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-rw-r--r--vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/agent/client.go14
-rw-r--r--vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/agent/keyring.go2
-rw-r--r--vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/agent/server.go2
-rw-r--r--vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/certs.go8
-rw-r--r--vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/channel.go142
-rw-r--r--vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/cipher.go247
-rw-r--r--vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client.go25
-rw-r--r--vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client_auth.go121
-rw-r--r--vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/common.go20
-rw-r--r--vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/handshake.go6
-rw-r--r--vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/kex.go24
-rw-r--r--vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/keys.go47
-rw-r--r--vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/messages.go38
-rw-r--r--vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/mux.go6
-rw-r--r--vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/server.go42
-rw-r--r--vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/session.go2
-rw-r--r--vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/streamlocal.go1
-rw-r--r--vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/tcpip.go9
-rw-r--r--vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/transport.go70
19 files changed, 536 insertions, 290 deletions
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/agent/client.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/agent/client.go
index dce7682..b1808dd 100644
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/agent/client.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/agent/client.go
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
// ssh-agent process using the sample server.
//
// References:
-// [PROTOCOL.agent]: http://cvsweb.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/cvsweb/src/usr.bin/ssh/PROTOCOL.agent?rev=HEAD
+// [PROTOCOL.agent]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-miller-ssh-agent-00
package agent // import "golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/agent"
import (
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ const (
agentAddIdentity = 17
agentRemoveIdentity = 18
agentRemoveAllIdentities = 19
- agentAddIdConstrained = 25
+ agentAddIDConstrained = 25
// 3.3 Key-type independent requests from client to agent
agentAddSmartcardKey = 20
@@ -515,7 +515,7 @@ func (c *client) insertKey(s interface{}, comment string, constraints []byte) er
// if constraints are present then the message type needs to be changed.
if len(constraints) != 0 {
- req[0] = agentAddIdConstrained
+ req[0] = agentAddIDConstrained
}
resp, err := c.call(req)
@@ -577,11 +577,11 @@ func (c *client) Add(key AddedKey) error {
constraints = append(constraints, agentConstrainConfirm)
}
- if cert := key.Certificate; cert == nil {
+ cert := key.Certificate
+ if cert == nil {
return c.insertKey(key.PrivateKey, key.Comment, constraints)
- } else {
- return c.insertCert(key.PrivateKey, cert, key.Comment, constraints)
}
+ return c.insertCert(key.PrivateKey, cert, key.Comment, constraints)
}
func (c *client) insertCert(s interface{}, cert *ssh.Certificate, comment string, constraints []byte) error {
@@ -633,7 +633,7 @@ func (c *client) insertCert(s interface{}, cert *ssh.Certificate, comment string
// if constraints are present then the message type needs to be changed.
if len(constraints) != 0 {
- req[0] = agentAddIdConstrained
+ req[0] = agentAddIDConstrained
}
signer, err := ssh.NewSignerFromKey(s)
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/agent/keyring.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/agent/keyring.go
index a6ba06a..1a51632 100644
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/agent/keyring.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/agent/keyring.go
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ func (r *keyring) Unlock(passphrase []byte) error {
if !r.locked {
return errors.New("agent: not locked")
}
- if len(passphrase) != len(r.passphrase) || 1 != subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(passphrase, r.passphrase) {
+ if 1 != subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(passphrase, r.passphrase) {
return fmt.Errorf("agent: incorrect passphrase")
}
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/agent/server.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/agent/server.go
index 321e48a..2e4692c 100644
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/agent/server.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/agent/server.go
@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ func (s *server) processRequest(data []byte) (interface{}, error) {
}
return rep, nil
- case agentAddIdConstrained, agentAddIdentity:
+ case agentAddIDConstrained, agentAddIdentity:
return nil, s.insertIdentity(data)
}
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/certs.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/certs.go
index b1f0220..42106f3 100644
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/certs.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/certs.go
@@ -44,7 +44,9 @@ type Signature struct {
const CertTimeInfinity = 1<<64 - 1
// An Certificate represents an OpenSSH certificate as defined in
-// [PROTOCOL.certkeys]?rev=1.8.
+// [PROTOCOL.certkeys]?rev=1.8. The Certificate type implements the
+// PublicKey interface, so it can be unmarshaled using
+// ParsePublicKey.
type Certificate struct {
Nonce []byte
Key PublicKey
@@ -340,10 +342,10 @@ func (c *CertChecker) Authenticate(conn ConnMetadata, pubKey PublicKey) (*Permis
// the signature of the certificate.
func (c *CertChecker) CheckCert(principal string, cert *Certificate) error {
if c.IsRevoked != nil && c.IsRevoked(cert) {
- return fmt.Errorf("ssh: certicate serial %d revoked", cert.Serial)
+ return fmt.Errorf("ssh: certificate serial %d revoked", cert.Serial)
}
- for opt, _ := range cert.CriticalOptions {
+ for opt := range cert.CriticalOptions {
// sourceAddressCriticalOption will be enforced by
// serverAuthenticate
if opt == sourceAddressCriticalOption {
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/channel.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/channel.go
index 195530e..c0834c0 100644
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/channel.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/channel.go
@@ -205,32 +205,32 @@ type channel struct {
// writePacket sends a packet. If the packet is a channel close, it updates
// sentClose. This method takes the lock c.writeMu.
-func (c *channel) writePacket(packet []byte) error {
- c.writeMu.Lock()
- if c.sentClose {
- c.writeMu.Unlock()
+func (ch *channel) writePacket(packet []byte) error {
+ ch.writeMu.Lock()
+ if ch.sentClose {
+ ch.writeMu.Unlock()
return io.EOF
}
- c.sentClose = (packet[0] == msgChannelClose)
- err := c.mux.conn.writePacket(packet)
- c.writeMu.Unlock()
+ ch.sentClose = (packet[0] == msgChannelClose)
+ err := ch.mux.conn.writePacket(packet)
+ ch.writeMu.Unlock()
return err
}
-func (c *channel) sendMessage(msg interface{}) error {
+func (ch *channel) sendMessage(msg interface{}) error {
if debugMux {
- log.Printf("send(%d): %#v", c.mux.chanList.offset, msg)
+ log.Printf("send(%d): %#v", ch.mux.chanList.offset, msg)
}
p := Marshal(msg)
- binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(p[1:], c.remoteId)
- return c.writePacket(p)
+ binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(p[1:], ch.remoteId)
+ return ch.writePacket(p)
}
// WriteExtended writes data to a specific extended stream. These streams are
// used, for example, for stderr.
-func (c *channel) WriteExtended(data []byte, extendedCode uint32) (n int, err error) {
- if c.sentEOF {
+func (ch *channel) WriteExtended(data []byte, extendedCode uint32) (n int, err error) {
+ if ch.sentEOF {
return 0, io.EOF
}
// 1 byte message type, 4 bytes remoteId, 4 bytes data length
@@ -241,16 +241,16 @@ func (c *channel) WriteExtended(data []byte, extendedCode uint32) (n int, err er
opCode = msgChannelExtendedData
}
- c.writeMu.Lock()
- packet := c.packetPool[extendedCode]
+ ch.writeMu.Lock()
+ packet := ch.packetPool[extendedCode]
// We don't remove the buffer from packetPool, so
// WriteExtended calls from different goroutines will be
// flagged as errors by the race detector.
