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authorAlex Rousskov <rousskov@measurement-factory.com>2016-11-16 10:49:15 -0700
committerDaniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>2016-11-24 23:41:44 +0100
commitcb4e2be7c6d42ca0780f8e0a747cecf9ba45f151 (patch)
tree8bfc55a2318327b0ad921d2d5a37d972e3cca373 /lib/x509asn1.c
parent8034d8fc624393326ea9874a4e2d60614ed6c78f (diff)
proxy: Support HTTPS proxy and SOCKS+HTTP(s)
* HTTPS proxies: An HTTPS proxy receives all transactions over an SSL/TLS connection. Once a secure connection with the proxy is established, the user agent uses the proxy as usual, including sending CONNECT requests to instruct the proxy to establish a [usually secure] TCP tunnel with an origin server. HTTPS proxies protect nearly all aspects of user-proxy communications as opposed to HTTP proxies that receive all requests (including CONNECT requests) in vulnerable clear text. With HTTPS proxies, it is possible to have two concurrent _nested_ SSL/TLS sessions: the "outer" one between the user agent and the proxy and the "inner" one between the user agent and the origin server (through the proxy). This change adds supports for such nested sessions as well. A secure connection with a proxy requires its own set of the usual SSL options (their actual descriptions differ and need polishing, see TODO): --proxy-cacert FILE CA certificate to verify peer against --proxy-capath DIR CA directory to verify peer against --proxy-cert CERT[:PASSWD] Client certificate file and password --proxy-cert-type TYPE Certificate file type (DER/PEM/ENG) --proxy-ciphers LIST SSL ciphers to use --proxy-crlfile FILE Get a CRL list in PEM format from the file --proxy-insecure Allow connections to proxies with bad certs --proxy-key KEY Private key file name --proxy-key-type TYPE Private key file type (DER/PEM/ENG) --proxy-pass PASS Pass phrase for the private key --proxy-ssl-allow-beast Allow security flaw to improve interop --proxy-sslv2 Use SSLv2 --proxy-sslv3 Use SSLv3 --proxy-tlsv1 Use TLSv1 --proxy-tlsuser USER TLS username --proxy-tlspassword STRING TLS password --proxy-tlsauthtype STRING TLS authentication type (default SRP) All --proxy-foo options are independent from their --foo counterparts, except --proxy-crlfile which defaults to --crlfile and --proxy-capath which defaults to --capath. Curl now also supports %{proxy_ssl_verify_result} --write-out variable, similar to the existing %{ssl_verify_result} variable. Supported backends: OpenSSL, GnuTLS, and NSS. * A SOCKS proxy + HTTP/HTTPS proxy combination: If both --socks* and --proxy options are given, Curl first connects to the SOCKS proxy and then connects (through SOCKS) to the HTTP or HTTPS proxy. TODO: Update documentation for the new APIs and --proxy-* options. Look for "Added in 7.XXX" marks.
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/x509asn1.c')
-rw-r--r--lib/x509asn1.c21
1 files changed, 13 insertions, 8 deletions
diff --git a/lib/x509asn1.c b/lib/x509asn1.c
index dc8aa81f3..5540406a0 100644
--- a/lib/x509asn1.c
+++ b/lib/x509asn1.c
@@ -1078,6 +1078,11 @@ CURLcode Curl_verifyhost(struct connectdata * conn,
int matched = -1;
size_t addrlen = (size_t) -1;
ssize_t len;
+ const char * const hostname = SSL_IS_PROXY()? conn->http_proxy.host.name:
+ conn->host.name;
+ const char * const dispname = SSL_IS_PROXY()?
+ conn->http_proxy.host.dispname:
+ conn->host.dispname;
#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
struct in6_addr addr;
#else
@@ -1087,7 +1092,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_verifyhost(struct connectdata * conn,
/* Verify that connection server matches info in X509 certificate at
`beg'..`end'. */
- if(!data->set.ssl.verifyhost)
+ if(!SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifyhost))
return CURLE_OK;
if(Curl_parseX509(&cert, beg, end))
@@ -1095,11 +1100,11 @@ CURLcode Curl_verifyhost(struct connectdata * conn,
/* Get the server IP address. */
#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
- if(conn->bits.ipv6_ip && Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET6, conn->host.name, &addr))
+ if(conn->bits.ipv6_ip && Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET6, hostname, &addr))
addrlen = sizeof(struct in6_addr);
else
#endif
- if(Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET, conn->host.name, &addr))
+ if(Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET, hostname, &addr))
addrlen = sizeof(struct in_addr);
/* Process extensions. */
@@ -1122,7 +1127,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_verifyhost(struct connectdata * conn,
len = utf8asn1str(&dnsname, CURL_ASN1_IA5_STRING,
name.beg, name.end);
if(len > 0 && (size_t)len == strlen(dnsname))
- matched = Curl_cert_hostcheck(dnsname, conn->host.name);
+ matched = Curl_cert_hostcheck(dnsname, hostname);
else
matched = 0;
free(dnsname);
@@ -1140,12 +1145,12 @@ CURLcode Curl_verifyhost(struct connectdata * conn,
switch (matched) {
case 1:
/* an alternative name matched the server hostname */
- infof(data, "\t subjectAltName: %s matched\n", conn->host.dispname);
+ infof(data, "\t subjectAltName: %s matched\n", dispname);
return CURLE_OK;
case 0:
/* an alternative name field existed, but didn't match and then
we MUST fail */
- infof(data, "\t subjectAltName does not match %s\n", conn->host.dispname);
+ infof(data, "\t subjectAltName does not match %s\n", dispname);
return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
}
@@ -1177,14 +1182,14 @@ CURLcode Curl_verifyhost(struct connectdata * conn,
}
if(strlen(dnsname) != (size_t) len) /* Nul byte in string ? */
failf(data, "SSL: illegal cert name field");
- else if(Curl_cert_hostcheck((const char *) dnsname, conn->host.name)) {
+ else if(Curl_cert_hostcheck((const char *) dnsname, hostname)) {
infof(data, "\t common name: %s (matched)\n", dnsname);
free(dnsname);
return CURLE_OK;
}
else
failf(data, "SSL: certificate subject name '%s' does not match "
- "target host name '%s'", dnsname, conn->host.dispname);
+ "target host name '%s'", dnsname, dispname);
free(dnsname);
}