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-rw-r--r--vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/channel.go4
-rw-r--r--vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/cipher.go62
-rw-r--r--vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client.go6
-rw-r--r--vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client_auth.go4
-rw-r--r--vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/common.go17
-rw-r--r--vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/handshake.go423
-rw-r--r--vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/keys.go6
-rw-r--r--vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/mac.go10
-rw-r--r--vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/mux.go4
-rw-r--r--vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/server.go37
-rw-r--r--vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/transport.go50
11 files changed, 450 insertions, 173 deletions
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/channel.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/channel.go
index 6d709b5..195530e 100644
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/channel.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/channel.go
@@ -461,8 +461,8 @@ func (m *mux) newChannel(chanType string, direction channelDirection, extraData
pending: newBuffer(),
extPending: newBuffer(),
direction: direction,
- incomingRequests: make(chan *Request, 16),
- msg: make(chan interface{}, 16),
+ incomingRequests: make(chan *Request, chanSize),
+ msg: make(chan interface{}, chanSize),
chanType: chanType,
extraData: extraData,
mux: m,
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/cipher.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/cipher.go
index 34d3917..13484ab 100644
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/cipher.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/cipher.go
@@ -135,6 +135,7 @@ const prefixLen = 5
type streamPacketCipher struct {
mac hash.Hash
cipher cipher.Stream
+ etm bool
// The following members are to avoid per-packet allocations.
prefix [prefixLen]byte
@@ -150,7 +151,14 @@ func (s *streamPacketCipher) readPacket(seqNum uint32, r io.Reader) ([]byte, err
return nil, err
}
- s.cipher.XORKeyStream(s.prefix[:], s.prefix[:])
+ var encryptedPaddingLength [1]byte
+ if s.mac != nil && s.etm {
+ copy(encryptedPaddingLength[:], s.prefix[4:5])
+ s.cipher.XORKeyStream(s.prefix[4:5], s.prefix[4:5])
+ } else {
+ s.cipher.XORKeyStream(s.prefix[:], s.prefix[:])
+ }
+
length := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(s.prefix[0:4])
paddingLength := uint32(s.prefix[4])
@@ -159,7 +167,12 @@ func (s *streamPacketCipher) readPacket(seqNum uint32, r io.Reader) ([]byte, err
s.mac.Reset()
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(s.seqNumBytes[:], seqNum)
s.mac.Write(s.seqNumBytes[:])
- s.mac.Write(s.prefix[:])
+ if s.etm {
+ s.mac.Write(s.prefix[:4])
+ s.mac.Write(encryptedPaddingLength[:])
+ } else {
+ s.mac.Write(s.prefix[:])
+ }
macSize = uint32(s.mac.Size())
}
@@ -184,10 +197,17 @@ func (s *streamPacketCipher) readPacket(seqNum uint32, r io.Reader) ([]byte, err
}
mac := s.packetData[length-1:]
data := s.packetData[:length-1]
+
+ if s.mac != nil && s.etm {
+ s.mac.Write(data)
+ }
+
s.cipher.XORKeyStream(data, data)
if s.mac != nil {
- s.mac.Write(data)
+ if !s.etm {
+ s.mac.Write(data)
+ }
s.macResult = s.mac.Sum(s.macResult[:0])
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(s.macResult, mac) != 1 {
return nil, errors.New("ssh: MAC failure")
@@ -203,7 +223,13 @@ func (s *streamPacketCipher) writePacket(seqNum uint32, w io.Writer, rand io.Rea
return errors.New("ssh: packet too large")
}
- paddingLength := packetSizeMultiple - (prefixLen+len(packet))%packetSizeMultiple
+ aadlen := 0
+ if s.mac != nil && s.etm {
+ // packet length is not encrypted for EtM modes
+ aadlen = 4
+ }
+
+ paddingLength := packetSizeMultiple - (prefixLen+len(packet)-aadlen)%packetSizeMultiple
if paddingLength < 4 {
paddingLength += packetSizeMultiple
}
@@ -220,15 +246,37 @@ func (s *streamPacketCipher) writePacket(seqNum uint32, w io.Writer, rand io.Rea
s.mac.Reset()
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(s.seqNumBytes[:], seqNum)
s.mac.Write(s.seqNumBytes[:])
+
+ if s.etm {
+ // For EtM algorithms, the packet length must stay unencrypted,
+ // but the following data (padding length) must be encrypted
+ s.cipher.XORKeyStream(s.prefix[4:5], s.prefix[4:5])
+ }
+
s.mac.Write(s.prefix[:])
- s.mac.Write(packet)
- s.mac.Write(padding)