- c.writeMu.Unlock()
+ ch.writeMu.Unlock()
for len(data) > 0 {
- space := min(c.maxRemotePayload, len(data))
- if space, err = c.remoteWin.reserve(space); err != nil {
+ space := min(ch.maxRemotePayload, len(data))
+ if space, err = ch.remoteWin.reserve(space); err != nil {
return n, err
}
if want := headerLength + space; uint32(cap(packet)) < want {
@@ -262,13 +262,13 @@ func (c *channel) WriteExtended(data []byte, extendedCode uint32) (n int, err er
todo := data[:space]
packet[0] = opCode
- binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(packet[1:], c.remoteId)
+ binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(packet[1:], ch.remoteId)
if extendedCode > 0 {
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(packet[5:], uint32(extendedCode))
}
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(packet[headerLength-4:], uint32(len(todo)))
copy(packet[headerLength:], todo)
- if err = c.writePacket(packet); err != nil {
+ if err = ch.writePacket(packet); err != nil {
return n, err
}
@@ -276,14 +276,14 @@ func (c *channel) WriteExtended(data []byte, extendedCode uint32) (n int, err er
data = data[len(todo):]
}
- c.writeMu.Lock()
- c.packetPool[extendedCode] = packet
- c.writeMu.Unlock()
+ ch.writeMu.Lock()
+ ch.packetPool[extendedCode] = packet
+ ch.writeMu.Unlock()
return n, err
}
-func (c *channel) handleData(packet []byte) error {
+func (ch *channel) handleData(packet []byte) error {
headerLen := 9
isExtendedData := packet[0] == msgChannelExtendedData
if isExtendedData {
@@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ func (c *channel) handleData(packet []byte) error {
if length == 0 {
return nil
}
- if length > c.maxIncomingPayload {
+ if length > ch.maxIncomingPayload {
// TODO(hanwen): should send Disconnect?
return errors.New("ssh: incoming packet exceeds maximum payload size")
}
@@ -313,21 +313,21 @@ func (c *channel) handleData(packet []byte) error {
return errors.New("ssh: wrong packet length")
}
- c.windowMu.Lock()
- if c.myWindow < length {
- c.windowMu.Unlock()
+ ch.windowMu.Lock()
+ if ch.myWindow < length {
+ ch.windowMu.Unlock()
// TODO(hanwen): should send Disconnect with reason?
return errors.New("ssh: remote side wrote too much")
}
- c.myWindow -= length
- c.windowMu.Unlock()
+ ch.myWindow -= length
+ ch.windowMu.Unlock()
if extended == 1 {
- c.extPending.write(data)
+ ch.extPending.write(data)
} else if extended > 0 {
// discard other extended data.
} else {
- c.pending.write(data)
+ ch.pending.write(data)
}
return nil
}
@@ -384,31 +384,31 @@ func (c *channel) close() {
// responseMessageReceived is called when a success or failure message is
// received on a channel to check that such a message is reasonable for the
// given channel.
-func (c *channel) responseMessageReceived() error {
- if c.direction == channelInbound {
+func (ch *channel) responseMessageReceived() error {
+ if ch.direction == channelInbound {
return errors.New("ssh: channel response message received on inbound channel")
}
- if c.decided {
+ if ch.decided {
return errors.New("ssh: duplicate response received for channel")
}
- c.decided = true
+ ch.decided = true
return nil
}
-func (c *channel) handlePacket(packet []byte) error {
+func (ch *channel) handlePacket(packet []byte) error {
switch packet[0] {
case msgChannelData, msgChannelExtendedData:
- return c.handleData(packet)
+ return ch.handleData(packet)
case msgChannelClose:
- c.sendMessage(channelCloseMsg{PeersId: c.remoteId})
- c.mux.chanList.remove(c.localId)
- c.close()
+ ch.sendMessage(channelCloseMsg{PeersID: ch.remoteId})
+ ch.mux.chanList.remove(ch.localId)
+ ch.close()
return nil
case msgChannelEOF:
// RFC 4254 is mute on how EOF affects dataExt messages but
// it is logical to signal EOF at the same time.
- c.extPending.eof()
- c.pending.eof()
+ ch.extPending.eof()
+ ch.pending.eof()
return nil
}
@@ -419,24 +419,24 @@ func (c *channel) handlePacket(packet []byte) error {
switch msg := decoded.(type) {
case *channelOpenFailureMsg:
- if err := c.responseMessageReceived(); err != nil {
+ if err := ch.responseMessageReceived(); err != nil {
return err
}
- c.mux.chanList.remove(msg.PeersId)
- c.msg <- msg
+ ch.mux.chanList.remove(msg.PeersID)
+ ch.msg <- msg
case *channelOpenConfirmMsg:
- if err := c.responseMessageReceived(); err != nil {
+ if err := ch.responseMessageReceived(); err != nil {
return err
}
if msg.MaxPacketSize < minPacketLength || msg.MaxPacketSize > 1<<31 {
return fmt.Errorf("ssh: invalid MaxPacketSize %d from peer", msg.MaxPacketSize)
}
- c.remoteId = msg.MyId
- c.maxRemotePayload = msg.MaxPacketSize
- c.remoteWin.add(msg.MyWindow)
- c.msg <- msg
+ ch.remoteId = msg.MyID
+ ch.maxRemotePayload = msg.MaxPacketSize
+ ch.remoteWin.add(msg.MyWindow)
+ ch.msg <- msg
case *windowAdjustMsg:
- if !c.remoteWin.add(msg.AdditionalBytes) {
+ if !ch.remoteWin.add(msg.AdditionalBytes) {
return fmt.Errorf("ssh: invalid window update for %d bytes", msg.AdditionalBytes)
}
case *channelRequestMsg:
@@ -444,12 +444,12 @@ func (c *channel) handlePacket(packet []byte) error {
Type: msg.Request,
WantReply: msg.WantReply,
Payload: msg.RequestSpecificData,
- ch: c,
+ ch: ch,
}
- c.incomingRequests <- &req
+ ch.incomingRequests <- &req
default:
- c.msg <- msg
+ ch.msg <- msg
}
return nil
}
@@ -488,23 +488,23 @@ func (e *extChannel) Read(data []byte) (n int, err error) {
return e.ch.ReadExtended(data, e.code)
}
-func (c *channel) Accept() (Channel, <-chan *Request, error) {
- if c.decided {
+func (ch *channel) Accept() (Channel, <-chan *Request, error) {
+ if ch.decided {
return nil, nil, errDecidedAlready
}
- c.maxIncomingPayload = channelMaxPacket
+ ch.maxIncomingPayload = channelMaxPacket
confirm := channelOpenConfirmMsg{
- PeersId: c.remoteId,
- MyId: c.localId,
- MyWindow: c.myWindow,
- MaxPacketSize: c.maxIncomingPayload,
+ PeersID: ch.remoteId,
+ MyID: ch.localId,
+ MyWindow: ch.myWindow,
+ MaxPacketSize: ch.maxIncomingPayload,
}
- c.decided = true
- if err := c.sendMessage(confirm); err != nil {
+ ch.decided = true
+ if err := ch.sendMessage(confirm); err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
- return c, c.incomingRequests, nil
+ return ch, ch.incomingRequests, nil
}
func (ch *channel) Reject(reason RejectionReason, message string) error {
@@ -512,7 +512,7 @@ func (ch *channel) Reject(reason RejectionReason, message string) error {
return errDecidedAlready
}
reject := channelOpenFailureMsg{
- PeersId: ch.remoteId,
+ PeersID: ch.remoteId,
Reason: reason,
Message: message,
Language: "en",
@@ -541,7 +541,7 @@ func (ch *channel) CloseWrite() error {
}
ch.sentEOF = true
return ch.sendMessage(channelEOFMsg{
- PeersId: ch.remoteId})
+ PeersID: ch.remoteId})
}
func (ch *channel) Close() error {
@@ -550,7 +550,7 @@ func (ch *channel) Close() error {
}
return ch.sendMessage(channelCloseMsg{
- PeersId: ch.remoteId})
+ PeersID: ch.remoteId})
}
// Extended returns an io.ReadWriter that sends and receives data on the given,
@@ -577,7 +577,7 @@ func (ch *channel) SendRequest(name string, wantReply bool, payload []byte) (boo
}
msg := channelRequestMsg{
- PeersId: ch.remoteId,
+ PeersID: ch.remoteId,
Request: name,
WantReply: wantReply,
RequestSpecificData: payload,
@@ -614,11 +614,11 @@ func (ch *channel) ackRequest(ok bool) error {
var msg interface{}
if !ok {
msg = channelRequestFailureMsg{
- PeersId: ch.remoteId,
+ PeersID: ch.remoteId,
}
} else {
msg = channelRequestSuccessMsg{
- PeersId: ch.remoteId,
+ PeersID: ch.remoteId,
}
}
return ch.sendMessage(msg)
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/cipher.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/cipher.go
index 22bb30c..67b0126 100644
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/cipher.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/cipher.go
@@ -16,6 +16,10 @@ import (
"hash"
"io"
"io/ioutil"
+ "math/bits"
+
+ "golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20"
+ "golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305"
)
const (
@@ -53,78 +57,78 @@ func newRC4(key, iv []byte) (cipher.Stream, error) {
return rc4.NewCipher(key)
}
-type streamCipherMode struct {
- keySize int
- ivSize int
- skip int
- createFunc func(key, iv []byte) (cipher.Stream, error)
+type cipherMode struct {
+ keySize int
+ ivSize int
+ create func(key, iv []byte, macKey []byte, algs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error)
}
-func (c *streamCipherMode) createStream(key, iv []byte) (cipher.Stream, error) {
- if len(key) < c.keySize {
- panic("ssh: key length too small for cipher")
- }
- if len(iv) < c.ivSize {
- panic("ssh: iv too small for cipher")
- }
-
- stream, err := c.createFunc(key[:c.keySize], iv[:c.ivSize])
- if err != nil {
- return nil, err
- }
+func streamCipherMode(skip int, createFunc func(key, iv []byte) (cipher.Stream, error)) func(key, iv []byte, macKey []byte, algs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) {
+ return func(key, iv, macKey []byte, algs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) {
+ stream, err := createFunc(key, iv)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
- var streamDump []byte
- if c.skip > 0 {
- streamDump = make([]byte, 512)
- }
+ var streamDump []byte
+ if skip > 0 {
+ streamDump = make([]byte, 512)
+ }
- for remainingToDump := c.skip; remainingToDump > 0; {
- dumpThisTime := remainingToDump
- if dumpThisTime > len(streamDump) {
- dumpThisTime = len(streamDump)
+ for remainingToDump := skip; remainingToDump > 0; {
+ dumpThisTime := remainingToDump
+ if dumpThisTime > len(streamDump) {
+ dumpThisTime = len(streamDump)
+ }
+ stream.XORKeyStream(streamDump[:dumpThisTime], streamDump[:dumpThisTime])
+ remainingToDump -= dumpThisTime
}
- stream.XORKeyStream(streamDump[:dumpThisTime], streamDump[:dumpThisTime])
- remainingToDump -= dumpThisTime
- }
- return stream, nil
+ mac := macModes[algs.MAC].new(macKey)
+ return &streamPacketCipher{
+ mac: mac,
+ etm: macModes[algs.MAC].etm,
+ macResult: make([]byte, mac.Size()),
+ cipher: stream,
+ }, nil
+ }
}
// cipherModes documents properties of supported ciphers. Ciphers not included
// are not supported and will not be negotiated, even if explicitly requested in
// ClientConfig.Crypto.Ciphers.
