diff options
| author | Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se> | 2009-08-01 21:56:59 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se> | 2009-08-01 21:56:59 +0000 |
| commit | c0e8bed5bf7a7e56897e492a4dcc399621939995 (patch) | |
| tree | 5c5262804a2a51a53d69e1b66411a03612e5a929 /ares/bitncmp.c | |
| parent | 0dce2ff8a09065b2be2a3531f498006906c81db5 (diff) | |
- Scott Cantor posted the bug report #2829955
(http://curl.haxx.se/bug/view.cgi?id=2829955) mentioning the recent SSL cert
verification flaw found and exploited by Moxie Marlinspike. The presentation
he did at Black Hat is available here:
https://www.blackhat.com/html/bh-usa-09/bh-usa-09-archives.html#Marlinspike
Apparently at least one CA allowed a subjectAltName or CN that contain a
zero byte, and thus clients that assumed they would never have zero bytes
were exploited to OK a certificate that didn't actually match the site. Like
if the name in the cert was "example.com\0theatualsite.com", libcurl would
happily verify that cert for example.com.
libcurl now better use the length of the extracted name, not assuming it is
zero terminated.
Diffstat (limited to 'ares/bitncmp.c')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions