `json:"delete"`
+ }{
+ Resource: "authz",
+ Status: "deactivated",
+ Delete: true,
+ }
+ res, err := postJWS(ctx, c.HTTPClient, c.Key, url, req)
+ if err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ defer res.Body.Close()
+ if res.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
+ return responseError(res)
+ }
+ return nil
+}
+
+// WaitAuthorization polls an authorization at the given URL
+// until it is in one of the final states, StatusValid or StatusInvalid,
+// or the context is done.
+//
+// It returns a non-nil Authorization only if its Status is StatusValid.
+// In all other cases WaitAuthorization returns an error.
+// If the Status is StatusInvalid, the returned error is ErrAuthorizationFailed.
+func (c *Client) WaitAuthorization(ctx context.Context, url string) (*Authorization, error) {
+ var count int
+ sleep := func(v string, inc int) error {
+ count += inc
+ d := backoff(count, 10*time.Second)
+ d = retryAfter(v, d)
+ wakeup := time.NewTimer(d)
+ defer wakeup.Stop()
+ select {
+ case <-ctx.Done():
+ return ctx.Err()
+ case <-wakeup.C:
+ return nil
+ }
+ }
+
+ for {
+ res, err := ctxhttp.Get(ctx, c.HTTPClient, url)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+ retry := res.Header.Get("retry-after")
+ if res.StatusCode != http.StatusOK && res.StatusCode != http.StatusAccepted {
+ res.Body.Close()
+ if err := sleep(retry, 1); err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+ continue
+ }
+ var raw wireAuthz
+ err = json.NewDecoder(res.Body).Decode(&raw)
+ res.Body.Close()
+ if err != nil {
+ if err := sleep(retry, 0); err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+ continue
+ }
+ if raw.Status == StatusValid {
+ return raw.authorization(url), nil
+ }
+ if raw.Status == StatusInvalid {
+ return nil, ErrAuthorizationFailed
+ }
+ if err := sleep(retry, 0); err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+// GetChallenge retrieves the current status of an challenge.
+//
+// A client typically polls a challenge status using this method.
+func (c *Client) GetChallenge(ctx context.Context, url string) (*Challenge, error) {
+ res, err := ctxhttp.Get(ctx, c.HTTPClient, url)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+ defer res.Body.Close()
+ if res.StatusCode != http.StatusOK && res.StatusCode != http.StatusAccepted {
+ return nil, responseError(res)
+ }
+ v := wireChallenge{URI: url}
+ if err := json.NewDecoder(res.Body).Decode(&v); err != nil {
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: invalid response: %v", err)
+ }
+ return v.challenge(), nil
+}
+
+// Accept informs the server that the client accepts one of its challenges
+// previously obtained with c.Authorize.
+//
+// The server will then perform the validation asynchronously.
+func (c *Client) Accept(ctx context.Context, chal *Challenge) (*Challenge, error) {
+ auth, err := keyAuth(c.Key.Public(), chal.Token)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+
+ req := struct {
+ Resource string `json:"resource"`
+ Type string `json:"type"`
+ Auth string `json:"keyAuthorization"`
+ }{
+ Resource: "challenge",
+ Type: chal.Type,
+ Auth: auth,
+ }
+ res, err := postJWS(ctx, c.HTTPClient, c.Key, chal.URI, req)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+ defer res.Body.Close()
+ // Note: the protocol specifies 200 as the expected response code, but
+ // letsencrypt seems to be returning 202.
+ if res.StatusCode != http.StatusOK && res.StatusCode != http.StatusAccepted {
+ return nil, responseError(res)
+ }
+
+ var v wireChallenge
+ if err := json.NewDecoder(res.Body).Decode(&v); err != nil {
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: invalid response: %v", err)
+ }
+ return v.challenge(), nil
+}
+
+// DNS01ChallengeRecord returns a DNS record value for a dns-01 challenge response.
+// A TXT record containing the returned value must be provisioned under
+// "_acme-challenge" name of the domain being validated.
+//
+// The token argument is a Challenge.Token value.
+func (c *Client) DNS01ChallengeRecord(token string) (string, error) {
+ ka, err := keyAuth(c.Key.Public(), token)
+ if err != nil {
+ return "", err
+ }
+ b := sha256.Sum256([]byte(ka))
+ return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(b[:]), nil
+}
+
+// HTTP01ChallengeResponse returns the response for an http-01 challenge.
+// Servers should respond with the value to HTTP requests at the URL path
+// provided by HTTP01ChallengePath to validate the challenge and prove control
+// over a domain name.
+//
+// The token argument is a Challenge.Token value.
+func (c *Client) HTTP01ChallengeResponse(token string) (string, error) {
+ return keyAuth(c.Key.Public(), token)
+}
+
+// HTTP01ChallengePath returns the URL path at which the response for an http-01 challenge
+// should be provided by the servers.
+// The response value can be obtained with HTTP01ChallengeResponse.
+//
+// The token argument is a Challenge.Token value.
+func (c *Client) HTTP01ChallengePath(token string) string {
+ return "/.well-known/acme-challenge/" + token
+}
+
+// TLSSNI01ChallengeCert creates a certificate for TLS-SNI-01 challenge response.
+// Servers can present the certificate to validate the challenge and prove control
+// over a domain name.
+//
+// The implementation is incomplete in that the returned value is a single certificate,
+// computed only for Z0 of the key authorization. ACME CAs are expected to update
+// their implementations to use the newer version, TLS-SNI-02.
+// For more details on TLS-SNI-01 see https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-acme-acme-01#section-7.3.
+//
+// The token argument is a Challenge.Token value.
+// If a WithKey option is provided, its private part signs the returned cert,
+// and the public part is used to specify the signee.
+// If no WithKey option is provided, a new ECDSA key is generated using P-256 curve.
+//
+// The returned certificate is valid for the next 24 hours and must be presented only when
+// the server name of the client hello matches exactly the returned name value.
+func (c *Client) TLSSNI01ChallengeCert(token string, opt ...CertOption) (cert tls.Certificate, name string, err error) {
+ ka, err := keyAuth(c.Key.Public(), token)
+ if err != nil {
+ return tls.Certificate{}, "", err
+ }
+ b := sha256.Sum256([]byte(ka))
+ h := hex.EncodeToString(b[:])
+ name = fmt.Sprintf("%s.%s.acme.invalid", h[:32], h[32:])
+ cert, err = tlsChallengeCert([]string{name}, opt)
+ if err != nil {
+ return tls.Certificate{}, "", err
+ }
+ return cert, name, nil
+}
+
+// TLSSNI02ChallengeCert creates a certificate for TLS-SNI-02 challenge response.
+// Servers can present the certificate to validate the challenge and prove control
+// over a domain name. For more details on TLS-SNI-02 see
+// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-acme-acme-03#section-7.3.
+//
+// The token argument is a Challenge.Token value.
+// If a WithKey option is provided, its private part signs the returned cert,
+// and the public part is used to specify the signee.
+// If no WithKey option is provided, a new ECDSA key is generated using P-256 curve.
+//
+// The returned certificate is valid for the next 24 hours and must be presented only when
+// the server name in the client hello matches exactly the returned name value.
+func (c *Client) TLSSNI02ChallengeCert(token string, opt ...CertOption) (cert tls.Certificate, name string, err error) {
+ b := sha256.Sum256([]byte(token))
+ h := hex.EncodeToString(b[:])
+ sanA := fmt.Sprintf("%s.%s.token.acme.invalid", h[:32], h[32:])
+
+ ka, err := keyAuth(c.Key.Public(), token)
+ if err != nil {
+ return tls.Certificate{}, "", err
+ }
+ b = sha256.Sum256([]byte(ka))
+ h = hex.EncodeToString(b[:])
+ sanB := fmt.Sprintf("%s.%s.ka.acme.invalid", h[:32], h[32:])
+
+ cert, err = tlsChallengeCert([]string{sanA, sanB}, opt)
+ if err != nil {
+ return tls.Certificate{}, "", err
+ }
+ return cert, sanA, nil
+}
+
+// doReg sends all types of registration requests.