-var cipherModes = map[string]*streamCipherMode{
+var cipherModes = map[string]*cipherMode{
// Ciphers from RFC4344, which introduced many CTR-based ciphers. Algorithms
// are defined in the order specified in the RFC.
- "aes128-ctr": {16, aes.BlockSize, 0, newAESCTR},
- "aes192-ctr": {24, aes.BlockSize, 0, newAESCTR},
- "aes256-ctr": {32, aes.BlockSize, 0, newAESCTR},
+ "aes128-ctr": {16, aes.BlockSize, streamCipherMode(0, newAESCTR)},
+ "aes192-ctr": {24, aes.BlockSize, streamCipherMode(0, newAESCTR)},
+ "aes256-ctr": {32, aes.BlockSize, streamCipherMode(0, newAESCTR)},
// Ciphers from RFC4345, which introduces security-improved arcfour ciphers.
// They are defined in the order specified in the RFC.
- "arcfour128": {16, 0, 1536, newRC4},
- "arcfour256": {32, 0, 1536, newRC4},
+ "arcfour128": {16, 0, streamCipherMode(1536, newRC4)},
+ "arcfour256": {32, 0, streamCipherMode(1536, newRC4)},
// Cipher defined in RFC 4253, which describes SSH Transport Layer Protocol.
// Note that this cipher is not safe, as stated in RFC 4253: "Arcfour (and
// RC4) has problems with weak keys, and should be used with caution."
// RFC4345 introduces improved versions of Arcfour.
- "arcfour": {16, 0, 0, newRC4},
+ "arcfour": {16, 0, streamCipherMode(0, newRC4)},
- // AES-GCM is not a stream cipher, so it is constructed with a
- // special case. If we add any more non-stream ciphers, we
- // should invest a cleaner way to do this.
- gcmCipherID: {16, 12, 0, nil},
+ // AEAD ciphers
+ gcmCipherID: {16, 12, newGCMCipher},
+ chacha20Poly1305ID: {64, 0, newChaCha20Cipher},
// CBC mode is insecure and so is not included in the default config.
// (See http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~kp/SandPfinal.pdf). If absolutely
// needed, it's possible to specify a custom Config to enable it.
// You should expect that an active attacker can recover plaintext if
// you do.
- aes128cbcID: {16, aes.BlockSize, 0, nil},
+ aes128cbcID: {16, aes.BlockSize, newAESCBCCipher},
- // 3des-cbc is insecure and is disabled by default.
- tripledescbcID: {24, des.BlockSize, 0, nil},
+ // 3des-cbc is insecure and is not included in the default
+ // config.
+ tripledescbcID: {24, des.BlockSize, newTripleDESCBCCipher},
}
// prefixLen is the length of the packet prefix that contains the packet length
@@ -304,7 +308,7 @@ type gcmCipher struct {
buf []byte
}
-func newGCMCipher(iv, key, macKey []byte) (packetCipher, error) {
+func newGCMCipher(key, iv, unusedMacKey []byte, unusedAlgs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) {
c, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
@@ -372,7 +376,7 @@ func (c *gcmCipher) readPacket(seqNum uint32, r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) {
}
length := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(c.prefix[:])
if length > maxPacket {
- return nil, errors.New("ssh: max packet length exceeded.")
+ return nil, errors.New("ssh: max packet length exceeded")
}
if cap(c.buf) < int(length+gcmTagSize) {
@@ -422,7 +426,7 @@ type cbcCipher struct {
oracleCamouflage uint32
}
-func newCBCCipher(c cipher.Block, iv, key, macKey []byte, algs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) {
+func newCBCCipher(c cipher.Block, key, iv, macKey []byte, algs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) {
cbc := &cbcCipher{
mac: macModes[algs.MAC].new(macKey),
decrypter: cipher.NewCBCDecrypter(c, iv),
@@ -436,13 +440,13 @@ func newCBCCipher(c cipher.Block, iv, key, macKey []byte, algs directionAlgorith
return cbc, nil
}
-func newAESCBCCipher(iv, key, macKey []byte, algs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) {
+func newAESCBCCipher(key, iv, macKey []byte, algs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) {
c, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
- cbc, err := newCBCCipher(c, iv, key, macKey, algs)
+ cbc, err := newCBCCipher(c, key, iv, macKey, algs)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@@ -450,13 +454,13 @@ func newAESCBCCipher(iv, key, macKey []byte, algs directionAlgorithms) (packetCi
return cbc, nil
}
-func newTripleDESCBCCipher(iv, key, macKey []byte, algs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) {
+func newTripleDESCBCCipher(key, iv, macKey []byte, algs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) {
c, err := des.NewTripleDESCipher(key)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
- cbc, err := newCBCCipher(c, iv, key, macKey, algs)
+ cbc, err := newCBCCipher(c, key, iv, macKey, algs)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@@ -548,11 +552,11 @@ func (c *cbcCipher) readPacketLeaky(seqNum uint32, r io.Reader) ([]byte, error)
c.packetData = c.packetData[:entirePacketSize]
}
- if n, err := io.ReadFull(r, c.packetData[firstBlockLength:]); err != nil {
+ n, err := io.ReadFull(r, c.packetData[firstBlockLength:])
+ if err != nil {
return nil, err
- } else {
- c.oracleCamouflage -= uint32(n)
}
+ c.oracleCamouflage -= uint32(n)
remainingCrypted := c.packetData[firstBlockLength:macStart]
c.decrypter.CryptBlocks(remainingCrypted, remainingCrypted)
@@ -627,3 +631,140 @@ func (c *cbcCipher) writePacket(seqNum uint32, w io.Writer, rand io.Reader, pack
return nil
}
+
+const chacha20Poly1305ID = "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com"
+
+// chacha20Poly1305Cipher implements the chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
+// AEAD, which is described here:
+//
+// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-josefsson-ssh-chacha20-poly1305-openssh-00
+//
+// the methods here also implement padding, which RFC4253 Section 6
+// also requires of stream ciphers.