+
+ if !s.etm {
+ // For non-EtM algorithms, the algorithm is applied on unencrypted data
+ s.mac.Write(packet)
+ s.mac.Write(padding)
+ }
+ }
+
+ if !(s.mac != nil && s.etm) {
+ // For EtM algorithms, the padding length has already been encrypted
+ // and the packet length must remain unencrypted
+ s.cipher.XORKeyStream(s.prefix[:], s.prefix[:])
}
- s.cipher.XORKeyStream(s.prefix[:], s.prefix[:])
s.cipher.XORKeyStream(packet, packet)
s.cipher.XORKeyStream(padding, padding)
+ if s.mac != nil && s.etm {
+ // For EtM algorithms, packet and padding must be encrypted
+ s.mac.Write(packet)
+ s.mac.Write(padding)
+ }
+
if _, err := w.Write(s.prefix[:]); err != nil {
return err
}
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client.go
index 0212a20..c97f297 100644
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client.go
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ func (c *Client) HandleChannelOpen(channelType string) <-chan NewChannel {
return nil
}
- ch = make(chan NewChannel, 16)
+ ch = make(chan NewChannel, chanSize)
c.channelHandlers[channelType] = ch
return ch
}
@@ -97,13 +97,11 @@ func (c *connection) clientHandshake(dialAddress string, config *ClientConfig) e
c.transport = newClientTransport(
newTransport(c.sshConn.conn, config.Rand, true /* is client */),
c.clientVersion, c.serverVersion, config, dialAddress, c.sshConn.RemoteAddr())
- if err := c.transport.requestInitialKeyChange(); err != nil {
+ if err := c.transport.waitSession(); err != nil {
return err
}
- // We just did the key change, so the session ID is established.
c.sessionID = c.transport.getSessionID()
-
return c.clientAuthenticate(config)
}
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client_auth.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client_auth.go
index 294af0d..fd1ec5d 100644
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client_auth.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client_auth.go
@@ -30,8 +30,10 @@ func (c *connection) clientAuthenticate(config *ClientConfig) error {
// then any untried methods suggested by the server.
tried := make(map[string]bool)
var lastMethods []string
+
+ sessionID := c.transport.getSessionID()
for auth := AuthMethod(new(noneAuth)); auth != nil; {
- ok, methods, err := auth.auth(c.transport.getSessionID(), config.User, c.transport, config.Rand)
+ ok, methods, err := auth.auth(sessionID, config.User, c.transport, config.Rand)
if err != nil {
return err
}
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/common.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/common.go
index 2c72ab5..8656d0f 100644
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/common.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/common.go
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ var supportedHostKeyAlgos = []string{
// This is based on RFC 4253, section 6.4, but with hmac-md5 variants removed
// because they have reached the end of their useful life.
var supportedMACs = []string{
- "hmac-sha2-256", "hmac-sha1", "hmac-sha1-96",
+ "hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com", "hmac-sha2-256", "hmac-sha1", "hmac-sha1-96",
}
var supportedCompressions = []string{compressionNone}
@@ -104,6 +104,21 @@ type directionAlgorithms struct {
Compression string
}
+// rekeyBytes returns a rekeying intervals in bytes.
+func (a *directionAlgorithms) rekeyBytes() int64 {
+ // According to RFC4344 block ciphers should rekey after
+ // 2^(BLOCKSIZE/4) blocks. For all AES flavors BLOCKSIZE is
+ // 128.
+ switch a.Cipher {
+ case "aes128-ctr", "aes192-ctr", "aes256-ctr", gcmCipherID, aes128cbcID:
+ return 16 * (1 << 32)
+
+ }
+
+ // For others, stick with RFC4253 recommendation to rekey after 1 Gb of data.
+ return 1 << 30
+}
+
type algorithms struct {
kex string
hostKey string
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/handshake.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/handshake.go
index 37d42e4..8de6506 100644
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/handshake.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/handshake.go
@@ -19,6 +19,11 @@ import (
// messages are wrong when using ECDH.
const debugHandshake = false
+// chanSize sets the amount of buffering SSH connections. This is
+// primarily for testing: setting chanSize=0 uncovers deadlocks more
+// quickly.
+const chanSize = 16
+
// keyingTransport is a packet based transport that supports key
// changes. It need not be thread-safe. It should pass through
// msgNewKeys in both directions.