+// The type of request is identified by typ argument, which is a "resource"
+// in the ACME spec terms.
+//
+// A non-nil acct argument indicates whether the intention is to mutate data
+// of the Account. Only Contact and Agreement of its fields are used
+// in such cases.
+func (c *Client) doReg(ctx context.Context, url string, typ string, acct *Account) (*Account, error) {
+ req := struct {
+ Resource string `json:"resource"`
+ Contact []string `json:"contact,omitempty"`
+ Agreement string `json:"agreement,omitempty"`
+ }{
+ Resource: typ,
+ }
+ if acct != nil {
+ req.Contact = acct.Contact
+ req.Agreement = acct.AgreedTerms
+ }
+ res, err := postJWS(ctx, c.HTTPClient, c.Key, url, req)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+ defer res.Body.Close()
+ if res.StatusCode < 200 || res.StatusCode > 299 {
+ return nil, responseError(res)
+ }
+
+ var v struct {
+ Contact []string
+ Agreement string
+ Authorizations string
+ Certificates string
+ }
+ if err := json.NewDecoder(res.Body).Decode(&v); err != nil {
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: invalid response: %v", err)
+ }
+ var tos string
+ if v := linkHeader(res.Header, "terms-of-service"); len(v) > 0 {
+ tos = v[0]
+ }
+ var authz string
+ if v := linkHeader(res.Header, "next"); len(v) > 0 {
+ authz = v[0]
+ }
+ return &Account{
+ URI: res.Header.Get("Location"),
+ Contact: v.Contact,
+ AgreedTerms: v.Agreement,
+ CurrentTerms: tos,
+ Authz: authz,
+ Authorizations: v.Authorizations,
+ Certificates: v.Certificates,
+ }, nil
+}
+
+func responseCert(ctx context.Context, client *http.Client, res *http.Response, bundle bool) ([][]byte, error) {
+ b, err := ioutil.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(res.Body, maxCertSize+1))
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: response stream: %v", err)
+ }
+ if len(b) > maxCertSize {
+ return nil, errors.New("acme: certificate is too big")
+ }
+ cert := [][]byte{b}
+ if !bundle {
+ return cert, nil
+ }
+
+ // Append CA chain cert(s).
+ // At least one is required according to the spec:
+ // https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-acme-acme-03#section-6.3.1
+ up := linkHeader(res.Header, "up")
+ if len(up) == 0 {
+ return nil, errors.New("acme: rel=up link not found")
+ }
+ if len(up) > maxChainLen {
+ return nil, errors.New("acme: rel=up link is too large")
+ }
+ for _, url := range up {
+ cc, err := chainCert(ctx, client, url, 0)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+ cert = append(cert, cc...)
+ }
+ return cert, nil
+}
+
+// responseError creates an error of Error type from resp.
+func responseError(resp *http.Response) error {
+ // don't care if ReadAll returns an error:
+ // json.Unmarshal will fail in that case anyway
+ b, _ := ioutil.ReadAll(resp.Body)
+ e := struct {
+ Status int
+ Type string
+ Detail string
+ }{
+ Status: resp.StatusCode,
+ }
+ if err := json.Unmarshal(b, &e); err != nil {
+ // this is not a regular error response:
+ // populate detail with anything we received,
+ // e.Status will already contain HTTP response code value
+ e.Detail = string(b)
+ if e.Detail == "" {
+ e.Detail = resp.Status
+ }
+ }
+ return &Error{
+ StatusCode: e.Status,
+ ProblemType: e.Type,
+ Detail: e.Detail,
+ Header: resp.Header,
+ }
+}
+
+// chainCert fetches CA certificate chain recursively by following "up" links.
+// Each recursive call increments the depth by 1, resulting in an error
+// if the recursion level reaches maxChainLen.
+//
+// First chainCert call starts with depth of 0.
+func chainCert(ctx context.Context, client *http.Client, url string, depth int) ([][]byte, error) {
+ if depth >= maxChainLen {
+ return nil, errors.New("acme: certificate chain is too deep")
+ }
+
+ res, err := ctxhttp.Get(ctx, client, url)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+ defer res.Body.Close()
+ if res.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
+ return nil, responseError(res)
+ }
+ b, err := ioutil.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(res.Body, maxCertSize+1))
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+ if len(b) > maxCertSize {
+ return nil, errors.New("acme: certificate is too big")
+ }
+ chain := [][]byte{b}
+
+ uplink := linkHeader(res.Header, "up")
+ if len(uplink) > maxChainLen {
+ return nil, errors.New("acme: certificate chain is too large")
+ }
+ for _, up := range uplink {
+ cc, err := chainCert(ctx, client, up, depth+1)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+ chain = append(chain, cc...)
+ }
+
+ return chain, nil
+}
+
+// postJWS signs the body with the given key and POSTs it to the provided url.
+// The body argument must be JSON-serializable.
+func postJWS(ctx context.Context, client *http.Client, key crypto.Signer, url string, body interface{}) (*http.Response, error) {
+ nonce, err := fetchNonce(ctx, client, url)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+ b, err := jwsEncodeJSON(body, key, nonce)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+ return ctxhttp.Post(ctx, client, url, "application/jose+json", bytes.NewReader(b))
+}
+
+func fetchNonce(ctx context.Context, client *http.Client, url string) (string, error) {
+ resp, err := ctxhttp.Head(ctx, client, url)
+ if err != nil {
+ return "", nil
+ }
+ defer resp.Body.Close()
+ enc := resp.Header.Get("replay-nonce")
+ if enc == "" {
+ return "", errors.New("acme: nonce not found")
+ }
+ return enc, nil
+}
+
+// linkHeader returns URI-Reference values of all Link headers
+// with relation-type rel.
+// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5988#section-5 for details.
+func linkHeader(h http.Header, rel string) []string {
+ var links []string
+ for _, v := range h["Link"] {
+ parts := strings.Split(v, ";")
+ for _, p := range parts {
+ p = strings.TrimSpace(p)
+ if !strings.HasPrefix(p, "rel=") {
+ continue
+ }
+ if v := strings.Trim(p[4:], `"`); v == rel {
+ links = append(links, strings.Trim(parts[0], "<>"))
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return links
+}
+
+// retryAfter parses a Retry-After HTTP header value,
+// trying to convert v into an int (seconds) or use http.ParseTime otherwise.
+// It returns d if v cannot be parsed.
+func retryAfter(v string, d time.Duration) time.Duration {
+ if i, err := strconv.Atoi(v); err == nil {
+ return time.Duration(i) * time.Second
+ }
+ t, err := http.ParseTime(v)
+ if err != nil {
+ return d
+ }
+ return t.Sub(timeNow())
+}
+
+// backoff computes a duration after which an n+1 retry iteration should occur
+// using truncated exponential backoff algorithm.
+//
+// The n argument is always bounded between 0 and 30.
+// The max argument defines upper bound for the returned value.
+func backoff(n int, max time.Duration) time.Duration {
+ if n < 0 {
+ n = 0
+ }
+ if n > 30 {
+ n = 30
+ }
+ var d time.Duration
+ if x, err := rand.Int(rand.Reader, big.NewInt(1000)); err == nil {
+ d = time.Duration(x.Int64()) * time.Millisecond
+ }
+ d += time.Duration(1<<uint(n)) * time.Second
+ if d > max {
+ return max
+ }
+ return d
+}
+
+// keyAuth generates a key authorization string for a given token.