+type chacha20Poly1305Cipher struct {
+ lengthKey [8]uint32
+ contentKey [8]uint32
+ buf []byte
+}
+
+func newChaCha20Cipher(key, unusedIV, unusedMACKey []byte, unusedAlgs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) {
+ if len(key) != 64 {
+ panic(len(key))
+ }
+
+ c := &chacha20Poly1305Cipher{
+ buf: make([]byte, 256),
+ }
+
+ for i := range c.contentKey {
+ c.contentKey[i] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[i*4 : (i+1)*4])
+ }
+ for i := range c.lengthKey {
+ c.lengthKey[i] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[(i+8)*4 : (i+9)*4])
+ }
+ return c, nil
+}
+
+func (c *chacha20Poly1305Cipher) readPacket(seqNum uint32, r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) {
+ nonce := [3]uint32{0, 0, bits.ReverseBytes32(seqNum)}
+ s := chacha20.New(c.contentKey, nonce)
+ var polyKey [32]byte
+ s.XORKeyStream(polyKey[:], polyKey[:])
+ s.Advance() // skip next 32 bytes
+
+ encryptedLength := c.buf[:4]
+ if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, encryptedLength); err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+
+ var lenBytes [4]byte
+ chacha20.New(c.lengthKey, nonce).XORKeyStream(lenBytes[:], encryptedLength)
+
+ length := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(lenBytes[:])
+ if length > maxPacket {
+ return nil, errors.New("ssh: invalid packet length, packet too large")
+ }
+
+ contentEnd := 4 + length
+ packetEnd := contentEnd + poly1305.TagSize
+ if uint32(cap(c.buf)) < packetEnd {
+ c.buf = make([]byte, packetEnd)
+ copy(c.buf[:], encryptedLength)
+ } else {
+ c.buf = c.buf[:packetEnd]
+ }
+
+ if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, c.buf[4:packetEnd]); err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+
+ var mac [poly1305.TagSize]byte
+ copy(mac[:], c.buf[contentEnd:packetEnd])
+ if !poly1305.Verify(&mac, c.buf[:contentEnd], &polyKey) {
+ return nil, errors.New("ssh: MAC failure")
+ }
+
+ plain := c.buf[4:contentEnd]
+ s.XORKeyStream(plain, plain)
+
+ padding := plain[0]
+ if padding < 4 {
+ // padding is a byte, so it automatically satisfies
+ // the maximum size, which is 255.
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: illegal padding %d", padding)
+ }
+
+ if int(padding)+1 >= len(plain) {
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: padding %d too large", padding)
+ }
+
+ plain = plain[1 : len(plain)-int(padding)]
+
+ return plain, nil
+}
+
+func (c *chacha20Poly1305Cipher) writePacket(seqNum uint32, w io.Writer, rand io.Reader, payload []byte) error {
+ nonce := [3]uint32{0, 0, bits.ReverseBytes32(seqNum)}
+ s := chacha20.New(c.contentKey, nonce)
+ var polyKey [32]byte
+ s.XORKeyStream(polyKey[:], polyKey[:])
+ s.Advance() // skip next 32 bytes
+
+ // There is no blocksize, so fall back to multiple of 8 byte
+ // padding, as described in RFC 4253, Sec 6.
+ const packetSizeMultiple = 8
+
+ padding := packetSizeMultiple - (1+len(payload))%packetSizeMultiple
+ if padding < 4 {
+ padding += packetSizeMultiple
+ }
+
+ // size (4 bytes), padding (1), payload, padding, tag.
+ totalLength := 4 + 1 + len(payload) + padding + poly1305.TagSize
+ if cap(c.buf) < totalLength {
+ c.buf = make([]byte, totalLength)
+ } else {
+ c.buf = c.buf[:totalLength]
+ }
+
+ binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(c.buf, uint32(1+len(payload)+padding))
+ chacha20.New(c.lengthKey, nonce).XORKeyStream(c.buf, c.buf[:4])
+ c.buf[4] = byte(padding)
+ copy(c.buf[5:], payload)
+ packetEnd := 5 + len(payload) + padding
+ if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand, c.buf[5+len(payload):packetEnd]); err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+
+ s.XORKeyStream(c.buf[4:], c.buf[4:packetEnd])
+
+ var mac [poly1305.TagSize]byte
+ poly1305.Sum(&mac, c.buf[:packetEnd], &polyKey)
+
+ copy(c.buf[packetEnd:], mac[:])
+
+ if _, err := w.Write(c.buf); err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ return nil
+}
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client.go
index a7e3263..ae6ca77 100644
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client.go
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"net"
+ "os"
"sync"
"time"
)
@@ -18,6 +19,8 @@ import (
type Client struct {
Conn
+ handleForwardsOnce sync.Once // guards calling (*Client).handleForwards
+
forwards forwardList // forwarded tcpip connections from the remote side
mu sync.Mutex
channelHandlers map[string]chan NewChannel
@@ -59,8 +62,6 @@ func NewClient(c Conn, chans <-chan NewChannel, reqs <-chan *Request) *Client {
conn.Wait()
conn.forwards.closeAll()
}()
- go conn.forwards.handleChannels(conn.HandleChannelOpen("forwarded-tcpip"))
- go conn.forwards.handleChannels(conn.HandleChannelOpen("forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com"))
return conn
}
@@ -187,6 +188,10 @@ func Dial(network, addr string, config *ClientConfig) (*Client, error) {
// net.Conn underlying the the SSH connection.
type HostKeyCallback func(hostname string, remote net.Addr, key PublicKey) error
+// BannerCallback is the function type used for treat the banner sent by
+// the server. A BannerCallback receives the message sent by the remote server.
+type BannerCallback func(message string) error
+
// A ClientConfig structure is used to configure a Client. It must not be
// modified after having been passed to an SSH function.
type ClientConfig struct {
@@ -209,6 +214,12 @@ type ClientConfig struct {
// FixedHostKey can be used for simplistic host key checks.
HostKeyCallback HostKeyCallback
+ // BannerCallback is called during the SSH dance to display a custom
+ // server's message. The client configuration can supply this callback to
+ // handle it as wished. The function BannerDisplayStderr can be used for
+ // simplistic display on Stderr.
+ BannerCallback BannerCallback
+
// ClientVersion contains the version identification string that will
// be used for the connection. If empty, a reasonable default is used.
ClientVersion string
@@ -255,3 +266,13 @@ func FixedHostKey(key PublicKey) HostKeyCallback {
hk := &fixedHostKey{key}
return hk.check
}
+
+// BannerDisplayStderr returns a function that can be used for
+// ClientConfig.BannerCallback to display banners on os.Stderr.
+func BannerDisplayStderr() BannerCallback {
+ return func(banner string) error {
+ _, err := os.Stderr.WriteString(banner)
+
+ return err
+ }
+}
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client_auth.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client_auth.go
index 3acd8d4..5f44b77 100644
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client_auth.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client_auth.go
@@ -11,6 +11,14 @@ import (
"io"
)
+type authResult int
+
+const (
+ authFailure authResult = iota
+ authPartialSuccess
+ authSuccess
+)
+
// clientAuthenticate authenticates with the remote server. See RFC 4252.
func (c *connection) clientAuthenticate(config *ClientConfig) error {
// initiate user auth session
@@ -37,11 +45,12 @@ func (c *connection) clientAuthenticate(config *ClientConfig) error {
if err != nil {
return err
}
- if ok {
+ if ok == authSuccess {
// success
return nil
+ } else if ok == authFailure {
+ tried[auth.method()] = true
}
- tried[auth.method()] = true
if methods == nil {
methods = lastMethods
}
@@ -82,7 +91,7 @@ type AuthMethod interface {
// If authentication is not successful, a []string of alternative
// method names is returned. If the slice is nil, it will be ignored
// and the previous set of possible methods will be reused.
- auth(session []byte, user string, p packetConn, rand io.Reader) (bool, []string, error)
+ auth(session []byte, user string, p packetConn, rand io.Reader) (authResult, []string, error)
// method returns the RFC 4252 method name.
method() string
@@ -91,13 +100,13 @@ type AuthMethod interface {
// "none" authentication, RFC 4252 section 5.2.
type noneAuth int
-func (n *noneAuth) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader) (bool, []string, error) {
+func (n *noneAuth) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader) (authResult, []string, error) {
if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&userAuthRequestMsg{
User: user,
Service: serviceSSH,
Method: "none",
})); err != nil {
- return false, nil, err
+ return authFailure, nil, err
}
return handleAuthResponse(c)
@@ -111,7 +120,7 @@ func (n *noneAuth) method() string {
// a function call, e.g. by prompting the user.
type passwordCallback func() (password string, err error)
-func (cb passwordCallback) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader) (bool, []string, error) {
+func (cb passwordCallback) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader) (authResult, []string, error) {
type passwordAuthMsg struct {
User string `sshtype:"50"`
Service string
@@ -125,7 +134,7 @@ func (cb passwordCallback) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand
// The program may only find out that the user doesn't have a password
// when prompting.
