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authorJay Satiro <raysatiro@yahoo.com>2016-02-05 01:44:27 -0500
committerJay Satiro <raysatiro@yahoo.com>2016-02-05 01:44:27 -0500
commit4520534e6d5576f0647d03d6c573c5d7d45ccf6e (patch)
tree5871d4b60f9b4fab60b22287a065b5b0deac1815 /tests/unit/unit1604.c
parentd49881cb19971c058eca4a41317b6487bf939e5c (diff)
tool_doswin: Improve sanitization processing
- Add unit test 1604 to test the sanitize_file_name function. - Use -DCURL_STATICLIB when building libcurltool for unit testing. - Better detection of reserved DOS device names. - New flags to modify sanitize behavior: SANITIZE_ALLOW_COLONS: Allow colons SANITIZE_ALLOW_PATH: Allow path separators and colons SANITIZE_ALLOW_RESERVED: Allow reserved device names SANITIZE_ALLOW_TRUNCATE: Allow truncating a long filename - Restore sanitization of banned characters from user-specified outfile. Prior to this commit sanitization of a user-specified outfile was temporarily disabled in 2b6dadc because there was no way to allow path separators and colons through while replacing other banned characters. Now in such a case we call the sanitize function with SANITIZE_ALLOW_PATH which allows path separators and colons to pass through. Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/624 Reported-by: Octavio Schroeder
Diffstat (limited to 'tests/unit/unit1604.c')
-rw-r--r--tests/unit/unit1604.c327
1 files changed, 327 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tests/unit/unit1604.c b/tests/unit/unit1604.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..218c627fd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/unit/unit1604.c
@@ -0,0 +1,327 @@
+/***************************************************************************
+ * _ _ ____ _
+ * Project ___| | | | _ \| |
+ * / __| | | | |_) | |
+ * | (__| |_| | _ <| |___
+ * \___|\___/|_| \_\_____|
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2016, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al.
+ *
+ * This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which
+ * you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms
+ * are also available at http://curl.haxx.se/docs/copyright.html.
+ *
+ * You may opt to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute and/or sell
+ * copies of the Software, and permit persons to whom the Software is
+ * furnished to do so, under the terms of the COPYING file.
+ *
+ * This software is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY
+ * KIND, either express or implied.
+ *
+ ***************************************************************************/
+#include "curlcheck.h"
+
+#include "tool_cfgable.h"
+#include "tool_doswin.h"
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "memdebug.h" /* LAST include file */
+
+static CURLcode unit_setup(void)
+{
+ return SANITIZE_ERR_OK;
+}
+
+static void unit_stop(void)
+{
+
+}
+
+#if defined(MSDOS) || defined(WIN32)
+
+static char *getflagstr(int flags) {
+ char *buf = malloc(256);
+ fail_unless(buf, "out of memory");
+ sprintf(buf, "%s,%s,%s,%s",
+ ((flags & SANITIZE_ALLOW_COLONS) ? "SANITIZE_ALLOW_COLONS" : ""),
+ ((flags & SANITIZE_ALLOW_PATH) ? "SANITIZE_ALLOW_PATH" : ""),
+ ((flags & SANITIZE_ALLOW_RESERVED) ? "SANITIZE_ALLOW_RESERVED" : ""),
+ ((flags & SANITIZE_ALLOW_TRUNCATE) ? "SANITIZE_ALLOW_TRUNCATE" : ""));
+ return buf;
+}
+
+static char *getcurlcodestr(int cc) {
+ char *buf = malloc(256);
+ fail_unless(buf, "out of memory");
+ sprintf(buf, "%s (%d)",
+ (cc == SANITIZE_ERR_OK ? "SANITIZE_ERR_OK" :
+ cc == SANITIZE_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT ? "SANITIZE_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT" :
+ cc == SANITIZE_ERR_INVALID_PATH ? "SANITIZE_ERR_INVALID_PATH" :
+ cc == SANITIZE_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY ? "SANITIZE_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY" :
+ "unexpected error code - add name"),
+ cc);
+ return buf;
+}
+
+struct data {
+ const char *input;
+ int flags;
+ const char *expected_output;
+ CURLcode expected_result;
+};
+
+UNITTEST_START
+
+{ /* START sanitize_file_name */