+func keyAuth(pub crypto.PublicKey, token string) (string, error) {
+ th, err := JWKThumbprint(pub)
+ if err != nil {
+ return "", err
+ }
+ return fmt.Sprintf("%s.%s", token, th), nil
+}
+
+// tlsChallengeCert creates a temporary certificate for TLS-SNI challenges
+// with the given SANs and auto-generated public/private key pair.
+// To create a cert with a custom key pair, specify WithKey option.
+func tlsChallengeCert(san []string, opt []CertOption) (tls.Certificate, error) {
+ var (
+ key crypto.Signer
+ tmpl *x509.Certificate
+ )
+ for _, o := range opt {
+ switch o := o.(type) {
+ case *certOptKey:
+ if key != nil {
+ return tls.Certificate{}, errors.New("acme: duplicate key option")
+ }
+ key = o.key
+ case *certOptTemplate:
+ var t = *(*x509.Certificate)(o) // shallow copy is ok
+ tmpl = &t
+ default:
+ // package's fault, if we let this happen:
+ panic(fmt.Sprintf("unsupported option type %T", o))
+ }
+ }
+ if key == nil {
+ var err error
+ if key, err = ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader); err != nil {
+ return tls.Certificate{}, err
+ }
+ }
+ if tmpl == nil {
+ tmpl = &x509.Certificate{
+ SerialNumber: big.NewInt(1),
+ NotBefore: time.Now(),
+ NotAfter: time.Now().Add(24 * time.Hour),
+ BasicConstraintsValid: true,
+ KeyUsage: x509.KeyUsageKeyEncipherment,
+ }
+ }
+ tmpl.DNSNames = san
+
+ der, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, tmpl, tmpl, key.Public(), key)
+ if err != nil {
+ return tls.Certificate{}, err
+ }
+ return tls.Certificate{
+ Certificate: [][]byte{der},
+ PrivateKey: key,
+ }, nil
+}
+
+// encodePEM returns b encoded as PEM with block of type typ.
+func encodePEM(typ string, b []byte) []byte {
+ pb := &pem.Block{Type: typ, Bytes: b}
+ return pem.EncodeToMemory(pb)
+}
+
+// timeNow is useful for testing for fixed current time.
+var timeNow = time.Now
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/autocert.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/autocert.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4b15816
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/autocert.go
@@ -0,0 +1,793 @@
+// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+// Package autocert provides automatic access to certificates from Let's Encrypt
+// and any other ACME-based CA.
+//
+// This package is a work in progress and makes no API stability promises.
+package autocert
+
+import (
+ "bytes"
+ "crypto"
+ "crypto/ecdsa"
+ "crypto/elliptic"
+ "crypto/rand"
+ "crypto/rsa"
+ "crypto/tls"
+ "crypto/x509"
+ "crypto/x509/pkix"
+ "encoding/pem"
+ "errors"
+ "fmt"
+ "io"
+ mathrand "math/rand"
+ "net/http"
+ "strconv"
+ "strings"
+ "sync"
+ "time"
+
+ "golang.org/x/crypto/acme"
+ "golang.org/x/net/context"
+)
+
+// pseudoRand is safe for concurrent use.
+var pseudoRand *lockedMathRand
+
+func init() {
+ src := mathrand.NewSource(timeNow().UnixNano())
+ pseudoRand = &lockedMathRand{rnd: mathrand.New(src)}
+}
+
+// AcceptTOS always returns true to indicate the acceptance of a CA Terms of Service
+// during account registration.
+func AcceptTOS(tosURL string) bool { return true }
+
+// HostPolicy specifies which host names the Manager is allowed to respond to.
+// It returns a non-nil error if the host should be rejected.
+// The returned error is accessible via tls.Conn.Handshake and its callers.
+// See Manager's HostPolicy field and GetCertificate method docs for more details.
+type HostPolicy func(ctx context.Context, host string) error
+
+// HostWhitelist returns a policy where only the specified host names are allowed.
+// Only exact matches are currently supported. Subdomains, regexp or wildcard
+// will not match.
+func HostWhitelist(hosts ...string) HostPolicy {
+ whitelist := make(map[string]bool, len(hosts))
+ for _, h := range hosts {
+ whitelist[h] = true
+ }
+ return func(_ context.Context, host string) error {
+ if !whitelist[host] {
+ return errors.New("acme/autocert: host not configured")
+ }
+ return nil
+ }
+}
+
+// defaultHostPolicy is used when Manager.HostPolicy is not set.
+func defaultHostPolicy(context.Context, string) error {
+ return nil
+}
+
+// Manager is a stateful certificate manager built on top of acme.Client.
+// It obtains and refreshes certificates automatically,
+// as well as providing them to a TLS server via tls.Config.
+//
+// A simple usage example:
+//
+// m := autocert.Manager{
+// Prompt: autocert.AcceptTOS,
+// HostPolicy: autocert.HostWhitelist("example.org"),
+// }
+// s := &http.Server{
+// Addr: ":https",
+// TLSConfig: &tls.Config{GetCertificate: m.GetCertificate},
+// }
+// s.ListenAndServeTLS("", "")
+//
+// To preserve issued certificates and improve overall performance,
+// use a cache implementation of Cache. For instance, DirCache.
+type Manager struct {
+ // Prompt specifies a callback function to conditionally accept a CA's Terms of Service (TOS).
+ // The registration may require the caller to agree to the CA's TOS.
+ // If so, Manager calls Prompt with a TOS URL provided by the CA. Prompt should report
+ // whether the caller agrees to the terms.
+ //
+ // To always accept the terms, the callers can use AcceptTOS.
+ Prompt func(tosURL string) bool
+
+ // Cache optionally stores and retrieves previously-obtained certificates.
+ // If nil, certs will only be cached for the lifetime of the Manager.
+ //
+ // Manager passes the Cache certificates data encoded in PEM, with private/public
+ // parts combined in a single Cache.Put call, private key first.
+ Cache Cache
+
+ // HostPolicy controls which domains the Manager will attempt
+ // to retrieve new certificates for. It does not affect cached certs.
+ //
+ // If non-nil, HostPolicy is called before requesting a new cert.
+ // If nil, all hosts are currently allowed. This is not recommended,
+ // as it opens a potential attack where clients connect to a server
+ // by IP address and pretend to be asking for an incorrect host name.
+ // Manager will attempt to obtain a certificate for that host, incorrectly,
+ // eventually reaching the CA's rate limit for certificate requests
+ // and making it impossible to obtain actual certificates.
+ //
+ // See GetCertificate for more details.
+ HostPolicy HostPolicy
+
+ // RenewBefore optionally specifies how early certificates should
+ // be renewed before they expire.
+ //
+ // If zero, they're renewed 1 week before expiration.
+ RenewBefore time.Duration
+
+ // Client is used to perform low-level operations, such as account registration
+ // and requesting new certificates.
+ // If Client is nil, a zero-value acme.Client is used with acme.LetsEncryptURL
+ // directory endpoint and a newly-generated ECDSA P-256 key.
+ //
+ // Mutating the field after the first call of GetCertificate method will have no effect.
+ Client *acme.Client
+
+ // Email optionally specifies a contact email address.
+ // This is used by CAs, such as Let's Encrypt, to notify about problems
+ // with issued certificates.
+ //
+ // If the Client's account key is already registered, Email is not used.
+ Email string
+
+ // ForceRSA makes the Manager generate certificates with 2048-bit RSA keys.
+ //
+ // If false, a default is used. Currently the default
+ // is EC-based keys using the P-256 curve.