@@ -53,34 +58,58 @@ type handshakeTransport struct {
incoming chan []byte
readError error
+ mu sync.Mutex
+ writeError error
+ sentInitPacket []byte
+ sentInitMsg *kexInitMsg
+ pendingPackets [][]byte // Used when a key exchange is in progress.
+
+ // If the read loop wants to schedule a kex, it pings this
+ // channel, and the write loop will send out a kex
+ // message.
+ requestKex chan struct{}
+
+ // If the other side requests or confirms a kex, its kexInit
+ // packet is sent here for the write loop to find it.
+ startKex chan *pendingKex
+
// data for host key checking
hostKeyCallback func(hostname string, remote net.Addr, key PublicKey) error
dialAddress string
remoteAddr net.Addr
- readSinceKex uint64
+ // Algorithms agreed in the last key exchange.
+ algorithms *algorithms
+
+ readPacketsLeft uint32
+ readBytesLeft int64
- // Protects the writing side of the connection
- mu sync.Mutex
- cond *sync.Cond
- sentInitPacket []byte
- sentInitMsg *kexInitMsg
- writtenSinceKex uint64
- writeError error
+ writePacketsLeft uint32
+ writeBytesLeft int64
// The session ID or nil if first kex did not complete yet.
sessionID []byte
}
+type pendingKex struct {
+ otherInit []byte
+ done chan error
+}
+
func newHandshakeTransport(conn keyingTransport, config *Config, clientVersion, serverVersion []byte) *handshakeTransport {
t := &handshakeTransport{
conn: conn,
serverVersion: serverVersion,
clientVersion: clientVersion,
- incoming: make(chan []byte, 16),
- config: config,
+ incoming: make(chan []byte, chanSize),
+ requestKex: make(chan struct{}, 1),
+ startKex: make(chan *pendingKex, 1),
+
+ config: config,
}
- t.cond = sync.NewCond(&t.mu)
+
+ // We always start with a mandatory key exchange.
+ t.requestKex <- struct{}{}
return t
}
@@ -95,6 +124,7 @@ func newClientTransport(conn keyingTransport, clientVersion, serverVersion []byt
t.hostKeyAlgorithms = supportedHostKeyAlgos
}
go t.readLoop()
+ go t.kexLoop()
return t
}
@@ -102,6 +132,7 @@ func newServerTransport(conn keyingTransport, clientVersion, serverVersion []byt
t := newHandshakeTransport(conn, &config.Config, clientVersion, serverVersion)
t.hostKeys = config.hostKeys
go t.readLoop()
+ go t.kexLoop()
return t
}
@@ -109,6 +140,20 @@ func (t *handshakeTransport) getSessionID() []byte {
return t.sessionID
}
+// waitSession waits for the session to be established. This should be
+// the first thing to call after instantiating handshakeTransport.
+func (t *handshakeTransport) waitSession() error {
+ p, err := t.readPacket()
+ if err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ if p[0] != msgNewKeys {
+ return fmt.Errorf("ssh: first packet should be msgNewKeys")
+ }
+
+ return nil
+}
+
func (t *handshakeTransport) id() string {
if len(t.hostKeys) > 0 {
return "server"
@@ -116,6 +161,20 @@ func (t *handshakeTransport) id() string {
return "client"
}
+func (t *handshakeTransport) printPacket(p []byte, write bool) {
+ action := "got"
+ if write {
+ action = "sent"
+ }
+
+ if p[0] == msgChannelData || p[0] == msgChannelExtendedData {
+ log.Printf("%s %s data (packet %d bytes)", t.id(), action, len(p))
+ } else {
+ msg, err := decode(p)
+ log.Printf("%s %s %T %v (%v)", t.id(), action, msg, msg, err)
+ }
+}
+
func (t *handshakeTransport) readPacket() ([]byte, error) {
p, ok := <-t.incoming
if !ok {
@@ -125,8 +184,10 @@ func (t *handshakeTransport) readPacket() ([]byte, error) {
}
func (t *handshakeTransport) readLoop() {
+ first := true
for {
- p, err := t.readOnePacket()
+ p, err := t.readOnePacket(first)
+ first = false
if err != nil {
t.readError = err
close(t.incoming)
@@ -138,67 +199,204 @@ func (t *handshakeTransport) readLoop() {
t.incoming <- p
}
- // If we can't read, declare the writing part dead too.
+ // Stop writers too.
+ t.recordWriteError(t.readError)
+
+ // Unblock the writer should it wait for this.
+ close(t.startKex)
+
+ // Don't close t.requestKex; it's also written to from writePacket.