+ struct data data[] = {
+ { "", 0,
+ "", SANITIZE_ERR_OK
+ },
+ { "normal filename", 0,
+ "normal filename", SANITIZE_ERR_OK
+ },
+ { "control\tchar", 0,
+ "control_char", SANITIZE_ERR_OK
+ },
+ { "banned*char", 0,
+ "banned_char", SANITIZE_ERR_OK
+ },
+ { "f:foo", 0,
+ "f_foo", SANITIZE_ERR_OK
+ },
+ { "f:foo", SANITIZE_ALLOW_COLONS,
+ "f:foo", SANITIZE_ERR_OK
+ },
+ { "f:foo", SANITIZE_ALLOW_PATH,
+ "f:foo", SANITIZE_ERR_OK
+ },
+ { "f:\\foo", 0,
+ "f__foo", SANITIZE_ERR_OK
+ },
+ { "f:\\foo", SANITIZE_ALLOW_PATH,
+ "f:\\foo", SANITIZE_ERR_OK
+ },
+ { "f:/foo", 0,
+ "f__foo", SANITIZE_ERR_OK
+ },
+ { "f:/foo", SANITIZE_ALLOW_PATH,
+ "f:/foo", SANITIZE_ERR_OK
+ },
+ { "foo:bar", 0,
+ "foo_bar", SANITIZE_ERR_OK
+ },
+ { "foo|<>/bar\\\":?*baz", 0,
+ "foo____bar_____baz", SANITIZE_ERR_OK
+ },
+ { "f:foo::$DATA", 0,
+ "f_foo__$DATA", SANITIZE_ERR_OK
+ },
+ { "con . air", 0,
+ "con _ air", SANITIZE_ERR_OK
+ },
+ { "con.air", 0,
+ "con_air", SANITIZE_ERR_OK
+ },
+ { "con:/x", 0,
+ "con__x", SANITIZE_ERR_OK
+ },
+ { "file . . . . .. .", 0,
+ "file", SANITIZE_ERR_OK
+ },
+ { "foo . . ? . . ", 0,
+ "foo . . _", SANITIZE_ERR_OK
+ },
+ { "com1", 0,
+ "_com1", SANITIZE_ERR_OK
+ },
+ { "com1", SANITIZE_ALLOW_RESERVED,
+ "com1", SANITIZE_ERR_OK
+ },
+ { "f:\\com1", 0,
+ "f__com1", SANITIZE_ERR_OK
+ },
+ { "f:\\com1", SANITIZE_ALLOW_PATH,
+ "f:\\_com1", SANITIZE_ERR_OK
+ },
+ { "f:\\com1", SANITIZE_ALLOW_RESERVED,
+ "f__com1", SANITIZE_ERR_OK
+ },
+ { "f:\\com1", SANITIZE_ALLOW_RESERVED | SANITIZE_ALLOW_COLONS,
+ "f:_com1", SANITIZE_ERR_OK
+ },
+ { "f:\\com1", SANITIZE_ALLOW_RESERVED | SANITIZE_ALLOW_PATH,
+ "f:\\com1", SANITIZE_ERR_OK
+ },
+ { "com1:\\com1", SANITIZE_ALLOW_PATH,
+ "_com1:\\_com1", SANITIZE_ERR_OK
+ },
+ { "com1:\\com1", SANITIZE_ALLOW_RESERVED | SANITIZE_ALLOW_PATH,
+ "com1:\\com1", SANITIZE_ERR_OK
+ },
+ { "com1:\\com1", SANITIZE_ALLOW_RESERVED,
+ "com1__com1", SANITIZE_ERR_OK
+ },
+ { "CoM1", 0,
+ "_CoM1", SANITIZE_ERR_OK
+ },
+ { "CoM1", SANITIZE_ALLOW_RESERVED,
+ "CoM1", SANITIZE_ERR_OK
+ },
+ { "COM56", 0,
+ "COM56", SANITIZE_ERR_OK
+ },
+ /* At the moment we expect a maximum path length of 259. I assume MSDOS
+ has variable max path lengths depending on compiler that are shorter
+ so currently these "good" truncate tests won't run on MSDOS */
+#ifndef MSDOS
+ { "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"
+ "BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB"
+ "CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC"
+ "DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD"
+ "EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE"
+ "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF",
+ SANITIZE_ALLOW_TRUNCATE,
+ "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"
+ "BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB"
+ "CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC"
+ "DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD"
+ "EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE"
+ "FFFFF", SANITIZE_ERR_OK
+ },
+ { "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"
+ "BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB"
+ "CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC"
+ "DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD"
+ "EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE"
+ "FFF\\FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF",
+ SANITIZE_ALLOW_TRUNCATE | SANITIZE_ALLOW_PATH,
+ "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"
+ "BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB"
+ "CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC"
+ "DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD"
+ "EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE"
+ "FFF\\FFFFF", SANITIZE_ERR_OK
+ },
+ { "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"
+ "BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB"
+ "CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC"
+ "DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD"
+ "EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE"
+ "FFF\\FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF",