+ ForceRSA bool
+
+ clientMu sync.Mutex
+ client *acme.Client // initialized by acmeClient method
+
+ stateMu sync.Mutex
+ state map[string]*certState // keyed by domain name
+
+ // tokenCert is keyed by token domain name, which matches server name
+ // of ClientHello. Keys always have ".acme.invalid" suffix.
+ tokenCertMu sync.RWMutex
+ tokenCert map[string]*tls.Certificate
+
+ // renewal tracks the set of domains currently running renewal timers.
+ // It is keyed by domain name.
+ renewalMu sync.Mutex
+ renewal map[string]*domainRenewal
+}
+
+// GetCertificate implements the tls.Config.GetCertificate hook.
+// It provides a TLS certificate for hello.ServerName host, including answering
+// *.acme.invalid (TLS-SNI) challenges. All other fields of hello are ignored.
+//
+// If m.HostPolicy is non-nil, GetCertificate calls the policy before requesting
+// a new cert. A non-nil error returned from m.HostPolicy halts TLS negotiation.
+// The error is propagated back to the caller of GetCertificate and is user-visible.
+// This does not affect cached certs. See HostPolicy field description for more details.
+func (m *Manager) GetCertificate(hello *tls.ClientHelloInfo) (*tls.Certificate, error) {
+ name := hello.ServerName
+ if name == "" {
+ return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: missing server name")
+ }
+
+ // check whether this is a token cert requested for TLS-SNI challenge
+ if strings.HasSuffix(name, ".acme.invalid") {
+ m.tokenCertMu.RLock()
+ defer m.tokenCertMu.RUnlock()
+ if cert := m.tokenCert[name]; cert != nil {
+ return cert, nil
+ }
+ if cert, err := m.cacheGet(name); err == nil {
+ return cert, nil
+ }
+ // TODO: cache error results?
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme/autocert: no token cert for %q", name)
+ }
+
+ // regular domain
+ name = strings.TrimSuffix(name, ".") // golang.org/issue/18114
+ cert, err := m.cert(name)
+ if err == nil {
+ return cert, nil
+ }
+ if err != ErrCacheMiss {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+
+ // first-time
+ ctx := context.Background() // TODO: use a deadline?
+ if err := m.hostPolicy()(ctx, name); err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+ cert, err = m.createCert(ctx, name)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+ m.cachePut(name, cert)
+ return cert, nil
+}
+
+// cert returns an existing certificate either from m.state or cache.
+// If a certificate is found in cache but not in m.state, the latter will be filled
+// with the cached value.
+func (m *Manager) cert(name string) (*tls.Certificate, error) {
+ m.stateMu.Lock()
+ if s, ok := m.state[name]; ok {
+ m.stateMu.Unlock()
+ s.RLock()
+ defer s.RUnlock()
+ return s.tlscert()
+ }
+ defer m.stateMu.Unlock()
+ cert, err := m.cacheGet(name)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+ signer, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer)
+ if !ok {
+ return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: private key cannot sign")
+ }
+ if m.state == nil {
+ m.state = make(map[string]*certState)
+ }
+ s := &certState{
+ key: signer,
+ cert: cert.Certificate,
+ leaf: cert.Leaf,
+ }
+ m.state[name] = s
+ go m.renew(name, s.key, s.leaf.NotAfter)
+ return cert, nil
+}
+
+// cacheGet always returns a valid certificate, or an error otherwise.
+func (m *Manager) cacheGet(domain string) (*tls.Certificate, error) {
+ if m.Cache == nil {
+ return nil, ErrCacheMiss
+ }
+ // TODO: might want to define a cache timeout on m
+ ctx := context.Background()
+ data, err := m.Cache.Get(ctx, domain)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+
+ // private
+ priv, pub := pem.Decode(data)
+ if priv == nil || !strings.Contains(priv.Type, "PRIVATE") {
+ return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: no private key found in cache")
+ }
+ privKey, err := parsePrivateKey(priv.Bytes)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+
+ // public
+ var pubDER [][]byte
+ for len(pub) > 0 {
+ var b *pem.Block
+ b, pub = pem.Decode(pub)
+ if b == nil {
+ break
+ }
+ pubDER = append(pubDER, b.Bytes)
+ }
+ if len(pub) > 0 {
+ return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: invalid public key")
+ }
+
+ // verify and create TLS cert
+ leaf, err := validCert(domain, pubDER, privKey)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+ tlscert := &tls.Certificate{
+ Certificate: pubDER,
+ PrivateKey: privKey,
+ Leaf: leaf,
+ }
+ return tlscert, nil
+}
+
+func (m *Manager) cachePut(domain string, tlscert *tls.Certificate) error {
+ if m.Cache == nil {
+ return nil
+ }
+
+ // contains PEM-encoded data
+ var buf bytes.Buffer
+
+ // private
+ switch key := tlscert.PrivateKey.(type) {
+ case *ecdsa.PrivateKey:
+ if err := encodeECDSAKey(&buf, key); err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ case *rsa.PrivateKey:
+ b := x509.MarshalPKCS1PrivateKey(key)
+ pb := &pem.Block{Type: "RSA PRIVATE KEY", Bytes: b}
+ if err := pem.Encode(&buf, pb); err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ default:
+ return errors.New("acme/autocert: unknown private key type")
+ }
+
+ // public
+ for _, b := range tlscert.Certificate {
+ pb := &pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: b}
+ if err := pem.Encode(&buf, pb); err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ }
+
+ // TODO: might want to define a cache timeout on m
+ ctx := context.Background()
+ return m.Cache.Put(ctx, domain, buf.Bytes())
+}
+
+func encodeECDSAKey(w io.Writer, key *ecdsa.PrivateKey) error {
+ b, err := x509.MarshalECPrivateKey(key)
+ if err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ pb := &pem.Block{Type: "EC PRIVATE KEY", Bytes: b}
+ return pem.Encode(w, pb)
+}
+
+// createCert starts the domain ownership verification and returns a certificate
+// for that domain upon success.
+//
+// If the domain is already being verified, it waits for the existing verification to complete.
+// Either way, createCert blocks for the duration of the whole process.
+func (m *Manager) createCert(ctx context.Context, domain string) (*tls.Certificate, error) {
+ // TODO: maybe rewrite this whole piece using sync.Once
+ state, err := m.certState(domain)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+ // state may exist if another goroutine is already working on it
+ // in which case just wait for it to finish
+ if !state.locked {
+ state.RLock()
+ defer state.RUnlock()
+ return state.tlscert()
+ }
+
+ // We are the first; state is locked.
+ // Unblock the readers when domain ownership is verified
+ // and the we got the cert or the process failed.
+ defer state.Unlock()
+ state.locked = false
+
+ der, leaf, err := m.authorizedCert(ctx, state.key, domain)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+ state.cert = der
+ state.leaf = leaf
+ go m.renew(domain, state.key, state.leaf.NotAfter)
+ return state.tlscert()
+}
+
+// certState returns a new or existing certState.
+// If a new certState is returned, state.exist is false and the state is locked.
+// The returned error is non-nil only in the case where a new state could not be created.
+func (m *Manager) certState(domain string) (*certState, error) {
+ m.stateMu.Lock()
+ defer m.stateMu.Unlock()
+ if m.state == nil {
+ m.state = make(map[string]*certState)
+ }
+ // existing state
+ if state, ok := m.state[domain]; ok {
+ return state, nil
+ }
+
+ // new locked state
+ var (
+ err error
+ key crypto.Signer
+ )
+ if m.ForceRSA {
+ key, err = rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
+ } else {
+ key, err = ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
+ }
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+
+ state := &certState{
+ key: key,
+ locked: true,
+ }
+ state.Lock() // will be unlocked by m.certState caller
+ m.state[domain] = state
+ return state, nil
+}
+
+// authorizedCert starts domain ownership verification process and requests a new cert upon success.