+}
+
+func (t *handshakeTransport) pushPacket(p []byte) error {
+ if debugHandshake {
+ t.printPacket(p, true)
+ }
+ return t.conn.writePacket(p)
+}
+
+func (t *handshakeTransport) getWriteError() error {
t.mu.Lock()
defer t.mu.Unlock()
- if t.writeError == nil {
- t.writeError = t.readError
+ return t.writeError
+}
+
+func (t *handshakeTransport) recordWriteError(err error) {
+ t.mu.Lock()
+ defer t.mu.Unlock()
+ if t.writeError == nil && err != nil {
+ t.writeError = err
}
- t.cond.Broadcast()
}
-func (t *handshakeTransport) readOnePacket() ([]byte, error) {
- if t.readSinceKex > t.config.RekeyThreshold {
- if err := t.requestKeyChange(); err != nil {
- return nil, err
+func (t *handshakeTransport) requestKeyExchange() {
+ select {
+ case t.requestKex <- struct{}{}:
+ default:
+ // something already requested a kex, so do nothing.
+ }
+}
+
+func (t *handshakeTransport) kexLoop() {
+
+write:
+ for t.getWriteError() == nil {
+ var request *pendingKex
+ var sent bool
+
+ for request == nil || !sent {
+ var ok bool
+ select {
+ case request, ok = <-t.startKex:
+ if !ok {
+ break write
+ }
+ case <-t.requestKex:
+ break
+ }
+
+ if !sent {
+ if err := t.sendKexInit(); err != nil {
+ t.recordWriteError(err)
+ break
+ }
+ sent = true
+ }
+ }
+
+ if err := t.getWriteError(); err != nil {
+ if request != nil {
+ request.done <- err
+ }
+ break
+ }
+
+ // We're not servicing t.requestKex, but that is OK:
+ // we never block on sending to t.requestKex.
+
+ // We're not servicing t.startKex, but the remote end
+ // has just sent us a kexInitMsg, so it can't send
+ // another key change request, until we close the done
+ // channel on the pendingKex request.
+
+ err := t.enterKeyExchange(request.otherInit)
+
+ t.mu.Lock()
+ t.writeError = err
+ t.sentInitPacket = nil
+ t.sentInitMsg = nil
+ t.writePacketsLeft = packetRekeyThreshold
+ if t.config.RekeyThreshold > 0 {
+ t.writeBytesLeft = int64(t.config.RekeyThreshold)
+ } else if t.algorithms != nil {
+ t.writeBytesLeft = t.algorithms.w.rekeyBytes()
+ }
+
+ // we have completed the key exchange. Since the
+ // reader is still blocked, it is safe to clear out
+ // the requestKex channel. This avoids the situation
+ // where: 1) we consumed our own request for the
+ // initial kex, and 2) the kex from the remote side
+ // caused another send on the requestKex channel,
+ clear:
+ for {
+ select {
+ case <-t.requestKex:
+ //
+ default:
+ break clear
+ }
+ }
+
+ request.done <- t.writeError
+
+ // kex finished. Push packets that we received while
+ // the kex was in progress. Don't look at t.startKex
+ // and don't increment writtenSinceKex: if we trigger
+ // another kex while we are still busy with the last
+ // one, things will become very confusing.
+ for _, p := range t.pendingPackets {
+ t.writeError = t.pushPacket(p)
+ if t.writeError != nil {
+ break
+ }
}
+ t.pendingPackets = t.pendingPackets[:0]
+ t.mu.Unlock()
}
+ // drain startKex channel. We don't service t.requestKex
+ // because nobody does blocking sends there.
+ go func() {
+ for init := range t.startKex {
+ init.done <- t.writeError
+ }
+ }()
+
+ // Unblock reader.
+ t.conn.Close()
+}
+
+// The protocol uses uint32 for packet counters, so we can't let them
+// reach 1<<32. We will actually read and write more packets than
+// this, though: the other side may send more packets, and after we
+// hit this limit on writing we will send a few more packets for the
+// key exchange itself.