if err != nil {
- return false, nil, err
+ return authFailure, nil, err
}
if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&passwordAuthMsg{
@@ -135,7 +144,7 @@ func (cb passwordCallback) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand
Reply: false,
Password: pw,
})); err != nil {
- return false, nil, err
+ return authFailure, nil, err
}
return handleAuthResponse(c)
@@ -178,7 +187,7 @@ func (cb publicKeyCallback) method() string {
return "publickey"
}
-func (cb publicKeyCallback) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader) (bool, []string, error) {
+func (cb publicKeyCallback) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader) (authResult, []string, error) {
// Authentication is performed by sending an enquiry to test if a key is
// acceptable to the remote. If the key is acceptable, the client will
// attempt to authenticate with the valid key. If not the client will repeat
@@ -186,13 +195,13 @@ func (cb publicKeyCallback) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand
signers, err := cb()
if err != nil {
- return false, nil, err
+ return authFailure, nil, err
}
var methods []string
for _, signer := range signers {
ok, err := validateKey(signer.PublicKey(), user, c)
if err != nil {
- return false, nil, err
+ return authFailure, nil, err
}
if !ok {
continue
@@ -206,7 +215,7 @@ func (cb publicKeyCallback) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand
Method: cb.method(),
}, []byte(pub.Type()), pubKey))
if err != nil {
- return false, nil, err
+ return authFailure, nil, err
}
// manually wrap the serialized signature in a string
@@ -224,24 +233,24 @@ func (cb publicKeyCallback) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand
}
p := Marshal(&msg)
if err := c.writePacket(p); err != nil {
- return false, nil, err
+ return authFailure, nil, err
}
- var success bool
+ var success authResult
success, methods, err = handleAuthResponse(c)
if err != nil {
- return false, nil, err
+ return authFailure, nil, err
}
// If authentication succeeds or the list of available methods does not
// contain the "publickey" method, do not attempt to authenticate with any
// other keys. According to RFC 4252 Section 7, the latter can occur when
// additional authentication methods are required.
- if success || !containsMethod(methods, cb.method()) {
+ if success == authSuccess || !containsMethod(methods, cb.method()) {
return success, methods, err
}
}
- return false, methods, nil
+ return authFailure, methods, nil
}
func containsMethod(methods []string, method string) bool {
@@ -283,7 +292,9 @@ func confirmKeyAck(key PublicKey, c packetConn) (bool, error) {
}
switch packet[0] {
case msgUserAuthBanner:
- // TODO(gpaul): add callback to present the banner to the user
+ if err := handleBannerResponse(c, packet); err != nil {
+ return false, err
+ }
case msgUserAuthPubKeyOk:
var msg userAuthPubKeyOkMsg
if err := Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil {
@@ -316,30 +327,53 @@ func PublicKeysCallback(getSigners func() (signers []Signer, err error)) AuthMet
// handleAuthResponse returns whether the preceding authentication request succeeded
// along with a list of remaining authentication methods to try next and
// an error if an unexpected response was received.
-func handleAuthResponse(c packetConn) (bool, []string, error) {
+func handleAuthResponse(c packetConn) (authResult, []string, error) {
for {
packet, err := c.readPacket()
if err != nil {
- return false, nil, err
+ return authFailure, nil, err
}
switch packet[0] {
case msgUserAuthBanner:
- // TODO: add callback to present the banner to the user
+ if err := handleBannerResponse(c, packet); err != nil {
+ return authFailure, nil, err
+ }
case msgUserAuthFailure:
var msg userAuthFailureMsg
if err := Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil {
- return false, nil, err
+ return authFailure, nil, err
+ }
+ if msg.PartialSuccess {
+ return authPartialSuccess, msg.Methods, nil
}
- return false, msg.Methods, nil
+ return authFailure, msg.Methods, nil
case msgUserAuthSuccess:
- return true, nil, nil
+ return authSuccess, nil, nil
default:
- return false, nil, unexpectedMessageError(msgUserAuthSuccess, packet[0])
+ return authFailure, nil, unexpectedMessageError(msgUserAuthSuccess, packet[0])
}
}
}
+func handleBannerResponse(c packetConn, packet []byte) error {
+ var msg userAuthBannerMsg
+ if err := Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+
+ transport, ok := c.(*handshakeTransport)
+ if !ok {
+ return nil
+ }
+
+ if transport.bannerCallback != nil {
+ return transport.bannerCallback(msg.Message)
+ }
+
+ return nil
+}
+
// KeyboardInteractiveChallenge should print questions, optionally
// disabling echoing (e.g. for passwords), and return all the answers.
// Challenge may be called multiple times in a single session. After
@@ -359,7 +393,7 @@ func (cb KeyboardInteractiveChallenge) method() string {
return "keyboard-interactive"
}
-func (cb KeyboardInteractiveChallenge) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader) (bool, []string, error) {
+func (cb KeyboardInteractiveChallenge) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader) (authResult, []string, error) {
type initiateMsg struct {
User string `sshtype:"50"`
Service string
@@ -373,37 +407,42 @@ func (cb KeyboardInteractiveChallenge) auth(session []byte, user string, c packe
Service: serviceSSH,
Method: "keyboard-interactive",
})); err != nil {
- return false, nil, err
+ return authFailure, nil, err
}
for {
packet, err := c.readPacket()
if err != nil {
- return false, nil, err
+ return authFailure, nil, err
}
// like handleAuthResponse, but with less options.
switch packet[0] {
case msgUserAuthBanner:
- // TODO: Print banners during userauth.
+ if err := handleBannerResponse(c, packet); err != nil {
+ return authFailure, nil, err
+ }
continue
case msgUserAuthInfoRequest:
// OK
case msgUserAuthFailure:
var msg userAuthFailureMsg
if err := Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil {
- return false, nil, err
+ return authFailure, nil, err
+ }
+ if msg.PartialSuccess {
+ return authPartialSuccess, msg.Methods, nil
}
- return false, msg.Methods, nil
+ return authFailure, msg.Methods, nil
case msgUserAuthSuccess:
- return true, nil, nil
+ return authSuccess, nil, nil
default:
- return false, nil, unexpectedMessageError(msgUserAuthInfoRequest, packet[0])
+ return authFailure, nil, unexpectedMessageError(msgUserAuthInfoRequest, packet[0])
}
var msg userAuthInfoRequestMsg
if err := Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil {
- return false, nil, err
+ return authFailure, nil, err
}
// Manually unpack the prompt/echo pairs.
@@ -413,7 +452,7 @@ func (cb KeyboardInteractiveChallenge) auth(session []byte, user string, c packe
for i := 0; i < int(msg.NumPrompts); i++ {
prompt, r, ok := parseString(rest)
if !ok || len(r) == 0 {
- return false, nil, errors.New("ssh: prompt format error")
+ return authFailure, nil, errors.New("ssh: prompt format error")
}
prompts = append(prompts, string(prompt))
echos = append(echos, r[0] != 0)
@@ -421,16 +460,16 @@ func (cb KeyboardInteractiveChallenge) auth(session []byte, user string, c packe
}
if len(rest) != 0 {
- return false, nil, errors.New("ssh: extra data following keyboard-interactive pairs")
+ return authFailure, nil, errors.New("ssh: extra data following keyboard-interactive pairs")
}
answers, err := cb(msg.User, msg.Instruction, prompts, echos)
if err != nil {
- return false, nil, err
+ return authFailure, nil, err
}
if len(answers) != len(prompts) {
- return false, nil, errors.New("ssh: not enough answers from keyboard-interactive callback")
+ return authFailure, nil, errors.New("ssh: not enough answers from keyboard-interactive callback")
}
responseLength := 1 + 4
for _, a := range answers {
@@ -446,7 +485,7 @@ func (cb KeyboardInteractiveChallenge) auth(session []byte, user string, c packe
}
if err := c.writePacket(serialized); err != nil {
- return false, nil, err
+ return authFailure, nil, err
}
}
}
@@ -456,10 +495,10 @@ type retryableAuthMethod struct {
maxTries int
}
-func (r *retryableAuthMethod) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader) (ok bool, methods []string, err error) {
+func (r *retryableAuthMethod) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader) (ok authResult, methods []string, err error) {
for i := 0; r.maxTries <= 0 || i < r.maxTries; i++ {
ok, methods, err = r.authMethod.auth(session, user, c, rand)
- if ok || err != nil { // either success or error terminate
+ if ok != authFailure || err != nil { // either success, partial success or error terminate
return ok, methods, err
}
}
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/common.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/common.go
index dc39e4d..04f3620 100644
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/common.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/common.go
@@ -24,11 +24,21 @@ const (
serviceSSH = "ssh-connection"
)
-// supportedCiphers specifies the supported ciphers in preference order.
+// supportedCiphers lists ciphers we support but might not recommend.
var supportedCiphers = []string{
"aes128-ctr", "aes192-ctr", "aes256-ctr",
"aes128-gcm@openssh.com",
- "arcfour256", "arcfour128",
+ chacha20Poly1305ID,
+ "arcfour256", "arcfour128", "arcfour",
+ aes128cbcID,
+ tripledescbcID,
+}
+
+// preferredCiphers specifies the default preference for ciphers.