+// The key argument is the certificate private key.
+func (m *Manager) authorizedCert(ctx context.Context, key crypto.Signer, domain string) (der [][]byte, leaf *x509.Certificate, err error) {
+ // TODO: make m.verify retry or retry m.verify calls here
+ if err := m.verify(ctx, domain); err != nil {
+ return nil, nil, err
+ }
+ client, err := m.acmeClient(ctx)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, nil, err
+ }
+ csr, err := certRequest(key, domain)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, nil, err
+ }
+ der, _, err = client.CreateCert(ctx, csr, 0, true)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, nil, err
+ }
+ leaf, err = validCert(domain, der, key)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, nil, err
+ }
+ return der, leaf, nil
+}
+
+// verify starts a new identifier (domain) authorization flow.
+// It prepares a challenge response and then blocks until the authorization
+// is marked as "completed" by the CA (either succeeded or failed).
+//
+// verify returns nil iff the verification was successful.
+func (m *Manager) verify(ctx context.Context, domain string) error {
+ client, err := m.acmeClient(ctx)
+ if err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+
+ // start domain authorization and get the challenge
+ authz, err := client.Authorize(ctx, domain)
+ if err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ // maybe don't need to at all
+ if authz.Status == acme.StatusValid {
+ return nil
+ }
+
+ // pick a challenge: prefer tls-sni-02 over tls-sni-01
+ // TODO: consider authz.Combinations
+ var chal *acme.Challenge
+ for _, c := range authz.Challenges {
+ if c.Type == "tls-sni-02" {
+ chal = c
+ break
+ }
+ if c.Type == "tls-sni-01" {
+ chal = c
+ }
+ }
+ if chal == nil {
+ return errors.New("acme/autocert: no supported challenge type found")
+ }
+
+ // create a token cert for the challenge response
+ var (
+ cert tls.Certificate
+ name string
+ )
+ switch chal.Type {
+ case "tls-sni-01":
+ cert, name, err = client.TLSSNI01ChallengeCert(chal.Token)
+ case "tls-sni-02":
+ cert, name, err = client.TLSSNI02ChallengeCert(chal.Token)
+ default:
+ err = fmt.Errorf("acme/autocert: unknown challenge type %q", chal.Type)
+ }
+ if err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ m.putTokenCert(name, &cert)
+ defer func() {
+ // verification has ended at this point
+ // don't need token cert anymore
+ go m.deleteTokenCert(name)
+ }()
+
+ // ready to fulfill the challenge
+ if _, err := client.Accept(ctx, chal); err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ // wait for the CA to validate
+ _, err = client.WaitAuthorization(ctx, authz.URI)
+ return err
+}
+
+// putTokenCert stores the cert under the named key in both m.tokenCert map
+// and m.Cache.
+func (m *Manager) putTokenCert(name string, cert *tls.Certificate) {
+ m.tokenCertMu.Lock()
+ defer m.tokenCertMu.Unlock()
+ if m.tokenCert == nil {
+ m.tokenCert = make(map[string]*tls.Certificate)
+ }
+ m.tokenCert[name] = cert
+ m.cachePut(name, cert)
+}
+
+// deleteTokenCert removes the token certificate for the specified domain name
+// from both m.tokenCert map and m.Cache.
+func (m *Manager) deleteTokenCert(name string) {
+ m.tokenCertMu.Lock()
+ defer m.tokenCertMu.Unlock()
+ delete(m.tokenCert, name)
+ if m.Cache != nil {
+ m.Cache.Delete(context.Background(), name)
+ }
+}
+
+// renew starts a cert renewal timer loop, one per domain.
+//
+// The loop is scheduled in two cases:
+// - a cert was fetched from cache for the first time (wasn't in m.state)
+// - a new cert was created by m.createCert
+//
+// The key argument is a certificate private key.
+// The exp argument is the cert expiration time (NotAfter).
+func (m *Manager) renew(domain string, key crypto.Signer, exp time.Time) {
+ m.renewalMu.Lock()
+ defer m.renewalMu.Unlock()
+ if m.renewal[domain] != nil {
+ // another goroutine is already on it
+ return
+ }
+ if m.renewal == nil {
+ m.renewal = make(map[string]*domainRenewal)
+ }
+ dr := &domainRenewal{m: m, domain: domain, key: key}
+ m.renewal[domain] = dr
+ dr.start(exp)
+}
+
+// stopRenew stops all currently running cert renewal timers.
+// The timers are not restarted during the lifetime of the Manager.
+func (m *Manager) stopRenew() {
+ m.renewalMu.Lock()
+ defer m.renewalMu.Unlock()
+ for name, dr := range m.renewal {
+ delete(m.renewal, name)
+ dr.stop()
+ }
+}
+
+func (m *Manager) accountKey(ctx context.Context) (crypto.Signer, error) {
+ const keyName = "acme_account.key"
+
+ genKey := func() (*ecdsa.PrivateKey, error) {
+ return ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
+ }
+
+ if m.Cache == nil {
+ return genKey()
+ }
+
+ data, err := m.Cache.Get(ctx, keyName)
+ if err == ErrCacheMiss {
+ key, err := genKey()
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+ var buf bytes.Buffer
+ if err := encodeECDSAKey(&buf, key); err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+ if err := m.Cache.Put(ctx, keyName, buf.Bytes()); err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+ return key, nil
+ }
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+
+ priv, _ := pem.Decode(data)
+ if priv == nil || !strings.Contains(priv.Type, "PRIVATE") {
+ return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: invalid account key found in cache")
+ }
+ return parsePrivateKey(priv.Bytes)
+}
+
+func (m *Manager) acmeClient(ctx context.Context) (*acme.Client, error) {
+ m.clientMu.Lock()
+ defer m.clientMu.Unlock()
+ if m.client != nil {
+ return m.client, nil
+ }
+
+ client := m.Client
+ if client == nil {
+ client = &acme.Client{DirectoryURL: acme.LetsEncryptURL}
+ }
+ if client.Key == nil {
+ var err error
+ client.Key, err = m.accountKey(ctx)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+ }
+ var contact []string
+ if m.Email != "" {
+ contact = []string{"mailto:" + m.Email}
+ }
+ a := &acme.Account{Contact: contact}
+ _, err := client.Register(ctx, a, m.Prompt)
+ if ae, ok := err.(*acme.Error); err == nil || ok && ae.StatusCode == http.StatusConflict {
+ // conflict indicates the key is already registered
+ m.client = client
+ err = nil
+ }
+ return m.client, err
+}
+
+func (m *Manager) hostPolicy() HostPolicy {
+ if m.HostPolicy != nil {
+ return m.HostPolicy
+ }
+ return defaultHostPolicy
+}
+
+func (m *Manager) renewBefore() time.Duration {
+ if m.RenewBefore > maxRandRenew {
+ return m.RenewBefore
+ }
+ return 7 * 24 * time.Hour // 1 week
+}
+
+// certState is ready when its mutex is unlocked for reading.
+type certState struct {
+ sync.RWMutex
+ locked bool // locked for read/write
+ key crypto.Signer // private key for cert
+ cert [][]byte // DER encoding
+ leaf *x509.Certificate // parsed cert[0]; always non-nil if cert != nil
+}
+
+// tlscert creates a tls.Certificate from s.key and s.cert.
+// Callers should wrap it in s.RLock() and s.RUnlock().
+func (s *certState) tlscert() (*tls.Certificate, error) {
+ if s.key == nil {
+ return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: missing signer")
+ }
+ if len(s.cert) == 0 {
+ return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: missing certificate")
+ }
+ return &tls.Certificate{
+ PrivateKey: s.key,
+ Certificate: s.cert,
+ Leaf: s.leaf,
+ }, nil
+}
+
+// certRequest creates a certificate request for the given common name cn
+// and optional SANs.