+const packetRekeyThreshold = (1 << 31)
+
+func (t *handshakeTransport) readOnePacket(first bool) ([]byte, error) {
p, err := t.conn.readPacket()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
- t.readSinceKex += uint64(len(p))
+ if t.readPacketsLeft > 0 {
+ t.readPacketsLeft--
+ } else {
+ t.requestKeyExchange()
+ }
+
+ if t.readBytesLeft > 0 {
+ t.readBytesLeft -= int64(len(p))
+ } else {
+ t.requestKeyExchange()
+ }
+
if debugHandshake {
- if p[0] == msgChannelData || p[0] == msgChannelExtendedData {
- log.Printf("%s got data (packet %d bytes)", t.id(), len(p))
- } else {
- msg, err := decode(p)
- log.Printf("%s got %T %v (%v)", t.id(), msg, msg, err)
- }
+ t.printPacket(p, false)
+ }
+
+ if first && p[0] != msgKexInit {
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: first packet should be msgKexInit")
}
+
if p[0] != msgKexInit {
return p, nil
}
- t.mu.Lock()
-
firstKex := t.sessionID == nil
- err = t.enterKeyExchangeLocked(p)
- if err != nil {
- // drop connection
- t.conn.Close()
- t.writeError = err
+ kex := pendingKex{
+ done: make(chan error, 1),
+ otherInit: p,
}
+ t.startKex <- &kex
+ err = <-kex.done
if debugHandshake {
log.Printf("%s exited key exchange (first %v), err %v", t.id(), firstKex, err)
}
- // Unblock writers.
- t.sentInitMsg = nil
- t.sentInitPacket = nil
- t.cond.Broadcast()
- t.writtenSinceKex = 0
- t.mu.Unlock()
-
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
- t.readSinceKex = 0
+ t.readPacketsLeft = packetRekeyThreshold
+ if t.config.RekeyThreshold > 0 {
+ t.readBytesLeft = int64(t.config.RekeyThreshold)
+ } else {
+ t.readBytesLeft = t.algorithms.r.rekeyBytes()
+ }
// By default, a key exchange is hidden from higher layers by
// translating it into msgIgnore.
@@ -213,61 +411,16 @@ func (t *handshakeTransport) readOnePacket() ([]byte, error) {
return successPacket, nil
}
-// keyChangeCategory describes whether a key exchange is the first on a
-// connection, or a subsequent one.
-type keyChangeCategory bool
-
-const (
- firstKeyExchange keyChangeCategory = true
- subsequentKeyExchange keyChangeCategory = false
-)
-
-// sendKexInit sends a key change message, and returns the message
-// that was sent. After initiating the key change, all writes will be
-// blocked until the change is done, and a failed key change will
-// close the underlying transport. This function is safe for
-// concurrent use by multiple goroutines.
-func (t *handshakeTransport) sendKexInit(isFirst keyChangeCategory) error {
- var err error
-
+// sendKexInit sends a key change message.
+func (t *handshakeTransport) sendKexInit() error {
t.mu.Lock()
- // If this is the initial key change, but we already have a sessionID,
- // then do nothing because the key exchange has already completed
- // asynchronously.
- if !isFirst || t.sessionID == nil {
- _, _, err = t.sendKexInitLocked(isFirst)
- }
- t.mu.Unlock()
- if err != nil {
- return err
- }
- if isFirst {
- if packet, err := t.readPacket(); err != nil {
- return err
- } else if packet[0] != msgNewKeys {
- return unexpectedMessageError(msgNewKeys, packet[0])
- }
- }
- return nil
-}
-
-func (t *handshakeTransport) requestInitialKeyChange() error {
- return t.sendKexInit(firstKeyExchange)
-}
-
-func (t *handshakeTransport) requestKeyChange() error {
- return t.sendKexInit(subsequentKeyExchange)
-}
-
-// sendKexInitLocked sends a key change message. t.mu must be locked
-// while this happens.
-func (t *handshakeTransport) sendKexInitLocked(isFirst keyChangeCategory) (*kexInitMsg, []byte, error) {
- // kexInits may be sent either in response to the other side,
- // or because our side wants to initiate a key change, so we
- // may have already sent a kexInit. In that case, don't send a
- // second kexInit.
+ defer t.mu.Unlock()
if t.sentInitMsg != nil {
- return t.sentInitMsg, t.sentInitPacket, nil
+ // kexInits may be sent either in response to the other side,
+ // or because our side wants to initiate a key change, so we
+ // may have already sent a kexInit. In that case, don't send a
+ // second kexInit.