+var preferredCiphers = []string{
+ "aes128-gcm@openssh.com",
+ chacha20Poly1305ID,
+ "aes128-ctr", "aes192-ctr", "aes256-ctr",
}
// supportedKexAlgos specifies the supported key-exchange algorithms in
@@ -211,7 +221,7 @@ func (c *Config) SetDefaults() {
c.Rand = rand.Reader
}
if c.Ciphers == nil {
- c.Ciphers = supportedCiphers
+ c.Ciphers = preferredCiphers
}
var ciphers []string
for _, c := range c.Ciphers {
@@ -242,7 +252,7 @@ func (c *Config) SetDefaults() {
// buildDataSignedForAuth returns the data that is signed in order to prove
// possession of a private key. See RFC 4252, section 7.
-func buildDataSignedForAuth(sessionId []byte, req userAuthRequestMsg, algo, pubKey []byte) []byte {
+func buildDataSignedForAuth(sessionID []byte, req userAuthRequestMsg, algo, pubKey []byte) []byte {
data := struct {
Session []byte
Type byte
@@ -253,7 +263,7 @@ func buildDataSignedForAuth(sessionId []byte, req userAuthRequestMsg, algo, pubK
Algo []byte
PubKey []byte
}{
- sessionId,
+ sessionID,
msgUserAuthRequest,
req.User,
req.Service,
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/handshake.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/handshake.go
index 932ce83..4f7912e 100644
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/handshake.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/handshake.go
@@ -78,6 +78,11 @@ type handshakeTransport struct {
dialAddress string
remoteAddr net.Addr
+ // bannerCallback is non-empty if we are the client and it has been set in
+ // ClientConfig. In that case it is called during the user authentication
+ // dance to handle a custom server's message.
+ bannerCallback BannerCallback
+
// Algorithms agreed in the last key exchange.
algorithms *algorithms
@@ -120,6 +125,7 @@ func newClientTransport(conn keyingTransport, clientVersion, serverVersion []byt
t.dialAddress = dialAddr
t.remoteAddr = addr
t.hostKeyCallback = config.HostKeyCallback
+ t.bannerCallback = config.BannerCallback
if config.HostKeyAlgorithms != nil {
t.hostKeyAlgorithms = config.HostKeyAlgorithms
} else {
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/kex.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/kex.go
index f91c277..f34bcc0 100644
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/kex.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/kex.go
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ func (group *dhGroup) Client(c packetConn, randSource io.Reader, magics *handsha
return nil, err
}
- kInt, err := group.diffieHellman(kexDHReply.Y, x)
+ ki, err := group.diffieHellman(kexDHReply.Y, x)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@@ -129,8 +129,8 @@ func (group *dhGroup) Client(c packetConn, randSource io.Reader, magics *handsha
writeString(h, kexDHReply.HostKey)
writeInt(h, X)
writeInt(h, kexDHReply.Y)
- K := make([]byte, intLength(kInt))
- marshalInt(K, kInt)
+ K := make([]byte, intLength(ki))
+ marshalInt(K, ki)
h.Write(K)
return &kexResult{
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ func (group *dhGroup) Server(c packetConn, randSource io.Reader, magics *handsha
}
Y := new(big.Int).Exp(group.g, y, group.p)
- kInt, err := group.diffieHellman(kexDHInit.X, y)
+ ki, err := group.diffieHellman(kexDHInit.X, y)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@@ -177,8 +177,8 @@ func (group *dhGroup) Server(c packetConn, randSource io.Reader, magics *handsha
writeInt(h, kexDHInit.X)
writeInt(h, Y)
- K := make([]byte, intLength(kInt))
- marshalInt(K, kInt)
+ K := make([]byte, intLength(ki))
+ marshalInt(K, ki)
h.Write(K)
H := h.Sum(nil)
@@ -462,9 +462,9 @@ func (kex *curve25519sha256) Client(c packetConn, rand io.Reader, magics *handsh
writeString(h, kp.pub[:])
writeString(h, reply.EphemeralPubKey)
- kInt := new(big.Int).SetBytes(secret[:])
- K := make([]byte, intLength(kInt))
- marshalInt(K, kInt)
+ ki := new(big.Int).SetBytes(secret[:])
+ K := make([]byte, intLength(ki))
+ marshalInt(K, ki)
h.Write(K)
return &kexResult{
@@ -510,9 +510,9 @@ func (kex *curve25519sha256) Server(c packetConn, rand io.Reader, magics *handsh
writeString(h, kexInit.ClientPubKey)
writeString(h, kp.pub[:])
- kInt := new(big.Int).SetBytes(secret[:])
- K := make([]byte, intLength(kInt))
- marshalInt(K, kInt)
+ ki := new(big.Int).SetBytes(secret[:])
+ K := make([]byte, intLength(ki))
+ marshalInt(K, ki)
h.Write(K)
H := h.Sum(nil)
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/keys.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/keys.go
index b682c17..73697de 100644
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/keys.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/keys.go
@@ -276,7 +276,8 @@ type PublicKey interface {
Type() string
// Marshal returns the serialized key data in SSH wire format,
- // with the name prefix.
+ // with the name prefix. To unmarshal the returned data, use
+ // the ParsePublicKey function.
Marshal() []byte
// Verify that sig is a signature on the given data using this
@@ -363,7 +364,7 @@ func (r *rsaPublicKey) CryptoPublicKey() crypto.PublicKey {
type dsaPublicKey dsa.PublicKey
-func (r *dsaPublicKey) Type() string {
+func (k *dsaPublicKey) Type() string {
return "ssh-dss"
}
@@ -481,12 +482,12 @@ func (k *dsaPrivateKey) Sign(rand io.Reader, data []byte) (*Signature, error) {
type ecdsaPublicKey ecdsa.PublicKey
-func (key *ecdsaPublicKey) Type() string {
- return "ecdsa-sha2-" + key.nistID()
+func (k *ecdsaPublicKey) Type() string {
+ return "ecdsa-sha2-" + k.nistID()
}
-func (key *ecdsaPublicKey) nistID() string {
- switch key.Params().BitSize {
+func (k *ecdsaPublicKey) nistID() string {
+ switch k.Params().BitSize {
case 256:
return "nistp256"
case 384:
@@ -499,7 +500,7 @@ func (key *ecdsaPublicKey) nistID() string {
type ed25519PublicKey ed25519.PublicKey
-func (key ed25519PublicKey) Type() string {
+func (k ed25519PublicKey) Type() string {
return KeyAlgoED25519
}
@@ -518,23 +519,23 @@ func parseED25519(in []byte) (out PublicKey, rest []byte, err error) {
return (ed25519PublicKey)(key), w.Rest, nil
}
-func (key ed25519PublicKey) Marshal() []byte {
+func (k ed25519PublicKey) Marshal() []byte {
w := struct {
Name string
KeyBytes []byte
}{
KeyAlgoED25519,
- []byte(key),
+ []byte(k),
}
return Marshal(&w)
}
-func (key ed25519PublicKey) Verify(b []byte, sig *Signature) error {
- if sig.Format != key.Type() {
- return fmt.Errorf("ssh: signature type %s for key type %s", sig.Format, key.Type())
+func (k ed25519PublicKey) Verify(b []byte, sig *Signature) error {
+ if sig.Format != k.Type() {
+ return fmt.Errorf("ssh: signature type %s for key type %s", sig.Format, k.Type())
}
- edKey := (ed25519.PublicKey)(key)
+ edKey := (ed25519.PublicKey)(k)
if ok := ed25519.Verify(edKey, b, sig.Blob); !ok {
return errors.New("ssh: signature did not verify")
}
@@ -595,9 +596,9 @@ func parseECDSA(in []byte) (out PublicKey, rest []byte, err error) {
return (*ecdsaPublicKey)(key), w.Rest, nil
}
-func (key *ecdsaPublicKey) Marshal() []byte {
+func (k *ecdsaPublicKey) Marshal() []byte {
// See RFC 5656, section 3.1.