+func certRequest(key crypto.Signer, cn string, san ...string) ([]byte, error) {
+ req := &x509.CertificateRequest{
+ Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: cn},
+ DNSNames: san,
+ }
+ return x509.CreateCertificateRequest(rand.Reader, req, key)
+}
+
+// Attempt to parse the given private key DER block. OpenSSL 0.9.8 generates
+// PKCS#1 private keys by default, while OpenSSL 1.0.0 generates PKCS#8 keys.
+// OpenSSL ecparam generates SEC1 EC private keys for ECDSA. We try all three.
+//
+// Inspired by parsePrivateKey in crypto/tls/tls.go.
+func parsePrivateKey(der []byte) (crypto.Signer, error) {
+ if key, err := x509.ParsePKCS1PrivateKey(der); err == nil {
+ return key, nil
+ }
+ if key, err := x509.ParsePKCS8PrivateKey(der); err == nil {
+ switch key := key.(type) {
+ case *rsa.PrivateKey:
+ return key, nil
+ case *ecdsa.PrivateKey:
+ return key, nil
+ default:
+ return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: unknown private key type in PKCS#8 wrapping")
+ }
+ }
+ if key, err := x509.ParseECPrivateKey(der); err == nil {
+ return key, nil
+ }
+
+ return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: failed to parse private key")
+}
+
+// validCert parses a cert chain provided as der argument and verifies the leaf, der[0],
+// corresponds to the private key, as well as the domain match and expiration dates.
+// It doesn't do any revocation checking.
+//
+// The returned value is the verified leaf cert.
+func validCert(domain string, der [][]byte, key crypto.Signer) (leaf *x509.Certificate, err error) {
+ // parse public part(s)
+ var n int
+ for _, b := range der {
+ n += len(b)
+ }
+ pub := make([]byte, n)
+ n = 0
+ for _, b := range der {
+ n += copy(pub[n:], b)
+ }
+ x509Cert, err := x509.ParseCertificates(pub)
+ if len(x509Cert) == 0 {
+ return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: no public key found")
+ }
+ // verify the leaf is not expired and matches the domain name
+ leaf = x509Cert[0]
+ now := timeNow()
+ if now.Before(leaf.NotBefore) {
+ return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: certificate is not valid yet")
+ }
+ if now.After(leaf.NotAfter) {
+ return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: expired certificate")
+ }
+ if err := leaf.VerifyHostname(domain); err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+ // ensure the leaf corresponds to the private key
+ switch pub := leaf.PublicKey.(type) {
+ case *rsa.PublicKey:
+ prv, ok := key.(*rsa.PrivateKey)
+ if !ok {
+ return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: private key type does not match public key type")
+ }
+ if pub.N.Cmp(prv.N) != 0 {
+ return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: private key does not match public key")
+ }
+ case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
+ prv, ok := key.(*ecdsa.PrivateKey)
+ if !ok {
+ return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: private key type does not match public key type")
+ }
+ if pub.X.Cmp(prv.X) != 0 || pub.Y.Cmp(prv.Y) != 0 {
+ return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: private key does not match public key")
+ }
+ default:
+ return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: unknown public key algorithm")
+ }
+ return leaf, nil
+}
+
+func retryAfter(v string) time.Duration {
+ if i, err := strconv.Atoi(v); err == nil {
+ return time.Duration(i) * time.Second
+ }
+ if t, err := http.ParseTime(v); err == nil {
+ return t.Sub(timeNow())
+ }
+ return time.Second
+}
+
+type lockedMathRand struct {
+ sync.Mutex
+ rnd *mathrand.Rand
+}
+
+func (r *lockedMathRand) int63n(max int64) int64 {
+ r.Lock()
+ n := r.rnd.Int63n(max)
+ r.Unlock()
+ return n
+}
+
+// for easier testing
+var timeNow = time.Now
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/cache.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/cache.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1c67f6c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/cache.go
@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package autocert
+
+import (
+ "errors"
+ "io/ioutil"
+ "os"
+ "path/filepath"
+
+ "golang.org/x/net/context"
+)
+
+// ErrCacheMiss is returned when a certificate is not found in cache.
+var ErrCacheMiss = errors.New("acme/autocert: certificate cache miss")
+
+// Cache is used by Manager to store and retrieve previously obtained certificates
+// as opaque data.
+//
+// The key argument of the methods refers to a domain name but need not be an FQDN.
+// Cache implementations should not rely on the key naming pattern.
+type Cache interface {
+ // Get returns a certificate data for the specified key.
+ // If there's no such key, Get returns ErrCacheMiss.
+ Get(ctx context.Context, key string) ([]byte, error)
+
+ // Put stores the data in the cache under the specified key.
+ // Inderlying implementations may use any data storage format,
+ // as long as the reverse operation, Get, results in the original data.
+ Put(ctx context.Context, key string, data []byte) error
+
+ // Delete removes a certificate data from the cache under the specified key.
+ // If there's no such key in the cache, Delete returns nil.
+ Delete(ctx context.Context, key string) error
+}
+
+// DirCache implements Cache using a directory on the local filesystem.
+// If the directory does not exist, it will be created with 0700 permissions.
+type DirCache string
+
+// Get reads a certificate data from the specified file name.
+func (d DirCache) Get(ctx context.Context, name string) ([]byte, error) {
+ name = filepath.Join(string(d), name)
+ var (
+ data []byte
+ err error
+ done = make(chan struct{})
+ )
+ go func() {
+ data, err = ioutil.ReadFile(name)
+ close(done)
+ }()
+ select {
+ case <-ctx.Done():
+ return nil, ctx.Err()
+ case <-done:
+ }
+ if os.IsNotExist(err) {
+ return nil, ErrCacheMiss
+ }
+ return data, err
+}
+
+// Put writes the certificate data to the specified file name.
+// The file will be created with 0600 permissions.
+func (d DirCache) Put(ctx context.Context, name string, data []byte) error {
+ if err := os.MkdirAll(string(d), 0700); err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+
+ done := make(chan struct{})
+ var err error
+ go func() {
+ defer close(done)
+ var tmp string
+ if tmp, err = d.writeTempFile(name, data); err != nil {
+ return
+ }
+ // prevent overwriting the file if the context was cancelled
+ if ctx.Err() != nil {
+ return // no need to set err
+ }
+ name = filepath.Join(string(d), name)
+ err = os.Rename(tmp, name)
+ }()
+ select {
+ case <-ctx.Done():
+ return ctx.Err()
+ case <-done:
+ }
+ return err
+}
+
+// Delete removes the specified file name.
+func (d DirCache) Delete(ctx context.Context, name string) error {
+ name = filepath.Join(string(d), name)
+ var (
+ err error
+ done = make(chan struct{})
+ )
+ go func() {
+ err = os.Remove(name)
+ close(done)
+ }()
+ select {
+ case <-ctx.Done():
+ return ctx.Err()
+ case <-done:
+ }
+ if err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+ return err
+ }
+ return nil
+}
+
+// writeTempFile writes b to a temporary file, closes the file and returns its path.
+func (d DirCache) writeTempFile(prefix string, b []byte) (string, error) {
+ // TempFile uses 0600 permissions
+ f, err := ioutil.TempFile(string(d), prefix)
+ if err != nil {
+ return "", err
+ }
+ if _, err := f.Write(b); err != nil {
+ f.Close()
+ return "", err
+ }
+ return f.Name(), f.Close()
+}
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/renewal.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/renewal.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1a5018c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/renewal.go
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package autocert
+
+import (
+ "crypto"
+ "sync"
+ "time"
+
+ "golang.org/x/net/context"
+)
+
+// maxRandRenew is a maximum deviation from Manager.RenewBefore.