+ return nil
}
msg := &kexInitMsg{
@@ -295,53 +448,65 @@ func (t *handshakeTransport) sendKexInitLocked(isFirst keyChangeCategory) (*kexI
packetCopy := make([]byte, len(packet))
copy(packetCopy, packet)
- if err := t.conn.writePacket(packetCopy); err != nil {
- return nil, nil, err
+ if err := t.pushPacket(packetCopy); err != nil {
+ return err
}
t.sentInitMsg = msg
t.sentInitPacket = packet
- return msg, packet, nil
+
+ return nil
}
func (t *handshakeTransport) writePacket(p []byte) error {
+ switch p[0] {
+ case msgKexInit:
+ return errors.New("ssh: only handshakeTransport can send kexInit")
+ case msgNewKeys:
+ return errors.New("ssh: only handshakeTransport can send newKeys")
+ }
+
t.mu.Lock()
defer t.mu.Unlock()
+ if t.writeError != nil {
+ return t.writeError
+ }
- if t.writtenSinceKex > t.config.RekeyThreshold {
- t.sendKexInitLocked(subsequentKeyExchange)
+ if t.sentInitMsg != nil {
+ // Copy the packet so the writer can reuse the buffer.
+ cp := make([]byte, len(p))
+ copy(cp, p)
+ t.pendingPackets = append(t.pendingPackets, cp)
+ return nil
}
- for t.sentInitMsg != nil && t.writeError == nil {
- t.cond.Wait()
+
+ if t.writeBytesLeft > 0 {
+ t.writeBytesLeft -= int64(len(p))
+ } else {
+ t.requestKeyExchange()
}
- if t.writeError != nil {
- return t.writeError
+
+ if t.writePacketsLeft > 0 {
+ t.writePacketsLeft--
+ } else {
+ t.requestKeyExchange()
}
- t.writtenSinceKex += uint64(len(p))
- switch p[0] {
- case msgKexInit:
- return errors.New("ssh: only handshakeTransport can send kexInit")
- case msgNewKeys:
- return errors.New("ssh: only handshakeTransport can send newKeys")
- default:
- return t.conn.writePacket(p)
+ if err := t.pushPacket(p); err != nil {
+ t.writeError = err
}
+
+ return nil
}
func (t *handshakeTransport) Close() error {
return t.conn.Close()
}
-// enterKeyExchange runs the key exchange. t.mu must be held while running this.
-func (t *handshakeTransport) enterKeyExchangeLocked(otherInitPacket []byte) error {
+func (t *handshakeTransport) enterKeyExchange(otherInitPacket []byte) error {
if debugHandshake {
log.Printf("%s entered key exchange", t.id())
}
- myInit, myInitPacket, err := t.sendKexInitLocked(subsequentKeyExchange)
- if err != nil {
- return err
- }
otherInit := &kexInitMsg{}
if err := Unmarshal(otherInitPacket, otherInit); err != nil {
@@ -352,20 +517,20 @@ func (t *handshakeTransport) enterKeyExchangeLocked(otherInitPacket []byte) erro
clientVersion: t.clientVersion,
serverVersion: t.serverVersion,
clientKexInit: otherInitPacket,
- serverKexInit: myInitPacket,
+ serverKexInit: t.sentInitPacket,
}
clientInit := otherInit
- serverInit := myInit
+ serverInit := t.sentInitMsg
if len(t.hostKeys) == 0 {
- clientInit = myInit
- serverInit = otherInit
+ clientInit, serverInit = serverInit, clientInit
- magics.clientKexInit = myInitPacket
+ magics.clientKexInit = t.sentInitPacket
magics.serverKexInit = otherInitPacket
}
- algs, err := findAgreedAlgorithms(clientInit, serverInit)
+ var err error
+ t.algorithms, err = findAgreedAlgorithms(clientInit, serverInit)
if err != nil {
return err
}
@@ -388,16 +553,16 @@ func (t *handshakeTransport) enterKeyExchangeLocked(otherInitPacket []byte) erro
}
}
- kex, ok := kexAlgoMap[algs.kex]
+ kex, ok := kexAlgoMap[t.algorithms.kex]
if !ok {
- return fmt.Errorf("ssh: unexpected key exchange algorithm %v", algs.kex)
+ return fmt.Errorf("ssh: unexpected key exchange algorithm %v", t.algorithms.kex)
}
var result *kexResult
if len(t.hostKeys) > 0 {
- result, err = t.server(kex, algs, &magics)
+ result, err = t.server(kex, t.algorithms, &magics)
} else {
- result, err = t.client(kex, algs, &magics)
+ result, err = t.client(kex, t.algorithms, &magics)
}
if err != nil {
@@ -409,7 +574,7 @@ func (t *handshakeTransport) enterKeyExchangeLocked(otherInitPacket []byte) erro
}
result.SessionID = t.sessionID
- t.conn.prepareKeyChange(algs, result)
+ t.conn.prepareKeyChange(t.algorithms, result)
if err = t.conn.writePacket([]byte{msgNewKeys}); err != nil {
return err
}
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/keys.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/keys.go
index 21f7d0d..f38de98 100644
