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authorYAMADA Yasuharu <yasuharu.yamada@access-company.com>2013-04-11 00:17:15 +0200
committerDaniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>2013-04-11 23:52:12 +0200
commit2eb8dcf26cb37f09cffe26909a646e702dbcab66 (patch)
treebb1b22e9302afec2abe6e795533b9860ab691298
parent96ffe645fd2494f14780f7c105fcfeeb8ca7d94f (diff)
cookie: fix tailmatching to prevent cross-domain leakage
Cookies set for 'example.com' could accidentaly also be sent by libcurl to the 'bexample.com' (ie with a prefix to the first domain name). This is a security vulnerabilty, CVE-2013-1944. Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20130412.html
-rw-r--r--lib/cookie.c24
1 files changed, 19 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/lib/cookie.c b/lib/cookie.c
index 4b9ec0bdd..a67204e6e 100644
--- a/lib/cookie.c
+++ b/lib/cookie.c
@@ -118,15 +118,29 @@ static void freecookie(struct Cookie *co)
free(co);
}
-static bool tailmatch(const char *little, const char *bigone)
+static bool tailmatch(const char *cooke_domain, const char *hostname)
{
- size_t littlelen = strlen(little);
- size_t biglen = strlen(bigone);
+ size_t cookie_domain_len = strlen(cooke_domain);
+ size_t hostname_len = strlen(hostname);
- if(littlelen > biglen)
+ if(hostname_len < cookie_domain_len)
return FALSE;
- return Curl_raw_equal(little, bigone+biglen-littlelen) ? TRUE : FALSE;
+ if(!Curl_raw_equal(cooke_domain, hostname+hostname_len-cookie_domain_len))
+ return FALSE;
+
+ /* A lead char of cookie_domain is not '.'.
+ RFC6265 4.1.2.3. The Domain Attribute says:
+ For example, if the value of the Domain attribute is
+ "example.com", the user agent will include the cookie in the Cookie
+ header when making HTTP requests to example.com, www.example.com, and
+ www.corp.example.com.
+ */
+ if(hostname_len == cookie_domain_len)
+ return TRUE;
+ if('.' == *(hostname + hostname_len - cookie_domain_len - 1))
+ return TRUE;
+ return FALSE;
}
/*