+const maxRandRenew = time.Hour
+
+// domainRenewal tracks the state used by the periodic timers
+// renewing a single domain's cert.
+type domainRenewal struct {
+ m *Manager
+ domain string
+ key crypto.Signer
+
+ timerMu sync.Mutex
+ timer *time.Timer
+}
+
+// start starts a cert renewal timer at the time
+// defined by the certificate expiration time exp.
+//
+// If the timer is already started, calling start is a noop.
+func (dr *domainRenewal) start(exp time.Time) {
+ dr.timerMu.Lock()
+ defer dr.timerMu.Unlock()
+ if dr.timer != nil {
+ return
+ }
+ dr.timer = time.AfterFunc(dr.next(exp), dr.renew)
+}
+
+// stop stops the cert renewal timer.
+// If the timer is already stopped, calling stop is a noop.
+func (dr *domainRenewal) stop() {
+ dr.timerMu.Lock()
+ defer dr.timerMu.Unlock()
+ if dr.timer == nil {
+ return
+ }
+ dr.timer.Stop()
+ dr.timer = nil
+}
+
+// renew is called periodically by a timer.
+// The first renew call is kicked off by dr.start.
+func (dr *domainRenewal) renew() {
+ dr.timerMu.Lock()
+ defer dr.timerMu.Unlock()
+ if dr.timer == nil {
+ return
+ }
+
+ ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Minute)
+ defer cancel()
+ // TODO: rotate dr.key at some point?
+ next, err := dr.do(ctx)
+ if err != nil {
+ next = maxRandRenew / 2
+ next += time.Duration(pseudoRand.int63n(int64(next)))
+ }
+ dr.timer = time.AfterFunc(next, dr.renew)
+ testDidRenewLoop(next, err)
+}
+
+// do is similar to Manager.createCert but it doesn't lock a Manager.state item.
+// Instead, it requests a new certificate independently and, upon success,
+// replaces dr.m.state item with a new one and updates cache for the given domain.
+//
+// It may return immediately if the expiration date of the currently cached cert
+// is far enough in the future.
+//
+// The returned value is a time interval after which the renewal should occur again.
+func (dr *domainRenewal) do(ctx context.Context) (time.Duration, error) {
+ // a race is likely unavoidable in a distributed environment
+ // but we try nonetheless
+ if tlscert, err := dr.m.cacheGet(dr.domain); err == nil {
+ next := dr.next(tlscert.Leaf.NotAfter)
+ if next > dr.m.renewBefore()+maxRandRenew {
+ return next, nil
+ }
+ }
+
+ der, leaf, err := dr.m.authorizedCert(ctx, dr.key, dr.domain)
+ if err != nil {
+ return 0, err
+ }
+ state := &certState{
+ key: dr.key,
+ cert: der,
+ leaf: leaf,
+ }
+ tlscert, err := state.tlscert()
+ if err != nil {
+ return 0, err
+ }
+ dr.m.cachePut(dr.domain, tlscert)
+ dr.m.stateMu.Lock()
+ defer dr.m.stateMu.Unlock()
+ // m.state is guaranteed to be non-nil at this point
+ dr.m.state[dr.domain] = state
+ return dr.next(leaf.NotAfter), nil
+}
+
+func (dr *domainRenewal) next(expiry time.Time) time.Duration {
+ d := expiry.Sub(timeNow()) - dr.m.renewBefore()
+ // add a bit of randomness to renew deadline
+ n := pseudoRand.int63n(int64(maxRandRenew))
+ d -= time.Duration(n)
+ if d < 0 {
+ return 0
+ }
+ return d
+}
+
+var testDidRenewLoop = func(next time.Duration, err error) {}
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/jws.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/jws.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..49ba313
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/jws.go
@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
+// Copyright 2015 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package acme
+
+import (
+ "crypto"
+ "crypto/ecdsa"
+ "crypto/rand"
+ "crypto/rsa"
+ "crypto/sha256"
+ _ "crypto/sha512" // need for EC keys
+ "encoding/base64"
+ "encoding/json"
+ "fmt"
+ "math/big"
+)
+
+// jwsEncodeJSON signs claimset using provided key and a nonce.
+// The result is serialized in JSON format.
+// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7515#section-7.
+func jwsEncodeJSON(claimset interface{}, key crypto.Signer, nonce string) ([]byte, error) {
+ jwk, err := jwkEncode(key.Public())
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+ alg, sha := jwsHasher(key)
+ if alg == "" || !sha.Available() {
+ return nil, ErrUnsupportedKey
+ }
+ phead := fmt.Sprintf(`{"alg":%q,"jwk":%s,"nonce":%q}`, alg, jwk, nonce)
+ phead = base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(phead))
+ cs, err := json.Marshal(claimset)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+ payload := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(cs)
+ hash := sha.New()
+ hash.Write([]byte(phead + "." + payload))
+ sig, err := jwsSign(key, sha, hash.Sum(nil))
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+
+ enc := struct {
+ Protected string `json:"protected"`
+ Payload string `json:"payload"`
+ Sig string `json:"signature"`
+ }{
+ Protected: phead,
+ Payload: payload,
+ Sig: base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(sig),
+ }
+ return json.Marshal(&enc)
+}
+
+// jwkEncode encodes public part of an RSA or ECDSA key into a JWK.
+// The result is also suitable for creating a JWK thumbprint.
+// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7517
+func jwkEncode(pub crypto.PublicKey) (string, error) {
+ switch pub := pub.(type) {
+ case *rsa.PublicKey:
+ // https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7518#section-6.3.1
+ n := pub.N
+ e := big.NewInt(int64(pub.E))
+ // Field order is important.
+ // See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7638#section-3.3 for details.
+ return fmt.Sprintf(`{"e":"%s","kty":"RSA","n":"%s"}`,
+ base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(e.Bytes()),
+ base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(n.Bytes()),
+ ), nil
+ case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
+ // https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7518#section-6.2.1
+ p := pub.Curve.Params()
+ n := p.BitSize / 8
+ if p.BitSize%8 != 0 {
+ n++
+ }
+ x := pub.X.Bytes()
+ if n > len(x) {
+ x = append(make([]byte, n-len(x)), x...)
+ }
+ y := pub.Y.Bytes()
+ if n > len(y) {
+ y = append(make([]byte, n-len(y)), y...)
+ }
+ // Field order is important.
+ // See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7638#section-3.3 for details.
+ return fmt.Sprintf(`{"crv":"%s","kty":"EC","x":"%s","y":"%s"}`,
+ p.Name,
+ base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(x),
+ base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(y),
+ ), nil
+ }
+ return "", ErrUnsupportedKey
+}
+
+// jwsSign signs the digest using the given key.
+// It returns ErrUnsupportedKey if the key type is unknown.
+// The hash is used only for RSA keys.
+func jwsSign(key crypto.Signer, hash crypto.Hash, digest []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+ switch key := key.(type) {
+ case *rsa.PrivateKey:
+ return key.Sign(rand.Reader, digest, hash)
+ case *ecdsa.PrivateKey:
+ r, s, err := ecdsa.Sign(rand.Reader, key, digest)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+ rb, sb := r.Bytes(), s.Bytes()
+ size := key.Params().BitSize / 8
+ if size%8 > 0 {
+ size++
+ }
+ sig := make([]byte, size*2)
+ copy(sig[size-len(rb):], rb)
+ copy(sig[size*2-len(sb):], sb)
+ return sig, nil
+ }
+ return nil, ErrUnsupportedKey
+}
+
+// jwsHasher indicates suitable JWS algorithm name and a hash function
+// to use for signing a digest with the provided key.