+ SANITIZE_ALLOW_TRUNCATE,
+ "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"
+ "BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB"
+ "CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC"
+ "DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD"
+ "EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE"
+ "FFF_F", SANITIZE_ERR_OK
+ },
+#endif /* !MSDOS */
+ { "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"
+ "BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB"
+ "CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC"
+ "DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD"
+ "EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE"
+ "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF",
+ 0,
+ NULL, SANITIZE_ERR_INVALID_PATH
+ },
+ { "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"
+ "BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB"
+ "CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC"
+ "DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD"
+ "EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE"
+ "FFFF\\FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF",
+ SANITIZE_ALLOW_TRUNCATE,
+ NULL, SANITIZE_ERR_INVALID_PATH
+ },
+ { "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"
+ "BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB"
+ "CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC"
+ "DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD"
+ "EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE"
+ "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF\\FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF",
+ SANITIZE_ALLOW_TRUNCATE | SANITIZE_ALLOW_PATH,
+ NULL, SANITIZE_ERR_INVALID_PATH
+ },
+ { "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"
+ "BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB"
+ "CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC"
+ "DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD"
+ "EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE"
+ "FFF\\FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF:FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF",
+ SANITIZE_ALLOW_TRUNCATE | SANITIZE_ALLOW_PATH,
+ NULL, SANITIZE_ERR_INVALID_PATH
+ },
+ { "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"
+ "BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB"
+ "CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC"
+ "DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD"
+ "EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE"
+ "FF\\F:FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF",
+ SANITIZE_ALLOW_TRUNCATE | SANITIZE_ALLOW_PATH,
+ NULL, SANITIZE_ERR_INVALID_PATH
+ },
+ { NULL, 0,
+ NULL, SANITIZE_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT
+ },
+ };
+
+ size_t i;
+
+ for(i = 0; i < sizeof data / sizeof data[0]; ++i) {
+ char *output = NULL;
+ char *flagstr = NULL;
+ char *received_ccstr = NULL;
+ char *expected_ccstr = NULL;
+
+ CURLcode res = sanitize_file_name(&output, data[i].input, data[i].flags);
+
+ if(res == data[i].expected_result &&
+ ((!output && !data[i].expected_output) ||
+ (output && data[i].expected_output &&
+ !strcmp(output, data[i].expected_output)))) { /* OK */
+ free(output);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ flagstr = getflagstr(data[i].flags);
+ received_ccstr = getcurlcodestr(res);
+ expected_ccstr = getcurlcodestr(data[i].expected_result);
+
+ unitfail++;
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n"
+ "%s:%d sanitize_file_name failed.\n"
+ "input: %s\n"
+ "flags: %s\n"
+ "output: %s\n"
+ "result: %s\n"
+ "expected output: %s\n"
+ "expected result: %s\n",
+ __FILE__, __LINE__,
+ data[i].input,
+ flagstr,
+ (output ? output : "(null)"),
+ received_ccstr,
+ (data[i].expected_output ? data[i].expected_output : "(null)"),
+ expected_ccstr);
+
+ free(output);
+ free(flagstr);
+ free(received_ccstr);
+ free(expected_ccstr);
+ }
+} /* END sanitize_file_name */
+
+#else
+UNITTEST_START
+
+{
+ fprintf(stderr, "Skipped test not for this platform\n");
+}
+#endif /* MSDOS || WIN32 */
+
+UNITTEST_STOP