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/keys.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/keys.go
@@ -798,8 +798,8 @@ func ParseDSAPrivateKey(der []byte) (*dsa.PrivateKey, error) {
P *big.Int
Q *big.Int
G *big.Int
- Priv *big.Int
Pub *big.Int
+ Priv *big.Int
}
rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(der, &k)
if err != nil {
@@ -816,9 +816,9 @@ func ParseDSAPrivateKey(der []byte) (*dsa.PrivateKey, error) {
Q: k.Q,
G: k.G,
},
- Y: k.Priv,
+ Y: k.Pub,
},
- X: k.Pub,
+ X: k.Priv,
}, nil
}
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/mac.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/mac.go
index 07744ad..c07a062 100644
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/mac.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/mac.go
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ import (
type macMode struct {
keySize int
+ etm bool
new func(key []byte) hash.Hash
}
@@ -45,13 +46,16 @@ func (t truncatingMAC) Size() int {
func (t truncatingMAC) BlockSize() int { return t.hmac.BlockSize() }
var macModes = map[string]*macMode{
- "hmac-sha2-256": {32, func(key []byte) hash.Hash {
+ "hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com": {32, true, func(key []byte) hash.Hash {
return hmac.New(sha256.New, key)
}},
- "hmac-sha1": {20, func(key []byte) hash.Hash {
+ "hmac-sha2-256": {32, false, func(key []byte) hash.Hash {
+ return hmac.New(sha256.New, key)
+ }},
+ "hmac-sha1": {20, false, func(key []byte) hash.Hash {
return hmac.New(sha1.New, key)
}},
- "hmac-sha1-96": {20, func(key []byte) hash.Hash {
+ "hmac-sha1-96": {20, false, func(key []byte) hash.Hash {
return truncatingMAC{12, hmac.New(sha1.New, key)}
}},
}
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/mux.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/mux.go
index f3a3ddd..27a527c 100644
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/mux.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/mux.go
@@ -116,9 +116,9 @@ func (m *mux) Wait() error {
func newMux(p packetConn) *mux {
m := &mux{
conn: p,
- incomingChannels: make(chan NewChannel, 16),
+ incomingChannels: make(chan NewChannel, chanSize),
globalResponses: make(chan interface{}, 1),
- incomingRequests: make(chan *Request, 16),
+ incomingRequests: make(chan *Request, chanSize),
errCond: newCond(),
}
if debugMux {
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/server.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/server.go
index 9037470..77c84d1 100644
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/server.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/server.go
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import (
"fmt"
"io"
"net"
+ "strings"
)
// The Permissions type holds fine-grained permissions that are
@@ -188,7 +189,7 @@ func (s *connection) serverHandshake(config *ServerConfig) (*Permissions, error)
tr := newTransport(s.sshConn.conn, config.Rand, false /* not client */)
s.transport = newServerTransport(tr, s.clientVersion, s.serverVersion, config)
- if err := s.transport.requestInitialKeyChange(); err != nil {
+ if err := s.transport.waitSession(); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@@ -231,7 +232,7 @@ func isAcceptableAlgo(algo string) bool {
return false
}
-func checkSourceAddress(addr net.Addr, sourceAddr string) error {
+func checkSourceAddress(addr net.Addr, sourceAddrs string) error {
if addr == nil {
return errors.New("ssh: no address known for client, but source-address match required")
}
@@ -241,18 +242,20 @@ func checkSourceAddress(addr net.Addr, sourceAddr string) error {
return fmt.Errorf("ssh: remote address %v is not an TCP address when checking source-address match", addr)
}
- if allowedIP := net.ParseIP(sourceAddr); allowedIP != nil {
- if allowedIP.Equal(tcpAddr.IP) {
- return nil
- }
- } else {
- _, ipNet, err := net.ParseCIDR(sourceAddr)
- if err != nil {
- return fmt.Errorf("ssh: error parsing source-address restriction %q: %v", sourceAddr, err)
- }
+ for _, sourceAddr := range strings.Split(sourceAddrs, ",") {
+ if allowedIP := net.ParseIP(sourceAddr); allowedIP != nil {
+ if allowedIP.Equal(tcpAddr.IP) {
+ return nil