- keyBytes := elliptic.Marshal(key.Curve, key.X, key.Y)
+ keyBytes := elliptic.Marshal(k.Curve, k.X, k.Y)
// ECDSA publickey struct layout should match the struct used by
// parseECDSACert in the x/crypto/ssh/agent package.
w := struct {
@@ -605,20 +606,20 @@ func (key *ecdsaPublicKey) Marshal() []byte {
ID string
Key []byte
}{
- key.Type(),
- key.nistID(),
+ k.Type(),
+ k.nistID(),
keyBytes,
}
return Marshal(&w)
}
-func (key *ecdsaPublicKey) Verify(data []byte, sig *Signature) error {
- if sig.Format != key.Type() {
- return fmt.Errorf("ssh: signature type %s for key type %s", sig.Format, key.Type())
+func (k *ecdsaPublicKey) Verify(data []byte, sig *Signature) error {
+ if sig.Format != k.Type() {
+ return fmt.Errorf("ssh: signature type %s for key type %s", sig.Format, k.Type())
}
- h := ecHash(key.Curve).New()
+ h := ecHash(k.Curve).New()
h.Write(data)
digest := h.Sum(nil)
@@ -635,7 +636,7 @@ func (key *ecdsaPublicKey) Verify(data []byte, sig *Signature) error {
return err
}
- if ecdsa.Verify((*ecdsa.PublicKey)(key), digest, ecSig.R, ecSig.S) {
+ if ecdsa.Verify((*ecdsa.PublicKey)(k), digest, ecSig.R, ecSig.S) {
return nil
}
return errors.New("ssh: signature did not verify")
@@ -758,7 +759,7 @@ func NewPublicKey(key interface{}) (PublicKey, error) {
return (*rsaPublicKey)(key), nil
case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
if !supportedEllipticCurve(key.Curve) {
- return nil, errors.New("ssh: only P-256, P-384 and P-521 EC keys are supported.")
+ return nil, errors.New("ssh: only P-256, P-384 and P-521 EC keys are supported")
}
return (*ecdsaPublicKey)(key), nil
case *dsa.PublicKey:
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/messages.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/messages.go
index e6ecd3a..08d2811 100644
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/messages.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/messages.go
@@ -23,10 +23,6 @@ const (
msgUnimplemented = 3
msgDebug = 4
msgNewKeys = 21
-
- // Standard authentication messages
- msgUserAuthSuccess = 52
- msgUserAuthBanner = 53
)
// SSH messages:
@@ -137,6 +133,18 @@ type userAuthFailureMsg struct {
PartialSuccess bool
}
+// See RFC 4252, section 5.1
+const msgUserAuthSuccess = 52
+
+// See RFC 4252, section 5.4
+const msgUserAuthBanner = 53
+
+type userAuthBannerMsg struct {
+ Message string `sshtype:"53"`
+ // unused, but required to allow message parsing
+ Language string
+}
+
// See RFC 4256, section 3.2
const msgUserAuthInfoRequest = 60
const msgUserAuthInfoResponse = 61
@@ -154,7 +162,7 @@ const msgChannelOpen = 90
type channelOpenMsg struct {
ChanType string `sshtype:"90"`
- PeersId uint32
+ PeersID uint32
PeersWindow uint32
MaxPacketSize uint32
TypeSpecificData []byte `ssh:"rest"`
@@ -165,7 +173,7 @@ const msgChannelData = 94
// Used for debug print outs of packets.
type channelDataMsg struct {
- PeersId uint32 `sshtype:"94"`
+ PeersID uint32 `sshtype:"94"`
Length uint32
Rest []byte `ssh:"rest"`
}
@@ -174,8 +182,8 @@ type channelDataMsg struct {
const msgChannelOpenConfirm = 91
type channelOpenConfirmMsg struct {
- PeersId uint32 `sshtype:"91"`
- MyId uint32
+ PeersID uint32 `sshtype:"91"`
+ MyID uint32
MyWindow uint32
MaxPacketSize uint32
TypeSpecificData []byte `ssh:"rest"`
@@ -185,7 +193,7 @@ type channelOpenConfirmMsg struct {
const msgChannelOpenFailure = 92
type channelOpenFailureMsg struct {
- PeersId uint32 `sshtype:"92"`
+ PeersID uint32 `sshtype:"92"`
Reason RejectionReason
Message string
Language string
@@ -194,7 +202,7 @@ type channelOpenFailureMsg struct {
const msgChannelRequest = 98
type channelRequestMsg struct {
- PeersId uint32 `sshtype:"98"`
+ PeersID uint32 `sshtype:"98"`
Request string
WantReply bool
RequestSpecificData []byte `ssh:"rest"`
@@ -204,28 +212,28 @@ type channelRequestMsg struct {
const msgChannelSuccess = 99
type channelRequestSuccessMsg struct {
- PeersId uint32 `sshtype:"99"`
+ PeersID uint32 `sshtype:"99"`
}
// See RFC 4254, section 5.4.
const msgChannelFailure = 100
type channelRequestFailureMsg struct {
- PeersId uint32 `sshtype:"100"`
+ PeersID uint32 `sshtype:"100"`
}
// See RFC 4254, section 5.3
const msgChannelClose = 97
type channelCloseMsg struct {
- PeersId uint32 `sshtype:"97"`
+ PeersID uint32 `sshtype:"97"`
}
// See RFC 4254, section 5.3
const msgChannelEOF = 96
type channelEOFMsg struct {
- PeersId uint32 `sshtype:"96"`
+ PeersID uint32 `sshtype:"96"`
}
// See RFC 4254, section 4
@@ -255,7 +263,7 @@ type globalRequestFailureMsg struct {
const msgChannelWindowAdjust = 93
type windowAdjustMsg struct {
- PeersId uint32 `sshtype:"93"`
+ PeersID uint32 `sshtype:"93"`
AdditionalBytes uint32
}
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/mux.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/mux.go
index 27a527c..f190162 100644
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/mux.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/mux.go
@@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ func (m *mux) handleChannelOpen(packet []byte) error {
if msg.MaxPacketSize < minPacketLength || msg.MaxPacketSize > 1<<31 {
failMsg := channelOpenFailureMsg{
- PeersId: msg.PeersId,
+ PeersID: msg.PeersID,
Reason: ConnectionFailed,
Message: "invalid request",
Language: "en_US.UTF-8",
@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ func (m *mux) handleChannelOpen(packet []byte) error {
}
c := m.newChannel(msg.ChanType, channelInbound, msg.TypeSpecificData)
- c.remoteId = msg.PeersId
+ c.remoteId = msg.PeersID
c.maxRemotePayload = msg.MaxPacketSize
c.remoteWin.add(msg.PeersWindow)
m.incomingChannels <- c
@@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ func (m *mux) openChannel(chanType string, extra []byte) (*channel, error) {
PeersWindow: ch.myWindow,
MaxPacketSize: ch.maxIncomingPayload,
TypeSpecificData: extra,
- PeersId: ch.localId,
+ PeersID: ch.localId,
}
if err := m.sendMessage(open); err != nil {
return nil, err
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/server.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/server.go
index 8a78b7c..d0f4825 100644
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/server.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/server.go
@@ -95,6 +95,10 @@ type ServerConfig struct {
// Note that RFC 4253 section 4.2 requires that this string start with
// "SSH-2.0-".
ServerVersion string
+
+ // BannerCallback, if present, is called and the return string is sent to
+ // the client after key exchange completed but before authentication.
+ BannerCallback func(conn ConnMetadata) string
}
// AddHostKey adds a private key as a host key. If an existing host
@@ -162,6 +166,9 @@ type ServerConn struct {
// unsuccessful, it closes the connection and returns an error. The
// Request and NewChannel channels must be serviced, or the connection
// will hang.
+//
+// The returned error may be of type *ServerAuthError for
+// authentication errors.
func NewServerConn(c net.Conn, config *ServerConfig) (*ServerConn, <-chan NewChannel, <-chan *Request, error) {
fullConf := *config
fullConf.SetDefaults()
@@ -252,7 +259,7 @@ func (s *connection) serverHandshake(config *ServerConfig) (*Permissions, error)
func isAcceptableAlgo(algo string) bool {
switch algo {
case KeyAlgoRSA, KeyAlgoDSA, KeyAlgoECDSA256, KeyAlgoECDSA384, KeyAlgoECDSA521, KeyAlgoED25519,
- CertAlgoRSAv01, CertAlgoDSAv01, CertAlgoECDSA256v01, CertAlgoECDSA384v01, CertAlgoECDSA521v01:
+ CertAlgoRSAv01, CertAlgoDSAv01, CertAlgoECDSA256v01, CertAlgoECDSA384v01, CertAlgoECDSA521v01, CertAlgoED25519v01:
return true
}
return false
@@ -288,12 +295,13 @@ func checkSourceAddress(addr net.Addr, sourceAddrs string) error {
return fmt.Errorf("ssh: remote address %v is not allowed because of source-address restriction", addr)
}
-// ServerAuthError implements the error interface. It appends any authentication
-// errors that may occur, and is returned if all of the authentication methods
-// provided by the user failed to authenticate.