+// It returns ("", 0) if the key is not supported.
+func jwsHasher(key crypto.Signer) (string, crypto.Hash) {
+ switch key := key.(type) {
+ case *rsa.PrivateKey:
+ return "RS256", crypto.SHA256
+ case *ecdsa.PrivateKey:
+ switch key.Params().Name {
+ case "P-256":
+ return "ES256", crypto.SHA256
+ case "P-384":
+ return "ES384", crypto.SHA384
+ case "P-512":
+ return "ES512", crypto.SHA512
+ }
+ }
+ return "", 0
+}
+
+// JWKThumbprint creates a JWK thumbprint out of pub
+// as specified in https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7638.
+func JWKThumbprint(pub crypto.PublicKey) (string, error) {
+ jwk, err := jwkEncode(pub)
+ if err != nil {
+ return "", err
+ }
+ b := sha256.Sum256([]byte(jwk))
+ return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(b[:]), nil
+}
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/types.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/types.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0513b2e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/types.go
@@ -0,0 +1,209 @@
+package acme
+
+import (
+ "errors"
+ "fmt"
+ "net/http"
+)
+
+// ACME server response statuses used to describe Authorization and Challenge states.
+const (
+ StatusUnknown = "unknown"
+ StatusPending = "pending"
+ StatusProcessing = "processing"
+ StatusValid = "valid"
+ StatusInvalid = "invalid"
+ StatusRevoked = "revoked"
+)
+
+// CRLReasonCode identifies the reason for a certificate revocation.
+type CRLReasonCode int
+
+// CRL reason codes as defined in RFC 5280.
+const (
+ CRLReasonUnspecified CRLReasonCode = 0
+ CRLReasonKeyCompromise CRLReasonCode = 1
+ CRLReasonCACompromise CRLReasonCode = 2
+ CRLReasonAffiliationChanged CRLReasonCode = 3
+ CRLReasonSuperseded CRLReasonCode = 4
+ CRLReasonCessationOfOperation CRLReasonCode = 5
+ CRLReasonCertificateHold CRLReasonCode = 6
+ CRLReasonRemoveFromCRL CRLReasonCode = 8
+ CRLReasonPrivilegeWithdrawn CRLReasonCode = 9
+ CRLReasonAACompromise CRLReasonCode = 10
+)
+
+var (
+ // ErrAuthorizationFailed indicates that an authorization for an identifier
+ // did not succeed.
+ ErrAuthorizationFailed = errors.New("acme: identifier authorization failed")
+
+ // ErrUnsupportedKey is returned when an unsupported key type is encountered.
+ ErrUnsupportedKey = errors.New("acme: unknown key type; only RSA and ECDSA are supported")
+)
+
+// Error is an ACME error, defined in Problem Details for HTTP APIs doc
+// http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-appsawg-http-problem.
+type Error struct {
+ // StatusCode is The HTTP status code generated by the origin server.
+ StatusCode int
+ // ProblemType is a URI reference that identifies the problem type,
+ // typically in a "urn:acme:error:xxx" form.
+ ProblemType string
+ // Detail is a human-readable explanation specific to this occurrence of the problem.
+ Detail string
+ // Header is the original server error response headers.
+ Header http.Header
+}
+
+func (e *Error) Error() string {
+ return fmt.Sprintf("%d %s: %s", e.StatusCode, e.ProblemType, e.Detail)
+}
+
+// Account is a user account. It is associated with a private key.
+type Account struct {
+ // URI is the account unique ID, which is also a URL used to retrieve
+ // account data from the CA.
+ URI string
+
+ // Contact is a slice of contact info used during registration.
+ Contact []string
+
+ // The terms user has agreed to.
+ // A value not matching CurrentTerms indicates that the user hasn't agreed
+ // to the actual Terms of Service of the CA.
+ AgreedTerms string
+
+ // Actual terms of a CA.
+ CurrentTerms string
+
+ // Authz is the authorization URL used to initiate a new authz flow.
+ Authz string
+
+ // Authorizations is a URI from which a list of authorizations
+ // granted to this account can be fetched via a GET request.
+ Authorizations string
+
+ // Certificates is a URI from which a list of certificates
+ // issued for this account can be fetched via a GET request.
+ Certificates string
+}
+
+// Directory is ACME server discovery data.
+type Directory struct {
+ // RegURL is an account endpoint URL, allowing for creating new
+ // and modifying existing accounts.
+ RegURL string
+
+ // AuthzURL is used to initiate Identifier Authorization flow.
+ AuthzURL string
+
+ // CertURL is a new certificate issuance endpoint URL.
+ CertURL string
+
+ // RevokeURL is used to initiate a certificate revocation flow.
+ RevokeURL string
+
+ // Term is a URI identifying the current terms of service.
+ Terms string
+
+ // Website is an HTTP or HTTPS URL locating a website
+ // providing more information about the ACME server.
+ Website string
+
+ // CAA consists of lowercase hostname elements, which the ACME server
+ // recognises as referring to itself for the purposes of CAA record validation
+ // as defined in RFC6844.
+ CAA []string
+}
+
+// Challenge encodes a returned CA challenge.
+type Challenge struct {
+ // Type is the challenge type, e.g. "http-01", "tls-sni-02", "dns-01".
+ Type string
+
+ // URI is where a challenge response can be posted to.
+ URI string
+
+ // Token is a random value that uniquely identifies the challenge.
+ Token string
+
+ // Status identifies the status of this challenge.
+ Status string
+}
+
+// Authorization encodes an authorization response.
+type Authorization struct {
+ // URI uniquely identifies a authorization.
+ URI string
+
+ // Status identifies the status of an authorization.
+ Status string
+
+ // Identifier is what the account is authorized to represent.
+ Identifier AuthzID
+
+ // Challenges that the client needs to fulfill in order to prove possession
+ // of the identifier (for pending authorizations).
+ // For final authorizations, the challenges that were used.
+ Challenges []*Challenge
+
+ // A collection of sets of challenges, each of which would be sufficient
+ // to prove possession of the identifier.
+ // Clients must complete a set of challenges that covers at least one set.
+ // Challenges are identified by their indices in the challenges array.
+ // If this field is empty, the client needs to complete all challenges.
+ Combinations [][]int
+}
+
+// AuthzID is an identifier that an account is authorized to represent.
+type AuthzID struct {
+ Type string // The type of identifier, e.g. "dns".
+ Value string // The identifier itself, e.g. "example.org".
+}
+
+// wireAuthz is ACME JSON representation of Authorization objects.
+type wireAuthz struct {
+ Status string
+ Challenges []wireChallenge
+ Combinations [][]int
+ Identifier struct {
+ Type string
+ Value string
+ }
+}
+
+func (z *wireAuthz) authorization(uri string) *Authorization {
+ a := &Authorization{
+ URI: uri,
+ Status: z.Status,
+ Identifier: AuthzID{Type: z.Identifier.Type, Value: z.Identifier.Value},
+ Combinations: z.Combinations, // shallow copy
+ Challenges: make([]*Challenge, len(z.Challenges)),
+ }
+ for i, v := range z.Challenges {
+ a.Challenges[i] = v.challenge()
+ }
+ return a
+}
+
+// wireChallenge is ACME JSON challenge representation.
+type wireChallenge struct {
+ URI string `json:"uri"`
+ Type string
+ Token string
+ Status string
+}
+
+func (c *wireChallenge) challenge() *Challenge {
+ v := &Challenge{
+ URI: c.URI,
+ Type: c.Type,
+ Token: c.Token,
+ Status: c.Status,
+ }
+ if v.Status == "" {
+ v.Status = StatusPending
+ }
+ return v
+}