+ }
+ } else {
+ _, ipNet, err := net.ParseCIDR(sourceAddr)
+ if err != nil {
+ return fmt.Errorf("ssh: error parsing source-address restriction %q: %v", sourceAddr, err)
+ }
- if ipNet.Contains(tcpAddr.IP) {
- return nil
+ if ipNet.Contains(tcpAddr.IP) {
+ return nil
+ }
}
}
@@ -260,7 +263,7 @@ func checkSourceAddress(addr net.Addr, sourceAddr string) error {
}
func (s *connection) serverAuthenticate(config *ServerConfig) (*Permissions, error) {
- var err error
+ sessionID := s.transport.getSessionID()
var cache pubKeyCache
var perms *Permissions
@@ -385,7 +388,7 @@ userAuthLoop:
if !isAcceptableAlgo(sig.Format) {
break
}
- signedData := buildDataSignedForAuth(s.transport.getSessionID(), userAuthReq, algoBytes, pubKeyData)
+ signedData := buildDataSignedForAuth(sessionID, userAuthReq, algoBytes, pubKeyData)
if err := pubKey.Verify(signedData, sig); err != nil {
return nil, err
@@ -421,12 +424,12 @@ userAuthLoop:
return nil, errors.New("ssh: no authentication methods configured but NoClientAuth is also false")
}
- if err = s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&failureMsg)); err != nil {
+ if err := s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&failureMsg)); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
}
- if err = s.transport.writePacket([]byte{msgUserAuthSuccess}); err != nil {
+ if err := s.transport.writePacket([]byte{msgUserAuthSuccess}); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return perms, nil
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/transport.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/transport.go
index 62fba62..f9780e0 100644
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/transport.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/transport.go
@@ -8,8 +8,13 @@ import (
"bufio"
"errors"
"io"
+ "log"
)
+// debugTransport if set, will print packet types as they go over the
+// wire. No message decoding is done, to minimize the impact on timing.
+const debugTransport = false
+
const (
gcmCipherID = "aes128-gcm@openssh.com"
aes128cbcID = "aes128-cbc"
@@ -22,7 +27,9 @@ type packetConn interface {
// Encrypt and send a packet of data to the remote peer.
writePacket(packet []byte) error
- // Read a packet from the connection
+ // Read a packet from the connection. The read is blocking,
+ // i.e. if error is nil, then the returned byte slice is
+ // always non-empty.
readPacket() ([]byte, error)
// Close closes the write-side of the connection.
@@ -38,7 +45,7 @@ type transport struct {
bufReader *bufio.Reader
bufWriter *bufio.Writer
rand io.Reader
-
+ isClient bool
io.Closer
}
@@ -84,9 +91,38 @@ func (t *transport) prepareKeyChange(algs *algorithms, kexResult *kexResult) err
return nil
}
+func (t *transport) printPacket(p []byte, write bool) {
+ if len(p) == 0 {
+ return
+ }
+ who := "server"
+ if t.isClient {
+ who = "client"
+ }
+ what := "read"
+ if write {
+ what = "write"
+ }
+
+ log.Println(what, who, p[0])
+}
+
// Read and decrypt next packet.
-func (t *transport) readPacket() ([]byte, error) {
- return t.reader.readPacket(t.bufReader)
+func (t *transport) readPacket() (p []byte, err error) {
+ for {
+ p, err = t.reader.readPacket(t.bufReader)
+ if err != nil {
+ break
+ }
+ if len(p) == 0 || (p[0] != msgIgnore && p[0] != msgDebug) {
+ break
+ }
+ }
+ if debugTransport {
+ t.printPacket(p, false)
+ }
+
+ return p, err
}
func (s *connectionState) readPacket(r *bufio.Reader) ([]byte, error) {
@@ -129,6 +165,9 @@ func (s *connectionState) readPacket(r *bufio.Reader) ([]byte, error) {
}
func (t *transport) writePacket(packet []byte) error {
+ if debugTransport {
+ t.printPacket(packet, true)
+ }
return t.writer.writePacket(t.bufWriter, t.rand, packet)
}
@@ -169,6 +208,8 @@ func newTransport(rwc io.ReadWriteCloser, rand io.Reader, isClient bool) *transp
},
Closer: rwc,
}
+ t.isClient = isClient
+
if isClient {
t.reader.dir = serverKeys
t.writer.dir = clientKeys
@@ -226,6 +267,7 @@ func newPacketCipher(d direction, algs directionAlgorithms, kex *kexResult) (pac
c := &streamPacketCipher{
mac: macModes[algs.MAC].new(macKey),
+ etm: macModes[algs.MAC].etm,
}
c.macResult = make([]byte, c.mac.Size())