+// ServerAuthError represents server authentication errors and is
+// sometimes returned by NewServerConn. It appends any authentication
+// errors that may occur, and is returned if all of the authentication
+// methods provided by the user failed to authenticate.
type ServerAuthError struct {
// Errors contains authentication errors returned by the authentication
- // callback methods.
+ // callback methods. The first entry is typically ErrNoAuth.
Errors []error
}
@@ -305,6 +313,13 @@ func (l ServerAuthError) Error() string {
return "[" + strings.Join(errs, ", ") + "]"
}
+// ErrNoAuth is the error value returned if no
+// authentication method has been passed yet. This happens as a normal
+// part of the authentication loop, since the client first tries
+// 'none' authentication to discover available methods.
+// It is returned in ServerAuthError.Errors from NewServerConn.
+var ErrNoAuth = errors.New("ssh: no auth passed yet")
+
func (s *connection) serverAuthenticate(config *ServerConfig) (*Permissions, error) {
sessionID := s.transport.getSessionID()
var cache pubKeyCache
@@ -312,6 +327,7 @@ func (s *connection) serverAuthenticate(config *ServerConfig) (*Permissions, err
authFailures := 0
var authErrs []error
+ var displayedBanner bool
userAuthLoop:
for {
@@ -343,8 +359,22 @@ userAuthLoop:
}
s.user = userAuthReq.User
+
+ if !displayedBanner && config.BannerCallback != nil {
+ displayedBanner = true
+ msg := config.BannerCallback(s)
+ if msg != "" {
+ bannerMsg := &userAuthBannerMsg{
+ Message: msg,
+ }
+ if err := s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(bannerMsg)); err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
perms = nil
- authErr := errors.New("no auth passed yet")
+ authErr := ErrNoAuth
switch userAuthReq.Method {
case "none":
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/session.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/session.go
index cc06e03..d3321f6 100644
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/session.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/session.go
@@ -406,7 +406,7 @@ func (s *Session) Wait() error {
s.stdinPipeWriter.Close()
}
var copyError error
- for _ = range s.copyFuncs {
+ for range s.copyFuncs {
if err := <-s.errors; err != nil && copyError == nil {
copyError = err
}
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/streamlocal.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/streamlocal.go
index a2dccc6..b171b33 100644
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/streamlocal.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/streamlocal.go
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ type streamLocalChannelForwardMsg struct {
// ListenUnix is similar to ListenTCP but uses a Unix domain socket.
func (c *Client) ListenUnix(socketPath string) (net.Listener, error) {
+ c.handleForwardsOnce.Do(c.handleForwards)
m := streamLocalChannelForwardMsg{
socketPath,
}
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/tcpip.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/tcpip.go
index acf1717..80d35f5 100644
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/tcpip.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/tcpip.go
@@ -90,10 +90,19 @@ type channelForwardMsg struct {
rport uint32
}
+// handleForwards starts goroutines handling forwarded connections.
+// It's called on first use by (*Client).ListenTCP to not launch
+// goroutines until needed.
+func (c *Client) handleForwards() {
+ go c.forwards.handleChannels(c.HandleChannelOpen("forwarded-tcpip"))
+ go c.forwards.handleChannels(c.HandleChannelOpen("forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com"))
+}
+
// ListenTCP requests the remote peer open a listening socket
// on laddr. Incoming connections will be available by calling
// Accept on the returned net.Listener.
func (c *Client) ListenTCP(laddr *net.TCPAddr) (net.Listener, error) {
+ c.handleForwardsOnce.Do(c.handleForwards)
if laddr.Port == 0 && isBrokenOpenSSHVersion(string(c.ServerVersion())) {
return c.autoPortListenWorkaround(laddr)
}
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/transport.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/transport.go
index f9780e0..f6fae1d 100644
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/transport.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/transport.go
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ package ssh
import (
"bufio"
+ "bytes"
"errors"
"io"
"log"
@@ -76,17 +77,17 @@ type connectionState struct {
// both directions are triggered by reading and writing a msgNewKey packet
// respectively.
func (t *transport) prepareKeyChange(algs *algorithms, kexResult *kexResult) error {
- if ciph, err := newPacketCipher(t.reader.dir, algs.r, kexResult); err != nil {
+ ciph, err := newPacketCipher(t.reader.dir, algs.r, kexResult)
+ if err != nil {
return err
- } else {
- t.reader.pendingKeyChange <- ciph
}
+ t.reader.pendingKeyChange <- ciph
- if ciph, err := newPacketCipher(t.writer.dir, algs.w, kexResult); err != nil {
+ ciph, err = newPacketCipher(t.writer.dir, algs.w, kexResult)
+ if err != nil {
return err
- } else {
- t.writer.pendingKeyChange <- ciph
}
+ t.writer.pendingKeyChange <- ciph
return nil
}
@@ -139,7 +140,7 @@ func (s *connectionState) readPacket(r *bufio.Reader) ([]byte, error) {
case cipher := <-s.pendingKeyChange:
s.packetCipher = cipher
default:
- return nil, errors.New("ssh: got bogus newkeys message.")
+ return nil, errors.New("ssh: got bogus newkeys message")
}
case msgDisconnect:
@@ -232,52 +233,22 @@ var (
clientKeys = direction{[]byte{'A'}, []byte{'C'}, []byte{'E'}}
)
-// generateKeys generates key material for IV, MAC and encryption.
-func generateKeys(d direction, algs directionAlgorithms, kex *kexResult) (iv, key, macKey []byte) {
+// setupKeys sets the cipher and MAC keys from kex.K, kex.H and sessionId, as
+// described in RFC 4253, section 6.4. direction should either be serverKeys
+// (to setup server->client keys) or clientKeys (for client->server keys).
+func newPacketCipher(d direction, algs directionAlgorithms, kex *kexResult) (packetCipher, error) {
cipherMode := cipherModes[algs.Cipher]
macMode := macModes[algs.MAC]
- iv = make([]byte, cipherMode.ivSize)
- key = make([]byte, cipherMode.keySize)
- macKey = make([]byte, macMode.keySize)
+ iv := make([]byte, cipherMode.ivSize)
+ key := make([]byte, cipherMode.keySize)
+ macKey := make([]byte, macMode.keySize)
generateKeyMaterial(iv, d.ivTag, kex)
generateKeyMaterial(key, d.keyTag, kex)
generateKeyMaterial(macKey, d.macKeyTag, kex)
- return
-}
-
-// setupKeys sets the cipher and MAC keys from kex.K, kex.H and sessionId, as
-// described in RFC 4253, section 6.4. direction should either be serverKeys
-// (to setup server->client keys) or clientKeys (for client->server keys).
-func newPacketCipher(d direction, algs directionAlgorithms, kex *kexResult) (packetCipher, error) {
- iv, key, macKey := generateKeys(d, algs, kex)
-
- if algs.Cipher == gcmCipherID {
- return newGCMCipher(iv, key, macKey)
- }
-
- if algs.Cipher == aes128cbcID {
- return newAESCBCCipher(iv, key, macKey, algs)
- }
-
- if algs.Cipher == tripledescbcID {
- return newTripleDESCBCCipher(iv, key, macKey, algs)
- }
- c := &streamPacketCipher{
- mac: macModes[algs.MAC].new(macKey),
- etm: macModes[algs.MAC].etm,
- }
- c.macResult = make([]byte, c.mac.Size())
-
- var err error
- c.cipher, err = cipherModes[algs.Cipher].createStream(key, iv)
- if err != nil {
- return nil, err
- }
-
- return c, nil
+ return cipherModes[algs.Cipher].create(key, iv, macKey, algs)
}
// generateKeyMaterial fills out with key material generated from tag, K, H
@@ -342,7 +313,7 @@ func readVersion(r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) {
var ok bool
var buf [1]byte
- for len(versionString) < maxVersionStringBytes {
+ for length := 0; length < maxVersionStringBytes; length++ {
_, err := io.ReadFull(r, buf[:])
if err != nil {
return nil, err
@@ -350,6 +321,13 @@ func readVersion(r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) {
// The RFC says that the version should be terminated with \r\n
// but several SSH servers actually only send a \n.
if buf[0] == '\n' {
+ if !bytes.HasPrefix(versionString, []byte("SSH-")) {
+ // RFC 4253 says we need to ignore all version string lines
+ // except the one containing the SSH version (provided that
+ // all the lines do not exceed 255 bytes in total).
+ versionString = versionString[:0]
+ continue
+ }
ok = true
break
}